Most forecasters are assuming output ends the year above its pre-pandemic trend while employment is still below. Which means *a lot* of productivity. Eg compare IHS Markit Dec-19 & Jun-21 forecasts for 2021-Q4:

GDP: +2.0%
Employment: -3.5%
Total hours: -2.3%
Productivity: +5.4%
The GDP +2.0% is extraordinary--it says that output will be higher than if we never went through the pandemic. A lot of other forecasts expect the same: Fed's Summary of Economic Projections, the Survey of Professional Forecasters, the OECD, IMF, etc.
Moreover, we're getting to this increased output with a lot fewer people. No one expects the unemployment rate to be 3.5% and the participation rate to fully recovery by Q4 of this year (and I don't either).
Implicitly the extra productivity is partly pandemic-induced innovation (our local bagel store has online ordering now) and partly greater work intensity to satisfy demand (the people there appear to be working even harder/faster than usual).
Additional productivity seems plausible but the magnitudes in most forecasts are very large. So I would take the under on IHS Markit productivity at four-to-one odds.

I would also take the under on GDP (at two-to-one odds) and over on employment (need one-to-one for this bet).
I'll be looking at the Fed's new Summary of Economic Projections this week to see if it has this feature. (You can't read productivity directly, will have to make assumptions about average hours and labor force participation, but can still get a general ballpark.)

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More from @jasonfurman

14 Jun
The more I think about inflation the less sure I get of anything other than that we should have a wide confidence interval & that policy decisions should explicitly recognize our uncertainty.

Will give the top 4 arguments for transitory and top 4 arguments for persistent. 🧵
#1 TRANSITORY: REOPENING PAINS. A lot of the inflation this year has been price spikes in areas like autos. These prices will fall in the future. Other prices have more to rise (e.g., airfares and restaurants) but will max out once the adjustment is complete.
#2 TRANSITORY: SUPPLY IS COMING. Job growth will pick up as COVID cases fall, vaccinations rise, UI rolls off, and things return more to normal. Supply will further be enhanced as bottlenecks for key inputs (e.g., microchips) resolve themselves.
Read 13 tweets
10 Jun
We have had more inflation in the first 5 months of this year than most forecasters expected for the full year. How should we revise our forecasts? Not obvious:

1. Expect less (or even negative) inflation going forward.

2. Only getting started (expect more going forward).

A 🧵
FIRST VIEW is based on mean reversion. A lot of the inflation we have seen is in specific categories like vehicles, travel and restaurants. Some of those increases could reverse and others could level off. This is a striking illustration of that.
Going for this view is the fact that I believe there is a very likely case for substantially faster job growth going forward so the supply-side of the economy could start catching up with the demand side.
Read 11 tweets
10 Jun
Nominal wages are about 0.9% above their pre-pandemic trend. BUT prices are about 1.4% above their pre-pandemic trend. So as of May real wages were down--with the notable exceptions of financial activities and leisure and hospitality.

(Caveat: some data kludge, see below.)
This is as of May, could easily change, potentially by a lot in coming months, depending on what happens to nominal wages and nominal prices.

Hopeful story: there is more of a story of mean reversion in prices (i.e., many *way* above normal and will come down) than in wages.
The data kludge caveat: the average hourly earnings data is seriously distorted by composition effects (low wage workers not back). The ECI data adjusts for this composition but only goes through March. So I used ECI through March and AHE to extend to May. Introduces some error.
Read 4 tweets
9 Jun
My thinking:

1. People's 90% confidence intervals are systematically too small (as in, stuff happens outside them more than 90% of the time).

2. Especially true of economic forecasters (how many jobs numbers in the last 15 months were outside your 90% confidence interval?)
3. This year two types of uncertainty are much larger than usual: (a) the virus could mutate and escape the vaccine and (b) our combination of positive demand and supply shocks plus reallocation is way out of our sample.
As for the numbers, I would think a 5%+ chance we have mandatory social distancing in December. Last time around prices fell 0.8% in a two month period. Plus add in all of the other randomness and unforeseeable events.
Read 5 tweets
8 Jun
The speed limit view of job creation is greatly overstated. Here are the fastest periods of six-month job growth in the United States since 1950 (scaled to today's job level)

We can and likely will do much better than 500K or 600K per month.

Slightly more nuanced 🧵follows.
These examples are a long time ago but I would argue conditions are better for job creation now than ever before:

--Huge stimulus

--Highest opening rate ever recorded

--A large number of unemployed

--People getting vaccinated, COVID coming down, policy restraints ending.
Moreover, the rate of people finding jobs is notably low right now as @p_ganong points out. If it was just normal we would be adding an extra 500,000 jobs a month give or take.

Read 11 tweets
8 Jun
Another interesting but impossible to interpret question fro the IGM forum on "The current combination of US fiscal and monetary policy poses a serious risk of prolonged higher inflation."

What is "serious risk" and "prolonged higher inflation"?

igmchicago.org/surveys/overhe…
Inflation was below the Fed's 2% target for a long time before this crisis. If it is 2% after this crisis that would be "prolonged higher inflation" but almost everyone would agree it was good. If this is what I thought should I answer yes or no to the question?
What if I think inflation will rise to 3% but that is a better rate than the 2% target? How should I answer the question?
Read 5 tweets

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