The key provisions are Art 4-6.
A few things to note: 1. It cast a very wide net. For example, Art. 4 covers any individuals and organizations directly or indirectly involved in the formulation, decision and implementation of the foreign sanctions.
This could potentially cover the legislators, government officials, law enforcement officers, or even banks or companies who implement foreign sanctions.
Art. 5 goes even further, by covering the spouse and immediate family members for individuals, and management or related companies of the sanctioned entities or individuals.
2. In terms of countermeasures, they are also very broad as I mentioned earlier, but most measures seem to be limited to measures within China. It is unclear whether the law could cover transactions between foreign entities, or even between CN & foreign entities outside of China.
No judicial review will be available as per Article 7 "The decision of the relevant department of the State Council made in accordance with the provisions of Articles 4 to 6 of this Law shall be final". This is also confirmed by the supreme court’s 2018 interpretation of the ALL.
This is confirmed by Art. 11, which only requires organizations and individuals in China to implement the countermeasures.
But this is further complicated by Art. 14, which makes liable any organization and individuals who do not implement or cooperate with the countermeasures.
Art. 14 could be interpreted to cover foreign entities, which would put them into an impossible position, as I explained in my @nytimes interview on China's new blocking statute in Jan. nytimes.com/2021/01/09/bus…
Also worth noting that the law is designed to "safeguard China's national sovereignty, security & development interests". The last of these -development interests- could be interpreted very broadly to cover foreign sanctions affecting China's economic interests, i.e, Huawei ban.
It's worth recalling that China's sanctions on EU individuals and entities in March were simply announced by the MFA without reference to any legal basis. This will change and expect all future announcements to include an explicit reference to the new anti-sanctions law.
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In addition to the anti-sanctions law, China also issued a Data Security Law yesterday, which includes some good news and some not-so-good news.
I will start with the good news:
1. The law explicitly mentions in two provisions that China will safeguard and promote the free flow of data, which is consistent with China’s new position on data flow in the RCEP;
2. China will actively participate in the making of international rules on data security and standards. This is consistent with China’s active participation in the WTO JSI negotiations on e-commerce, which was analyzed extensively in my paper at ssrn.com/abstract=36953….
Time to compare notes again: This morning @USTradeRep@AmbassadorTai had a phone call with Chinese vice Premier Liu He.
The two readouts from @USTradeRep and MOFCOM both emphasized two points: 1. They had a “candid exchange”; 2. They will have "future discussions".
Translating the diplomatic speak into normal language: 1. There are many disagreements; 2. They had so many disagreements that they have to wait until the next time to try to sort out the issues.
Now let's play the game of "spot the difference": 1. @USTradeRep: @AmbassadorTai discussed the "guiding principles of the Biden-Harris Administration’s worker-centered trade policy and her ongoing review of the U.S.-China trade relationship, while also raising issues of concern".
A thread on U.S.-China Joint Statement Addressing the Climate Crisis. Eng version: state.gov/u-s-china-join…;
Chinese version: xinhuanet.com/world/2021-04/… 1. Finally we have a statement where the English and Chinese versions mirror each other rather than speaking their own languages.
2. But this doesn't mean that we can't learn anything from the joint statement. Instead, we can learn a lot from this!
Let's compare, for example, the last sentence of the first paragraph:
Eng: Both countries recall their historic contribution to the development, adoption, signature, and entry into force of the Paris Agreement through their leadership and collaboration.
Chn: 双方回顾两国气候变化领域的领导力与合作,为巴黎协定的制定、通过、签署和生效作出历史性贡献。
"firmly safeguard the normal economic and trade cooperation between China and Iran and its legitimate rights and interests"
"If the extraterritorial application of relevant foreign laws and measures violates international law and basic norms of international relations,
and damages the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese citizens, legal persons or other organizations, China will carry out relevant work in accordance with relevant legal provisions, and firmly safeguard national sovereignty, security & development interests"
Let me try to translate USTR-designate Katherine Tai's opening statement before Senate Finance Committee:
"I previously served as America’s chief enforcer against China’s unfair trade practices":
I've taken WTO cases against China, and won (see rare earth).
/1
"I know firsthand how critically important it is that we have a strategic and coherent plan for holding China accountable to its promises and effectively competing with its model of state-directed economics":
Trade agreements are not just for soybeans. There will be more.
/2
"I know the opportunities and limitations in our existing toolbox".
I will make full use of the existing tools: trade remedies, Sec 301, national security...you name it.
I will also beef up the existing rules.
/3