Interesting thoughts on the vagaries of deflation. Curious @CathieDWood what your research team learned when you had them study market cap to GDP, famously now the Buffett Indicator? Perhaps by now you have discussed and published your findings? I haven’t seen anything. 1/
Recall you had written on April 11 that you believed the measure was 2 to 3 times today’s level in the late 1800s and early 1900s. I’d replied but you probably missed it. At today’s level of 200% your premise suggests the stock market was 4 to 6 times the size of GDP. 2/
Of course the peak then was 90% in 1929, followed by an 89% stock market decline and 45% plunge in GDP. Earlier, despite the industrial revolution, the economy was very agrarian & very private (not publicly traded). The market largely consisted of utilities, railroads & banks. 3/
Good data exists which demonstrates the measure would have averaged no more than 50% during the late 1800s and early 1900s, not the 400% to 600% you suggested. Bob Uecker’s great baseball and Miller Lite line comes to mind. 4/
If your premise that “good deflation” resulting from innovation and disruption in the earlier period justified the higher prices in the earlier period turned out to be factually incorrect and not high at all, which was the case, would you rethink your approach to valuation? 5/
Would not deflation that arises as a result of a debt bubble, particularly in government and corporate debt, not come with little growth or even economic collapse? Overlay high stock prices, margin debt and speculation in new era technologies and 1929 looks a lot like 2021. 6/
It would be hard, at least by those oriented toward conventional valuation and risk management, to make the case that the dangerous valuations now assigned to so many disruptive innovators would not collapse under a slow-growing or even shrinking economy. 7/
The market has never touched 200% of GDP until now. In fact it’s never remotely approached it. By many yardsticks, valuations have never been higher and speculation on “disruptive” businesses and unknowable outcomes is rampant. 8/
No need to beat a dead horse here, but if you recognize erring on market cap/GDP by a factor of 10x, would this bear on your argument for materially higher prices and stocks being undervalued? History shows paying very high multiples to sales is a dangerous, often losing game. 9/
Inadequate prospective returns often result. Further, if you are wrong on the high side regarding the stock market relationship to GDP by a factor of 10, could you also be wrong by a factor of 10 in, say, your model and target price valuation for companies like $TSLA? 10/
In any event, having spent a lot of time on my end working toward an understanding of market cap to GDP and nuances such as the proportion of both business conducted by public companies and that done globally, I’d love to see the results of your work.

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More from @ChrisBloomstran

14 May
Just realized Berkshire at $437,000 is precisely a 10-bagger from my initial $43,700 purchase in February 2000. With no dividends that’s 11.5% per year. For those that believe Berkshire & Mr.Buffett are “underperforming,” the S&P 500 total return over the same period is 6.7%. 1/
A critic can choose any arbitrary endpoints to bracket a return series. The outlay of cash is not arbitrary and sets the initial bracket. Little media mention of $BRKA up 25% YTD, more than double the index. It’s easy to find short intervals where x lags y and vice versa. 2/
Of course, the change in book value per share and harder to measure intrinsic value per share are better proxies for value accretion and the elements under control of management. By those measures Berkshire has likewise crushed the market over the same period. 3/
Read 5 tweets
1 May
A few quick observations from the $BRKA 10-Q.
The cash balance rose from $138.3B at yearend to $141.6B at 3/31. The media reports cash at $145.4B neglecting a $4.1B payable for T-Bill purchases that appears on the right side of the balance sheet. There was no payable at 12/31. 1/
Berkshire purchased $2.6B in common stocks and sold $6.5B for a net sale of $3.9B. The stock portfolio gained about 2% for the quarter and is up nearly 9% ytd. $GM was the best performing stock, up 37% to 3/31. I'd guess it was sold or materially trimmed. 2/
$BYD had grown to a top 7 portfolio holding from a cost of $232 million to $5.9B at yearend and $7.9B on 1/25. BYD is now down 21.5% for the year. I'd guess (and hope) the position was trimmed during the quarter. 3/
Read 11 tweets
28 Apr
In the absence of FASB directive, not sure which planet (guess) the AICPA was on when defaulting to treating #Bitcoin and crypto as indefinite-lived intangible assets. Cash? Clearly not. Not legal tender. Just bizarre to book realized gains as an offset to OPERATING expense. 1/
Declines below cost will be tested for "impairment" and when written down will no doubt be explained away as "one time." The room for abuse here is ripe. Why not treat crypto as a trading security, compelling marking realized and unrealized gains and losses through BOTH 2/
the income statement & the balance sheet? Take note of the way Berkshire Hathaway accounts for realized and unrealized gains and losses and makes clear they DO NOT consider them as operating. Lonely crowd. To the extent crypto rises in price, we now have the classic cookie jar.3/
Read 5 tweets
11 Apr
Cathie @CathieDWood, Not a chance was US stock market cap/GDP greater in the late 1800s and early 1900s than it is today. It was a FRACTION of today's level. It measured 90% at the stock market PEAK in 1929 and closed 2020 at a record 183%. Close to 200% now. Far less business 1/
was done by public companies then v today. Absolute levels of global trade were on the order of 20% of today's levels. 1929's market cap was $93B on GDP of $103.7 billion. Of course the stock market then fell by 89%, despite all of the revolutionary technologies you mentioned. 2/
Families spent half of their income on food at the end of the 19th century. You are absolutely correct that electricity, the telephone and automobiles allowed transformative growth in income & output. However, your conclusion that "genomic sequencing, robotics, energy storage, 3/
Read 8 tweets
27 Mar
Brett @wintonARK, Your taking the time to reply is again appreciated. I was going to let @ARKInvest's 2025 $TSLA $3,000 price target and your replies go but in thinking over the past several days a few of your answers just don’t resonate. Comments and a proposition follow...1/
While most of your replies lacked easily quantifiable or direct answers to my questions, your offhand response about Tesla’s expected 2025 share count suggests extremes of either promotional intent or lack of understanding. Perhaps it's neither and I'm missing something. 2/
The ARK model completely ignores coming dilution from the exercise of 165m option & RSU shares already issued (excluding any subsequent grants). This is a BIG deal. I guarantee you @elonmusk gets it. Seeing an even 1B shares outstanding in ARK's 2025 projection was baffling. 3/
Read 40 tweets
22 Mar
@wintonARK Brett, Your additional thoughts on $TSLA’s insurance business are appreciated. That said, I respectfully don’t see where your comments clarify or dispel the points I made in response to the 2025 ARK model and price target for Tesla and its “insurance operation.” 1/
Please allow me to ask a few direct questions for clarification.

1. You confirm Tesla is not yet underwriting insurance & won’t be until 2023. Can you walk through your assumptions that get to your “bear case” $23B insurance revenues at a 40% EBIT margin, $9.2B by 2025? 2/
2. You project Tesla will underwrite at a 70% loss ratio. That’s actually not a better ratio than the US private passenger auto loss ratio over time. In fact, for the three years prior to 2020 the industry loss ratio was under 70%. 3/
Read 29 tweets

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