1) Let's talk about Bytedance's product offerings and what that means for their future.
I went down a rabbit hole and this is what I've got on them after a few hours of googling. ~50 active apps and offerings.
2) A few things stand out, Bytedance lives up to their nickname of being a super app factory. But it's also surprising that they've made a number of acquisitions as well.
They seem increasingly focused on verticals esp edtech, B2B and potentially healthcare
3) They have been buying more community apps than building them. Does this mean their flagship algo is more suitable for centralised content delivery versus delocalised community content?
Or maybe scaling community is just very hard?
4) All of their utility apps seems to be "taking inspiration from" popular apps (even TikTok/ Douyin a Kuaishou copy).
- FaceU is similar to Meitu
- Dolphin ticketing looks similar to Ctrip
- Lemon browser looks like Chrome
Clubhouse clone is inevitable
5) Not all of their offerings are software - Edtech Dali lamp is a child surveillance lamp. Some of their B2B offerings state they are doing consulting services. I think as Bytedance matures and as online CAC gets higher, they'll move increasing past apps
6) For the B2B offering, it seems like Bytedance is taking the Amazon (and Alibaba) approach where they are making internal software into external products, Feishu (productivity suite), Terark (Databases), Bytedance cloud etc
7) International offerings are often reinterpretations of their biggest domestic hits (Toutiao and Douyin to BaBe and TikTok).
Most of their target geographies are not Europe or US but rather SEA and India. International apps' release has also noticeable slowed down.
8) Not that you need too many hits after getting TikTok and Toutiao but Bytedance also scored any new 'hit apps' after those two.
With 60k employees worldwide, I wonder what the future plan is? To continue exploring or to double down on the winners?
9) Bytedance seems to be on a similar path to other internet giants of the past Alibaba, JD and Tencent - nurture businesses within and then spin them off (see Ant, JD logistics, Tencent Music for examples).
It will probably be looking to spinout TikTok
10) I wonder how much Bytedance is still developing around based its flagship algo (which is available as a white label solution as ByteAir). It was based on Google’s Wide & Deep Learning, open-source models that combined wide linear models and deep neural networks.
11) "There’s no specific category that they want to go after. Bytedance’s approach is to make a ton of apps powered by algorithms with the same back-end. Pre-algorithms, companies were built up with a product first mentality. Post-algorithms it has been about solving questions."
1) Let's talk about a growth hack that Chinese apps use to get those eye-watering DAU and user numbers.
It's 地推 aka field sales but not as we know it. An entire ecosystem springs up to take advantage of sign-up subsidies to hook some bargain hunting users.
2) While chillin' with @passluo today in Chengdu, we were approached by university students who asked us whether we had Kuaishou Express app. If we downloaded the app, the students earn 8 RMB / $1.25.
We Pass'ed...hoho
Pass proceeded to school me on how app sign-ups are done
3) Turns out consumer apps will have 'co-operation partners agreement' with 3P companies when they are pushing out new apps. For every new user that signs up, these companies get a fee ranging from 50 RMB - 10 RMB / $7 - $1.5(depending on the app and region)
1) Let's talk about the international investment strategy of Tencent and Alibaba (and how this differs from their domestic strategy).
Both are kingmakers in the Chinese ecosystem as they bring value-add. But how does this translate once they turn towards international markets?
2) Domestically, Tencent and Alibaba are tier 1 investors in the Chinese VC system. What they bring to the table is traffic in the form of being allowed access to closed garden ecosystems.
Non-Tencent invested companies (aka Douyin) are cut off from sending links on wechat.
3) They are still 'strategic investors' at the end of the day, and similar to CVCs of the West, investment decisions will involve both financial and strategic considerations.
Their investment decisions will typically involve input from both business units and the investments.
1) Let's talk about how Taobao (of Alibaba) approaches selling apparel in different way to Amazon (and why I think its better).
It's a mix of product design which mirrors the shopping experience, sophisticated AI recommendations and superior customer service (even to Amazon)
2) Amazon has a product philosophy of selling based around SKUs and high intent search. When I open the app and search for items, I often wouldn't see the same item twice. As the sellers are all aggregated around the same product SKUs.
The platform is geared towards utility.
3) Taobao's designs reflect an understanding that apparel (especially non-basic clothing) is around mimetic desire.
Their search pages will often show the very similar items sold by different shops in lifestyle photo spreads. It's also highly tailored to your previous browsing
1) Let's talk about Tencent Music ($TME) which at a market cap of $29.5bn is the largest music platform in China.
Its strategies for success, positioning and where its future is.
2) Tencent Music today is a consolidated entity between three big music brands QQ music, KuGuo and Kuwo (and a few smaller brands).
Each of these brands has a different positioning from its legacy user base. Though an inorganic evolution, this is great brand strategy
3)
- KuGuo - blue-collar, 25-30 year old
- QQ music - White-collar professionals, students
- Kuwo - Married 30-40 year olds typically has kids
Each of these groups has different purchasing capacity, interests and music interests. Having sub-brands allows more precise targeting
In 2017, Ctrip was the undisputed OTA market leader with ~50% of China's online hotel bookings. They quashed competitors and lead a consolidation of the OTA market.
By 2018, they had lost all of that to Meituan.
Wtf happened?
2) The one KPI that rules Chinese consumer super apps - Meituan's secret sauce and their reason for all in on Community Group Buying (CGB)
It's not DAU, it's not AOV, it's not GMV
It's the frequency of use per day
3) I've said this many times, relative to western consumer tech companies, who tend to focus on “serving a function” as their core mission, Chinese companies tend to focus on “owning the user” as their core mission.
I propose a theory of digital transformation journey called Digitalisation-Cloud-Automation journey (DCA journey for short) and argue that each stage of the DCA journey enabled subsequent stages to occur for the West.
2) The journey is sequential as each step unlocks new business models and technology needs that would be unfeasible or unwanted at an earlier stage.
3) This development sequence is the assumed path for cloud adoption and growth of SaaS, but not so for China. China is undergoing all three stages of digitalisation, cloud adoption and automation concurrently rather than sequentially.