Expanded version of our childcare paper on @nberpubs today, with @kearney_melissa and Willie Powell.

Finds that the differential impact on women with younger children explains ~1% of the labor market worsening from Jan/Feb-2020 to Jan/Feb-2021.

nber.org/papers/w28934?…
Our Q: how much of the 3.6pp decline in EPOP was due to childcare issues. Intuition for small result:

1. Women with younger children ~10% of workforce

2. Need to look at their *differential* reduction in work, not entire reduction

3. If you include father's goes the other way.
The @nberpubs version goes through many, many, many sensitivity tests with different control groups, different concepts, but keeps getting roughly the same result. Because even if #2 on the previous were 2X that would take the result from 1% to 2%. So robustness not surprising.
I addressed many of these sensitivity issues in a previous thread (the numbers don't exactly match the @nberpubs version but they're close).
A reminder: we are NOT asking whether childcare has been a challenge (it has). We are also not asking whether school closures have been bad for children (it has).
We are also not trying to precisely estimate the impact of childcare challenge's on women's work. To the degree we find that mother's of young children have reduced their work somewhat compared to other control groups.
Instead we're asking a macroeconomic question: how much of the total job loss is due to this factor. Every other attempt to get at this question I have seen also finds a small result.
This paper is an attempt to better understand what was going on in the world. @nberpubs does not allow policy conclusions & wouldn't have wanted one regardless.

But here is my own policy view: our childcare system was problematic pre-pandemic, strongly support the Families Plan.

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More from @jasonfurman

21 Jun
In one sense the claim that fiscal policy is going to become less expansionary is obviously true. In another sense it fails to make a critical point: fiscal policy will still be *very* expansionary.

A 🧵motivated by @Neil_Irwin (among others): nytimes.com/2021/06/21/ups…
The largest fiscal injections are now behind us. Together with the reopenings they have contributed to the very rapid GDP growth we had in 2020-Q3 and Q4 and so far this yr. And the very rapid growth we're likely to have in the coming quarters.
Cash payments and pandemic-curtailed services have contributed to a big increase in spending on goods which in turn has contributed to higher imports, lower inventories, and higher prices.

(Note, retail sales #s are mostly but not entirely goods.)
Read 11 tweets
14 Jun
Most forecasters are assuming output ends the year above its pre-pandemic trend while employment is still below. Which means *a lot* of productivity. Eg compare IHS Markit Dec-19 & Jun-21 forecasts for 2021-Q4:

GDP: +2.0%
Employment: -3.5%
Total hours: -2.3%
Productivity: +5.4%
The GDP +2.0% is extraordinary--it says that output will be higher than if we never went through the pandemic. A lot of other forecasts expect the same: Fed's Summary of Economic Projections, the Survey of Professional Forecasters, the OECD, IMF, etc.
Moreover, we're getting to this increased output with a lot fewer people. No one expects the unemployment rate to be 3.5% and the participation rate to fully recovery by Q4 of this year (and I don't either).
Read 6 tweets
14 Jun
The more I think about inflation the less sure I get of anything other than that we should have a wide confidence interval & that policy decisions should explicitly recognize our uncertainty.

Will give the top 4 arguments for transitory and top 4 arguments for persistent. 🧵
#1 TRANSITORY: REOPENING PAINS. A lot of the inflation this year has been price spikes in areas like autos. These prices will fall in the future. Other prices have more to rise (e.g., airfares and restaurants) but will max out once the adjustment is complete.
#2 TRANSITORY: SUPPLY IS COMING. Job growth will pick up as COVID cases fall, vaccinations rise, UI rolls off, and things return more to normal. Supply will further be enhanced as bottlenecks for key inputs (e.g., microchips) resolve themselves.
Read 13 tweets
10 Jun
We have had more inflation in the first 5 months of this year than most forecasters expected for the full year. How should we revise our forecasts? Not obvious:

1. Expect less (or even negative) inflation going forward.

2. Only getting started (expect more going forward).

A 🧵
FIRST VIEW is based on mean reversion. A lot of the inflation we have seen is in specific categories like vehicles, travel and restaurants. Some of those increases could reverse and others could level off. This is a striking illustration of that.
Going for this view is the fact that I believe there is a very likely case for substantially faster job growth going forward so the supply-side of the economy could start catching up with the demand side.
Read 11 tweets
10 Jun
Nominal wages are about 0.9% above their pre-pandemic trend. BUT prices are about 1.4% above their pre-pandemic trend. So as of May real wages were down--with the notable exceptions of financial activities and leisure and hospitality.

(Caveat: some data kludge, see below.)
This is as of May, could easily change, potentially by a lot in coming months, depending on what happens to nominal wages and nominal prices.

Hopeful story: there is more of a story of mean reversion in prices (i.e., many *way* above normal and will come down) than in wages.
The data kludge caveat: the average hourly earnings data is seriously distorted by composition effects (low wage workers not back). The ECI data adjusts for this composition but only goes through March. So I used ECI through March and AHE to extend to May. Introduces some error.
Read 4 tweets
9 Jun
My thinking:

1. People's 90% confidence intervals are systematically too small (as in, stuff happens outside them more than 90% of the time).

2. Especially true of economic forecasters (how many jobs numbers in the last 15 months were outside your 90% confidence interval?)
3. This year two types of uncertainty are much larger than usual: (a) the virus could mutate and escape the vaccine and (b) our combination of positive demand and supply shocks plus reallocation is way out of our sample.
As for the numbers, I would think a 5%+ chance we have mandatory social distancing in December. Last time around prices fell 0.8% in a two month period. Plus add in all of the other randomness and unforeseeable events.
Read 5 tweets

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