I think a proper stance on #Protasevich should accept the following: 1) Whataboutism is wrong. 2) He must be released, even though he is a propagandist, his Telegram Nexta provoked hate and violence, and he apparently spent some time with the far-right Ukrainian regiment Azov.
3) Ban on flights and sanctions beyond personal hurt primarily Belarusian (and Ukrainian) people, not Lukashenka.
On Nexta hate-mongering Protasevich's own words (from 37:54)
Btw, I have no urge to dump all the dirt on Protasevich that is available. As I emphasized, his far-right views and connections do not really change anything in the assessment of his arrest.
It matters, of course, for a discussion of Western coverage biases and if one wants to solidarize and support Protasevich beyond human rights concerns. But meeting, as usual, such strong denialism, the bot-attacks questioning yours and your colleagues' integrity...
...you inevitably start collecting and publishing these facts. I don't understand why so many people find it so difficult to say: yes, Protasevich must be released and, yes, he has a nasty background and toxic politics.
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Although it's really difficult to feel personal sympathies to #Protasevich, not only because he served in Azov but also for the provocative role his Telegram Nexta played in Belarusian protests, I don't think his far-right links have any significance in this case.
Really fun to see a wave of similar comments questioning the confirmation of Protasevich's link to Azov by one of the oldest reputable Ukrainian newspapers. zn.ua/international/…
The Times:
"In 2014 Protasevich is reported to have travelled to eastern Ukraine, where he joined the Azov Battalion, a far-right group that fought Russian-backed separatists." thetimes.co.uk/article/hijack…
Some thoughts on the resumed talk that if #Ukraine implements the Minsk accords fully including the political provisions, it may throw the country into a civil war. /Thread
There are some very tentative hopes that Germany and France may start pushing a little bit harder within that "cluster" approach to the Minsk accords to make Ukraine finally implement at least some of the political provisions that they all signed in 2015. /1
This happens after six years of ignoring Ukraine's practical sabotage of the Minsk accords and only after Russia's recent "saber-rattling". I am not even sure that there is anything more than rumors and wishful thinking behind those hopes. /2