That's nearly half of the data showing the opposite of what we'd expect.
How is that possible?
4/ The "Oh S**t" Conundrum
The reason revenues tend to increase before the stall lies in the "Oh S**t" Conundrum. Management, realizing they might miss expectations, expands revenues by:
- M&A
- Channel stuffing
- Asset sales
All in hopes to keep that growth going. And yet..
5/ In other words, a rapid acceleration in revenue growth should prompt initial caution, not excitement.
What should investors do? Verify that revenue growth came from organic/planned business activity.
Watch out for past organic growers shifting to M&A-hungry expansion.
6/ You know what else sucks? Stall points aren't gradual declines. They're cliff-falling collapses.
The book calls it "The Myth of Soft Landings"
Put simply, soft landings are rare and most companies exhibit a steep, sudden revenue growth drop-off.
Like Taleb's Turkey
7/ The Consequences of Stall Points
- 42% of stocks declined more than two years after initial stall
- 51% lost more than 75% of market cap post-stall
- 40% lost between 50-70% of market cap post-stall
Stall points offer delayed, but certain penalties.
8/ Some Lessons
What should you take from this thread? A few things:
- Pay attention to type of revenue growth (not all growth created equal)
- Assign low probability of success to turnaround stories (hard to regain growth)
- Cut losses quickly at first sign of stall point
9/ Conclusion
Go buy the book. Here's the link.
I'm having a hell of a good time reading, underlining, and re-reading parts I don't understand.
1/ “We can have no finer role model. He was a value investor — a member of that eccentric tribe that believes it’s better to underpay than to overpay.”
This thread reveals the story of the greatest value investor you've never heard of.
The story of Floyd Odlum.
THREAD
2/ With a decent income from his job as a law clerk, Odlum started trading in the stock market. He initially saw the market as a rich, fertile ground for speculative profits. Far from his cemented legacy as a deep value investor.
3/ Yet like most beginning speculators, Odlum too paid his fair share of market tuition.
After losing all his $40,000 starting capital, Odlum retreated from the markets. One newspaper revealed it, “took [Odlum] a while to pay back that sum”.
There aren’t many investors compounding capital at double digits over the course of decades and those that do are already well known (i.e., that guy from Omaha). However, in a small office above a taco shop, a man did just that.
[THREAD]
Allan Mecham ran a hedge fund called Arlington Value who has demonstrated the advantage in simplicity, long-term thinking, and the power of compounding.
Arlington Value doesn’t have a large team of analysts.
They don’t run advanced machine-learning algorithms or exploit esoteric satellite data and there’s not a single distinguished diploma on their walls.
"In fact many were good ideas. Were there too many consumer startups? Yes! But there were also too many software companies, semiconductor companies, telecom equipment companies, and the list goes on and on.
As we later learned, over-funding (i.e., too many startups with too much capital) was the key issue, not the particular investment category. Low-cost, high-scale marketplaces do in fact exhibit increasing returns.