1) Let's talk about how the business models of Chinese edtech unicorns Zuoyebang (作业帮), Yuanfudao (猿辅导) and VIPKids were such a success and completed billions in fundraise and hired thousands in 2020 alone.

And also how the methods of their success came back to bite them. Image
2) There's a whiff of old wine in new bottles with these tech platforms, the B2C business model boils down to paid packages for K12 online lessons with brand name teachers. Covid accelerated homeschooling for these to become a hot 2020 fengkou.
3) The offering (numbers from GSX) there's a trial package for 49 RMB which includes a lecture with a teacher typically from a brand name school and scores of teaching accolades. Followed by 1-to-1 tutoring to go over specific points with the student.
4) 30% of trial students typically convert to paying members, and with a CAC cost of 500 RMB the unit economics breaks even (factoring labour costs) at a package lesson deal of ~2000 RMB. The tech platforms then cross-sell on additional question banks and mental arithmetic apps.
5) This is an operationally intensive business model which scales with the hiring of additional tutors for student supervision. There's also challenges about how to sell non-standardised service that has to be experienced to be appreciated.
6) Why this took off - education is a slow industry - results take a while to show and if you get young students, that's many years of LTV. Starting conditions of Chinese culture (more in this piece) and of course, COVID - the great accelerator.

lillianli.substack.com/p/what-i-talk-…
7) As the competition got more fierce, everyone was focusing on user acquisition(though I wonder how the CAC could afford to get higher from 500 RMB) and the selling methods were questionable, to say the least.
8) There was periods in January 2021 where I could not escape the ads - CCTV, bus stops, elevator posters, and mobile apps. In the ultimate power move, they were all over the spring gala programs. We know where the billions of funds were going.
9) The ads were targeting the parents of kids around 7-8. The entire industry specialised in selling 'educational anxiety' - one infamous slogan was 'Either we'll train your child or your child's competitor'. Anxiety spending of middle-class parents has never been so lucrative.
10) Yuanfudao, Zuoyebang and ByteDance’s education unit had the same actress posing as a teacher on their platforms, saying “It could be parents themselves who ruin their kids" if users didn't buy a livestreamed course.
11) For families that could afford them, the kids would stream these lessons after school and on the weekends (after the hours of official homework they would get - I had 4-5 hours worth of homework from school at age 8 decades ago without any afterschool work)
12) For families that couldn't afford them, this was set to be another barrier for social mobility when their children couldn't test well enough to get into the good middle or high schools.
It's a tax on the well-off and a tax on the poor in different ways.
13) The edtech platforms got big by selling middle-class anxieties using some dubious claims - Zuoyebang claimed it has cooperation with the United Nations, and falsified teacher's teaching experience, Yuanfudao claimed it offered one-on-one tutoring by headteachers
14) The regulations to limit the reach of the edtech companies weren't surprising in the end. For this generation of Chinese parents and kids, education is a necessary consumption but often not a very enjoyable one. And it was already a race to the bottom for a while.

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More from @lillianmli

10 Jun
1) I spoke with the China-focused portfolio manager of a $90bn AUM fund.

Mike Tian of WCM thinks Chinese tech who focuses on asset and operationally heavy businesses are more attractive investments then than asset-light businesses.

Counterintuitive, but here's why:
2) The conventional thinking is for internet companies to be 'Light': asset-light, people light, outsource all the ‘grunt work’ to the ecosystem, focus on ‘platform’, earn high margins and high returns on capital.

Mike thinks this might be a mistake
3) With heavier operational and asset business, while the initial outlay is higher, there’s also a chance of cultivating a wider moat. Especially true in China as big internet businesses are cross-vertical ecosystems, and barriers of entry for light businesses are very low.
Read 17 tweets
13 May
1) Let's talk about the history of JD.com and its complicated founder Richard Liu - a man who grew up in poverty and arrived in Beijing with 76 eggs.
Today JD.com is worth $110bn and has 3 successful spinouts to its name.
2) Growing up in a small village Jiangsu, Liu had no stable electricity or running water. Meat was a treat served on special occasions, and his grandmother would bribe the butchers with peanuts for a fattier cut each year.
3) In middle school, he took his entire savings of 50 RMB and went to Nanjing by way of Xuzhou. In Nanjing he saw the Jinling Mansion Hotel, a 37-story building, the tallest he had ever seen.
He realised there was an entire world outside of Suqian and he wanted to see it.
Read 20 tweets
10 May
1) Let's talk about a growth hack that Chinese apps use to get those eye-watering DAU and user numbers.

It's 地推 aka field sales but not as we know it. An entire ecosystem springs up to take advantage of sign-up subsidies to hook some bargain hunting users.
2) While chillin' with @passluo today in Chengdu, we were approached by university students who asked us whether we had Kuaishou Express app. If we downloaded the app, the students earn 8 RMB / $1.25.

We Pass'ed...hoho

Pass proceeded to school me on how app sign-ups are done
3) Turns out consumer apps will have 'co-operation partners agreement' with 3P companies when they are pushing out new apps. For every new user that signs up, these companies get a fee ranging from 50 RMB - 10 RMB / $7 - $1.5(depending on the app and region)
Read 10 tweets
8 May
1) Let's talk about Bytedance's product offerings and what that means for their future.

I went down a rabbit hole and this is what I've got on them after a few hours of googling. ~50 active apps and offerings. Image
2) A few things stand out, Bytedance lives up to their nickname of being a super app factory. But it's also surprising that they've made a number of acquisitions as well.
They seem increasingly focused on verticals esp edtech, B2B and potentially healthcare
3) They have been buying more community apps than building them. Does this mean their flagship algo is more suitable for centralised content delivery versus delocalised community content?
Or maybe scaling community is just very hard?
Read 13 tweets
6 May
1) Let's talk about the international investment strategy of Tencent and Alibaba (and how this differs from their domestic strategy).

Both are kingmakers in the Chinese ecosystem as they bring value-add. But how does this translate once they turn towards international markets?
2) Domestically, Tencent and Alibaba are tier 1 investors in the Chinese VC system. What they bring to the table is traffic in the form of being allowed access to closed garden ecosystems.

Non-Tencent invested companies (aka Douyin) are cut off from sending links on wechat.
3) They are still 'strategic investors' at the end of the day, and similar to CVCs of the West, investment decisions will involve both financial and strategic considerations.
Their investment decisions will typically involve input from both business units and the investments.
Read 17 tweets
4 May
1) Let's talk about how Taobao (of Alibaba) approaches selling apparel in different way to Amazon (and why I think its better).

It's a mix of product design which mirrors the shopping experience, sophisticated AI recommendations and superior customer service (even to Amazon)
2) Amazon has a product philosophy of selling based around SKUs and high intent search. When I open the app and search for items, I often wouldn't see the same item twice. As the sellers are all aggregated around the same product SKUs.

The platform is geared towards utility.
3) Taobao's designs reflect an understanding that apparel (especially non-basic clothing) is around mimetic desire.

Their search pages will often show the very similar items sold by different shops in lifestyle photo spreads. It's also highly tailored to your previous browsing
Read 14 tweets

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