Didi’s recent cyber security review seems to be the latest manifestation of an institution masquerading as a tech firm being brought to heel.
Let me explain
Didi has in many ways, become the governing mechanism for a lot of taxis and ride hailing.
However private enterprises optimising for growth have lead to lapses in safety precautions as well as price gauging activities
So the recent reviews are partly due to this, but there’s also additional concerns as Didi has unparalleled view into road usage into China.
Listing on the Nasdaq involves having over usage data to external partners (aka not China). This heightens the possibilities of exposing large vulnerabilities from the government’s perspective.
You can call the Chinese government draconian but as a semi-international relations scholar, I really don’t understand why protecting transport data as part of national security hasn’t been raised against Uber by developing and developed countries’ governments.
I have maintained the stance that tech firms globally are a new form of institutions. This is recognised by some governments but not other. They present a real challenge to national sovereignty and do not have consumer welfare as a core part of their agenda.
Governments who treat tech firms as institutions are increasing cracking down, and I think this will be a trend we see for many government that have the clout to do this.
Many could not rather than would not.
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1) Expanding on the newsletter as a SaaS product with my 3 learnings.
I have been a SaaS investor for most of my investment career. While writing a paid newsletter might seem like a little out of left field, to me, it is the MVP way in which I've been creating a SaaS product.
2) My focus has moved from product creation to marketing, to sales conversion and to churn management in the last 10 months.
I think this view of the newsletter as knowledge-as-a-service will gain more prevalent traction in the future. (It is a known concept in China - 知识付费)
3) Learning 1: Twitter as the top of the funnel is a great place to start. There's a match in conversion. People are used to reading here, it's not a jump to convince them to read more in longform.
But as that yield decrease (as it always does with marketing channels)..
1)The second to last of my convo with Mike from WCM:
“A big trend for Chinese software over the next 10-20 years will be internationalization. We are the first innings of this today. For some tech companies, I suspect the future profit pool globally will be bigger than China...
2) We've seen a couple of big success stories: Zoom and Tiktok have emerged just in the last couple of years. But I think that's the tip of the iceberg.
There are two kinds of plays here.
3) The first is consumer internet/gaming, China is on the bleeding edge. It's almost inevitable that Chinese companies will seek to export business models to the rest of the world.
Examples: Bigo, Yalla, Tiktok, Crossfire (sort of), etc.
1) So China's version of the office communication software war is between DingTalk (of Alibaba) and Lark (of Bytedance).
WeChat Enterprise has pivoted to become a retailer focused B2B2C coms tool.
I've heard good things about Lark but think DingTalk will win the market
2) Both gained traction during Covid lockdown but DingTalk's adoption is way ahead. In Nov 2020, according to Caixin, DingTalk's MAU was 173 million while Lark had 1.5 million MAU.
DingTalk was prolific and latched on to schools and service sector early.
3) Both are software created for internal need. Given Chinese tech's love of making a cost centre into a revenue line, both were then offered to the market for free.
The interesting thing about internal software, is that they mirror the originator's organisational culture
1) I spoke to the China fund PM of a $90bn AUM asset manager who had a good take. Mike of WCM thinks anti-monopoly enforcement in China will be good for investors in the long run.
2) Most investors’ natural tendency is to invest in dominant businesses. Especially in monopolies given their economic moats and very high margins / ROICs.
Mike thinks this might not be the right approach.
3) With dominance, businesses can lose the drive and pressure that made them great. The more profitable the business, the more difficult it is to keep the company’s culture sharp.
“It’s tough to get up at 5 am to train when you’ve been sleeping in silk pyjamas”. Marvin Hagler
1) I spoke with the China-focused portfolio manager of a $90bn AUM fund.
Mike Tian of WCM thinks Chinese tech who focuses on asset and operationally heavy businesses are more attractive investments then than asset-light businesses.
Counterintuitive, but here's why:
2) The conventional thinking is for internet companies to be 'Light': asset-light, people light, outsource all the ‘grunt work’ to the ecosystem, focus on ‘platform’, earn high margins and high returns on capital.
Mike thinks this might be a mistake
3) With heavier operational and asset business, while the initial outlay is higher, there’s also a chance of cultivating a wider moat. Especially true in China as big internet businesses are cross-vertical ecosystems, and barriers of entry for light businesses are very low.
1) Let's talk about how the business models of Chinese edtech unicorns Zuoyebang (作业帮), Yuanfudao (猿辅导) and VIPKids were such a success and completed billions in fundraise and hired thousands in 2020 alone.
And also how the methods of their success came back to bite them.
2) There's a whiff of old wine in new bottles with these tech platforms, the B2C business model boils down to paid packages for K12 online lessons with brand name teachers. Covid accelerated homeschooling for these to become a hot 2020 fengkou.
3) The offering (numbers from GSX) there's a trial package for 49 RMB which includes a lecture with a teacher typically from a brand name school and scores of teaching accolades. Followed by 1-to-1 tutoring to go over specific points with the student.