Thread by @TrentTelenko

@EugenPinak @CBI_PTO_History Eugen,

Just because you have a piece of kit doesn't mean you have the TTP to use it properly.

The Japanese Operations 100, 101 & 102 strategic bombing campaign in the summers of 1939-40-41 against Chongqing/Chungking were where the IJNAS got fighter escort signals techniques.

@EugenPinak @CBI_PTO_History Sussing out what the IJNAS was doing signals wise requires an operational template to understand equipment limitations at the time.

This is a good one:

Colgate calling: offensive strategic fighter control, ETO, 1943-45.
cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collec…

@EugenPinak @CBI_PTO_History This wikipedia page actually has some of the best operational template data on those raids to compare with the Colgate template.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_o…

@EugenPinak @CBI_PTO_History IJAAS C5M reconnaissance planes were doing the same sort of aerial radio relay tactics in 1940 for their bombers that VIIIth Ftr Cmd fighter escorts were in 1944 and USN Ftrs were at Okinawa in 1945 ftr sweeps.

The Japanese use HF as opposed to VHF, but conceptually, the same.

@EugenPinak @CBI_PTO_History The role of the radio direction finding kit stands out in Operation O-Go when G4M pathfinders flew from Hankow to Ichang - at night - married up with A6M Zeros, and then took them to Chongqing by morning of 11 Aug 1941. Then they took the Zeros home...

pacificeagles.net/operation-102-…

@EugenPinak @CBI_PTO_History ...and then returned to Hankow.

This wasn't a case of moonlight and dead reckoning. The IJN had a network of radio beacons through out the South China Sea for their land based planes to work with.

@EugenPinak @CBI_PTO_History In September 1944 General Akin's Central Bureau passed on their catalog of such beacons to Section 22 to keep the latter from confusing them with radars.

@EugenPinak @CBI_PTO_History @threadreaderapp unroll