Today we @ecb issued our new digital publication and interactive tool on inflation. It is one of our attempts to better explain the concept & measurement of inflation, its heterogeneity across goods and countries as well as the difference between perceived & actual inflation. 1/8
Chapter 1 explains the concept of inflation and why it matters. You can look at the inflation rate in a particular country for a particular category of goods and services, which gives an impression of the heterogeneity across countries and goods. 2/8
It also show the evolution over time for different countries, distinguishing the overall price index and certain subcategories, which show very different degrees of volatility: food, energy, non-energy industrial goods and services. 3/8
Chapter 2 is on inflation measurement. It explains how the basket of goods underlying the inflation index is compiled and shows the weights of different consumption categories. It also mentions the open issue of how to consider the costs of houses owned by consumers. 4/8
Chapter 3 deals with the distinction between measured inflation, personal actual inflation and personal perceived inflation. It explains the differences and shows how inflation perceptions differ across demographic groups: household income, education, gender and age. 5/8
It also shows that inflation perceptions tend to be substantially higher than measured inflation, that the gap has diminished somewhat over time and that the variation across households is very large. 6/8
Chapter 4 finally contains a personal inflation calculator, developed by @Lietuvosbankas, which allows euro area citizens to calculate their personal inflation rate and compare it with their own perception and with the measured rate for their country. Try it out! 7/8
In an interview with @derspiegel, conducted by @Bartz70Tim & @KaiserSte, I talk about recent inflation developments, monetary and fiscal policy in the pandemic, the @ecb’s role in combating climate change and financial stability. Below you find some key messages. 1/14
As we are still far from reaching our inflation aim of below, but close to, 2%, a sustainable rise of inflation in the direction of 2% would be good news. That would mean that the economy is gaining momentum and aggregate demand is increasing. 2/14
However, inflation is currently rising on the back of many one-off effects, like base effects in oil prices and the VAT rise in Germany. Our projections show that the rate of inflation will ease again in 2022, because aggregate demand will presumably remain weak. 3/14
On Mondays at 15:45 CET, we publish the Eurosystem’s PEPP holdings (at amortised cost), as of the previous Friday, on our website: 2/11
By taking the difference to the previous week, one obtains the *net* purchases for the previous trading week. This is the difference between gross purchases *settled* in that week (i.e. traded two trading days earlier, so from THU to WED) and redemptions (from MON to FRI). 3/11
Large-scale government & central bank interventions in the COVID-19 crisis have revived the debate on the alleged "zombification" of the economy if unviable firms are kept alive. In our recent VoxEU column with @laeven_luc & @gschepen, we survey the existing literature. 1/14
Why would banks lend to "zombie firms"? On the dark side, low-capitalised banks may engage in the "evergreening" of loans to avoid loss recognition. On the bright side, banks may lend to preserve valuable relationships, which can also avoid disruptions of supply chains. 2/14
A "zombification" of the economy can lead to a drop in productivity through credit misallocation: either mechanically by reducing aggregate productivity, or through a crowding-out effect when "zombie lending" tightens the credit constraints of high-productivity firms. 3/14
On Friday, I gave a speech at Deutscher @juristentag about the distributional effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the danger of “unequal scars”. My goal was to add a European dimension to the debate. Here is my usual Twitter summary, including some of the charts. 1/11
The pandemic is a global shock that hit all euro area countries almost simultaneously. But it has become increasingly clear that the pandemic has very different impacts on different countries, as can be seen from the @EU_Commission’s forecast of economic growth. 2/11
There is a negative correlation between the projected fall in GDP for 2020 and (a) the extent of government-imposed restrictions, measured by the Oxford Stringency Index, and (b) the dependency on tourism. 3/11
Today I gave a speech on the @ecb’s negative interest rate policy (NIRP) at the @EEANews Annual Congress in a panel with @helene_rey, Tobias #Adrian & Rafael #Repullo. In the speech, I could draw on fantastic ECB research, featuring @AngelaMaddaloni , @fheider & many others. 1/6
The NIRP helped to shift the perceived lower bound on interest rates into negative territory, supported by forward guidance that left the door open for further rate cuts. The zero lower bound was transformed into an effective lower bound below zero. 2/6
NIRP contributed to shifting € area sovereign yields down across the maturity spectrum. Due to a “hot potato effect”, NIRP compresses the term premium, reinforces the effects of asset purchases & supports bank lending. All these effects have improved monetary transmission. 3/6
Main message: Without the #PEPP and our other measures, we would now presumably be in the midst of a severe financial crisis. The measures taken by the ECB are (1) necessary, (2) suitable and (3) proportionate to ensure price stability in the euro area. 2/11
Important clarification: This speech is not about #PSPP, subject to a court case @BVerfG. It is about the measures taken in response to the pandemic, designed specifically for the pandemic & containing own safeguards to protect fundamental principles of the currency union. 3/11