I've reconstructed the 2014 and 2018 electorates by demographic, thanks to @DKElections and @Catalist_US data and a lot of math
-Midterms are whiter, more educated (~2pt Dem boost with whites on education-based turnout differential)
-Minority turnout is a crucial wildcard
[1/]
Midterms are generally whiter + more educated; whites are ~2% more favorable to Dems on educational splits alone. This was more pronounced in 2018 than it was in 2014. If R voters are increasingly tied to Trump ballot presence, it could complicate things for the GOP. [2/]
I calculate the electorate demographic composition for 2014/2018 myself and project 2020 support by demographic onto each electorate to get an idea of what its partisanship would be now. 2012/16/20 demographic composition & 2020 2-way support by demographic are from Catalist [3/]
Minority turnout will probably end up making or breaking Democrats in 2022 if polarization continues and 2020 support rates remain; 2014 saw minority turnout absolutely crater from 2012 levels, while 2018 saw it stay at roughly presidential levels. [4/]
The nation is continuing to get more non-white, so that helps Dems, but they absolutely *need* to keep minority turnout up. I do not believe Dems need to compromise their white support to drive up minority turnout; that said, they'll want to also boost Hispanic margins [5/]
This makes me pretty confident that Democrats have a really good chance at keeping the Senate. Wisconsin and Pennsylvania are very white (WI is 81% white alone, PA 76%), and Democrats have a very good chance at picking up those seats. House will be tougher [6/]
Caveats:
-These are not exact estimates; these are only solid ballpark ones based on the available data
-This does not account for partisan turnout gap within demographics -- e.g. Hispanic Ds could turn out more/less than Hispanic Rs.
-Vote switching probably matters most
[7/]
Special thanks to the folks who helped me on this, whether via sanity-check, debugging, or through helping me with the math
cc @NateSilver538, @Nate_Cohn, @gelliottmorris, @Redistrict, @JMilesColeman -- if anyone sees this, I'd love to hear your thoughts about the findings in this thread and how you think the 2022 midterm electorate might be impacted (or not) by any possible congressional laws
Lastly, the demographic data was fetched and scraped from the US Census Bureau, the state house electoral data was from @DKElections, and the 2020 2-way partisanship and the 2012/16/20 electorate demographic compositions are from @Catalist_UScatalist.us/wh-national/.
This took a *lot* of work and theory, so if you liked it, please give it an RT or let me know of your thoughts/feedback! Open to hearing all types of feedback; I just ask that you please stay respectful, because I did spend a lot of time on this.
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THREAD: Simulating an RCV election in Alaska, we see that running a Democrat probably helps Kelly Tshibaka more than anything. But the value Lisa Murkowski provides to a Democratic majority is minimal, and the expected value of running a Democrat is still higher, IMO
Let’s construct a grossly simplified scenario where we have Tshibaka (R) at 40%, Galvin (D) at 30%, Murkowski (R) at 30%, and Murkowski loses the second spot by a hair to Alyse Galvin. Now you go to the H2H...
Does Galvin get 66% of Murkowski’s voters to back her as the second choice? Possible...but a tall order...so you’ve just given Tshibaka a huge boost here.
Conversely, would 66% of Galvin’s voters rank Murkowski as a second choice? That’s much easier to imagine.
If the goal of the Democratic Party is to retain the majority in 2022, then funding or helping Lisa Murkowski makes absolutely no sense, because the value-over-replacement she provides to a Senate Democratic majority is minimal.
If Democrats think they've certainly lost the Senate in 2022, then helping to keep Murkowski might make a lot of sense.
If they think they've got a good chance to retain the Senate (as they do, given the map they're playing in), then keeping Murkowski provides no utility at all.
Any bill Murkowski goes for, all Democrats would have already supported, including Manchin. There is no use to a Democratic *majority* here, especially when you have a lane to elect Galvin, who'd be at the party median and cut the reliance on Manchin/Sinema by a fair bit.
Murkowski's 2022 odds are honestly not nearly as high as everyone thinks they are and I think it's not unreasonable to say that come November, she may not be the favorite to make it out of the field.
You can call Alaska likely/safe R, but it's not likely/safe Murkowski.
.@EScrimshaw breaks it down here, but because of the way RCV works, Tshibaka poses a very, very serious threat, especially given the amount of campaigning Trump will do for her against Murkowski. scrimshawunscripted.substack.com/p/2022-murkows…
That *does* open up an outside lane for a Democrat (I think @ElpisActual has discussed it as well) in which you could have Tshibaka (R) at 40%, Galvin (D) at 30%, Murkowski at 25%, and a random Independent at 5%.
And Galvin could edge out Tshibaka in a H2H there with RCV.
Also if you like things like this go follow @notkavi and our bot @bot_2024 — kavi does a lot of great modeling and work and programmed the bulk of that bot.
As I said in the replies to the original thread, I think the lack of demographics available to our bot (because of a lack of data) makes this estimation a bit susceptible to favoring Dems too much in some elections, but the overall picture is largely correct.
The two-way vote share, per Catalist, was ~R+12 with white voters in 2020. The white vote in a midterm would probably be ~R+10 or thereabouts, if we adjusted for voting propensity and assumed zero vote switching.
That *does* help Democrats a bit! But to take advantage of it, you need to make sure your base turns out, and this is still prone to the issue that white college voters who are Democratic may turn out at different rate from white college voters that are Republicans.
This is not meant to be a hard and fast quantification of everything. It's just meant to show that there is a real, somewhat quantifiable educational turnout edge based on recent history for Democrats, and that they could certainly use this to their benefit.
A very rough estimate, but I'd say that Democrats probably have a ~1.5%-2% education turnout edge in the midterm electorate among *white voters*, using 2020 support numbers from Catalist and 2018/2016 turnout data (filtered for state house districts that are >75% white).
Important to note a few things here:
(1) there is a clear correlation between education and turnout, especially among white voters, and that was only magnified in 2020. (2) This is a rough estimate because the granularity of data available here doesn't support anything more.
It's pretty critical to note that persuasion is far more important in influencing the electoral environment. That is to say that voters changing their mind is generally way more influential than a 1.5% turnout edge in *margin* (which is what this estimate is measuring in!)