A thread on U.S.-China Joint Statement Addressing the Climate Crisis. Eng version: state.gov/u-s-china-join…;
Chinese version: xinhuanet.com/world/2021-04/… 1. Finally we have a statement where the English and Chinese versions mirror each other rather than speaking their own languages.
2. But this doesn't mean that we can't learn anything from the joint statement. Instead, we can learn a lot from this!
Let's compare, for example, the last sentence of the first paragraph:
Eng: Both countries recall their historic contribution to the development, adoption, signature, and entry into force of the Paris Agreement through their leadership and collaboration.
Chn: 双方回顾两国气候变化领域的领导力与合作,为巴黎协定的制定、通过、签署和生效作出历史性贡献。
The Chinese version is, simply put, bad Chinese. This is not how Chinese normally write in their language, esp the part "双方回顾两国气候变化领域的领导力与合作". Two grammatical mistakes: 1. Chinese rarely write something like "回顾...领导力与合作";
2. If you have to write something like this, you'd "双方回顾两国【在】气候变化领域的领导力与合作", but the keyword I show in bracket - 在 -, which is a (介词) preposition in Chinese, went missing. This made it really bad Chinese.
WHY?
From this grammatically incorrect sentence, we can probably reverse-engineer several things leading to the finalization of the joint statement: 1. The statement was first drafted in English, and then translated into Chinese. This means that the US took a dominant role in drafting
2. Even the translation to Chinese was carefully scrutinized by both sides to make sure that the Chinese version mirrors the English version, for obvious reasons. I can imagine a Chinese official trying to translate it into the correct version, e.g.,"【在】气候变化领域的领导力"
But his version was shot down by his American counterpart, because "There was no 【在】(the English word "in") in our original English version"!
So here we are, this grammatically incorrect sentence.
Grammar defeated by politics, again.
The American official, smirking in triumph over his victory eliminating the preposition that was not in the original English text, never realized that his petty victory would be overshadowed by a much bigger defeat: the Chinese version which shifted the structure of the sentence
and thus also shifted the emphasis of the whole sentence, as in the original English text, from "Both countries recall their historic contribution" to "双方回顾两国气候变化领域的领导力与合作", i.e., "Both countries recall their climate change leadership & cooperation".
Put it simply, "the US and China recognize Chinese leadership". So this document will go down in history as the first document whereby the US openly acknowledge China's leadership on world issues.
"firmly safeguard the normal economic and trade cooperation between China and Iran and its legitimate rights and interests"
"If the extraterritorial application of relevant foreign laws and measures violates international law and basic norms of international relations,
and damages the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese citizens, legal persons or other organizations, China will carry out relevant work in accordance with relevant legal provisions, and firmly safeguard national sovereignty, security & development interests"
Let me try to translate USTR-designate Katherine Tai's opening statement before Senate Finance Committee:
"I previously served as America’s chief enforcer against China’s unfair trade practices":
I've taken WTO cases against China, and won (see rare earth).
/1
"I know firsthand how critically important it is that we have a strategic and coherent plan for holding China accountable to its promises and effectively competing with its model of state-directed economics":
Trade agreements are not just for soybeans. There will be more.
/2
"I know the opportunities and limitations in our existing toolbox".
I will make full use of the existing tools: trade remedies, Sec 301, national security...you name it.
I will also beef up the existing rules.
/3
MOFCOM just issued some interesting clarification on the Chinese Blocking Statute: 1. Injunctions prohibiting firms and individuals from recognizing, enforcing and complying with foreign sanctions only apply to Chines entities, NOT foreign entities;
2. Entities harming interests of Chinese entities by complying with foreign sanctions only include Chinese entities; 3. But entities benefiting from foreign judgments include both Chinese and third-country entities.
To illustrate with examples: 1. US issues sanctions against Chinese entity A dealing with third-country entities B. MOFCOM issues injunction against compliance with the sanction. Only Chinese entity C is required to comply with the injunction. But not third-country entity D.
MOFCOM just issued its first order for 2021: Rules on Counteracting Unjustified Extra-territorial Application of Foreign Legislation and Other Measures. Key message:
We are going to prohibit firms from complying with foreign laws prohibiting transactions with Chinese firms.
Key provisions: 1. The legislative basis is National Security Law; 2. Chinese firms and individuals are required to report foreign sanctions; 3. MOFCOM may issue injunctions prohibiting firms and individuals from recognizing, enforcing and complying with foreign sanctions.
4. Chinese firms suffering loss from another party's compliance with foreign sanctions can sue for damages in Chinese courts.
Thanks @loyaladvisor for this. This would be the most detailed info on the #CAI before the text is out. Here are a few gems I found in the internet sector:
1. Cloud services "will now be open to EU investors subject to a 50% equity cap". Good for EU but they are late to the Party, as Amazon AMS has been in China since 6 years ago;
2. The ‘technology neutrality' clause, which ensures that equity caps imposed for telecom VAS won't be applied to other online services such as financial, logistics, medical etc. AFAIK these have never been regarded as VAS to start with and never been subject to VAS equity caps.
The decision is hardly surprising, but there are two interesting points in the panel report: 1. Whether the Phase 1 deal constitutes a mutually agreed solution; 2. whether the US tariffs could be justified under the public morals exception.
The first one was easy, while the second one is more tricky, as the US measures were allegedly taken against IP theft, misappropriation and unfair competition by China. The Panel ruled against the US, not because the US couldn't do so, but due to the lack of nexus and necessity.
I'm most amused by the argument by China that the criminalization of a conduct under domestic law doesn't really provide sufficient justification for invoking public morals exception. I wonder if its lawyers ever realized that this argu could be used against China in another case