Thread by @TrentTelenko

@EugenPinak @CBI_PTO_History That is far too simple an explanation because it lacks the multiple intelligence intuitions -stupid- involved.

@EugenPinak @CBI_PTO_History How the USA did long range air navigation in WW2 was fundamentally different from the rest of the globe (See link). The Japanese Navy used UK Royal Navy/Continental European style interwar radio-navigation.

THE ARMY AIRWAYS COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE
ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/V…

@EugenPinak @CBI_PTO_History From what little bits I've put together, the IJNAS radio navigation in the SCS somewhat like the German one in continental Europe described here:

The British Meacon System
weaponsandwarfare.com/2016/02/06/the…

@EugenPinak @CBI_PTO_History From the article:

"These low power beacons are spread around German Occupied territory and transmit a continuous, omni directional carrier with a Morse identification on an allotted frequency. The position of these beacons (acting somewhat like invisible lighthouses) are marked

@EugenPinak @CBI_PTO_History ... on German charts, and by using normal direction finding equipment, and two beacons, aircrew could “fix” their position."

and

"The other Luftwaffe aid to navigation was a network of radio beacons, each with an indentifiable signal. Cross-bearings on two or more would give

@EugenPinak @CBI_PTO_History ...the bomber its precise location."

The US Military decided to let the UK handle what we would call electronic intelligence (ELINT) in Europe during WW2 because duplicating UK capability there was a waste.

On the surface it was a good decision. The problem for the Pacific

@EugenPinak @CBI_PTO_History ...War was neither US Navy Office of Naval Intelligence, US War Department M.I.D. G-2 nor USAAF A-2 developed an ELINT/Jamming capability for that sort of radio-navigation system.

MacArthur's Central Bureau had Australians who were familiar with the German radio navigation

@EugenPinak @CBI_PTO_History system.

They both recognized the system of IJNAS radio beacons for what they were and cataloged those beacons for electronic order of battle reasons.

Gen. Akin, MacArthur's chief signal officer, had tasked Central Bureau to be the "Electronic Deconfliction Agency" for SWPA

@EugenPinak @CBI_PTO_History ...and you had to track every transmission of both sides to do that.

Akin never got around to tasking either Central Bureau or Section 22 to meaconing IJNAS radio beacons because by the time it was needed. It was October 1944.

@EugenPinak @CBI_PTO_History What all that meant was the USN had no real idea how the Japanese aerial night raiders were navigating to Guadalcanal, Saipan, Iwo Jima, or Okinawa.

@EugenPinak @CBI_PTO_History The inability of the US Navy to monitor & jam IJNAS radio beacons by meaconing cost the 5th Fleet dearly when the Kamikazes cam calling during Operation Iceberg.

This was yet another WW2 US Intelligence failure buried in the post-war stage managing of the Pearl Harbor hearings.

@EugenPinak @CBI_PTO_History This sort of technological illiteracy and institutional hubris happened a lot in WW2.

We know a lot about the Axis mistakes in that regard as well as the British mistakes regards German radar plus American mistakes with the A6M Zero, Yamato class and Long Lance torpedo.

@EugenPinak @CBI_PTO_History Almost every American electronic warfare success & mistake in the Pacific Theater that made the Brass Hats in Washington DC look stupid went into the "round file" because of the War/Navy Department merger budget wars.

@EugenPinak @CBI_PTO_History FYI, this is another good meaconing on-line article.

bbc.co.uk/history/ww2peo…

@EugenPinak @CBI_PTO_History @threadreaderapp unroll