Entering 2016 I was pretty confident. Now in Singapore, I had put up v high, and uncorrelated, returns thru 2014/2015, and built my capital base substantially. But it was still subscale and one goal I had in 2016 was to 'bootstrap' my own fund launch...
Unfort it all went a bit pear-shaped in 2016. Here's how I did: +1.3% vs SPX +10%, so first year of underperformance. Sharpe collapsed to objectionable levels (0.2). I got hurt badly on shorts this year (3 out of 5 top losers were shorts):
Actually it was a bit more nuanced than this. I basically had one horrible qtr - Q2, where everything went wrong (and I traded it badly). I spent the rest of the year digging myself out...
I made a number of fundamental mistakes, mostly around sizing. Recall 2015 was a yr where chunky shorts almost all worked out - I was rewarded bigly for betting big, even on the short side.
This came back to bite me in 2016. Toshiba was still a core short...
...as they had an unsolvable balance sheet problem and I (was 100% sure) they were stuffing unrealized nuclear construction losses into assets on the B/S.
This was actually my VIC acceptance idea. You can read about this thesis, in retrospect, here:
The problem was memory prices were rallying and the market didnt care - because Tosh had yet to 'fess up and come clean. So the stock was going up, and up, and up, every day, for basically all of 2Q (and 3Q) and I effectively got squeezed out of the position...
Of course the stock eventually did this and Tosh ultimately almost went bankrupt...but far too late to help me. As I said, the position size was just too big.
Elsewhere I somehow lost another 5pts on $MWW, where I ignored an old maxim ('losers average losers') and compounded a big mistake from 2015. And then I got squeezed in a cpl other shorts as well like $UPLMQ where I ran into a commodity rally at the wrong time ๐คฎ๐คฎ
Basically 2016 taught me 1) a bad quarter can ruin a year (or more). I was pretty happy w finding some bargains on the long side (Bracell, 1768.HK, was great; $AER was a big winner too) but w/out some real home runs there was no outrunning a -23% qtr...
and 2) sizing is a perennial issue for me, especially on the shorts.
I also joined VIC, and put up a bunch of (what I thought) was good work, mostly on the short side - still my core skillset despite the mishaps.
But the biggest disappointment was not being able to raise $$$...
I like to think this endeavor didn't distract me from the mkts in 2Q/3Q, but it probably did. Either way, I wasn't able to raise meaningful $$ such that by the end of the yr I basically decided to go back to the buy-side for more experience, somewhat chastened...
...and disappointed in my 2016 performance, despite the still superior returns over 3yrs. As such I basically took off all my shorts and just ran longs from 2017 (due to PA restrictions at my new role)...which we will get to, next time, in part 4 ๐๐
โข โข โข
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2015 was a very different kind of year to 2014. Obviously the SPX went down (-1% but still down). I had moved from NYC to Singapore so my natural focus also shifted back to Asia, and in particular, Japanese stocks.
Shorting saved me in 2015, bigly. Here's how it went...
+39% vs SPX -1%, so obvi still a good outcome but it felt very hard at the time. My Sharpe fell, substantially, to 1.6 and I suffered a number of sizable drawdowns...making the yr much trickier:
For the sake of total clarity, this was a JOKE. I was not +850% in 1H...but I appreciate all the (undeserved) ๐
Tbh I'm not really a fan of posting recent, out-of-context PnL. But I am a fan of looking back on past performance and trying to learn the right lessons...
So I'm introducing a new segment, the 'Raper Capital Origin Story', pt1. if this is wildly unpopular it may prove to be part 1/1. Otherwise I will do these occasionally ad hoc.
Let's start at the beginning - 2014. I had just left a HF job (long/short credit), and was in NYC...
...having worked in finance for ~6yrs at the time (and invested PA for 12-13yrs at that point). But this was the first yr i attempted to 'prove' i could make it as a full-time investor.
My initial account was not large (sub 7 figs). Ie I needed to make big bets (fine w me!)...
Hunter Douglas UPDATE $HDG.NA. Great news as acquirer formally drops squeeze out after tender ends w/ abysmally low participation (23% of minorities at 82 EUR).
The go-forward setup is, I think, the is best risk/reward I have seen, in my history in the markets. Why?
๐๐
What did we learn from the tender process?
- the 84% shareholder wanted to pay 82 EUR to acquire all minorities
- a Minority Group consisting of 45% of minorities thought fair value was 150-200 EUR/share
- Add Value fund, a key minority, thinks fair value is 160->200 EUR/share
What else did the tender accomplish?
- Everyone who wanted to sell anywhere near the current price (ie 82), sold. This was ~1.3mm shares
- All other sizeable shareholders of record think fair value is SIGNIFICANTLY higher than current. Not 10%, 20%, - more than DOUBLE....
Been a while since I've done one of these so let's do a deep dive on a newish position I've built the last few weeks: Simonds Group, $SIO.AX
The quick + dirty: Aussie homebuilder at 3x EV/EBITDA w net cash and likely 'in play.' I think its good for at least a double.
THREAD ๐
This is a quintessential deep value Raper Capital special. The assets are so so but we're in a great point in the cycle; meanwhile the valuation is undeniably cheap, and there are some real near-term catalysts....
...meaning the odds of permanent capital impairment from here are vv low (just what I like), and if the catalysts unfold we get a super-normal return. In the middle is the 'nothing happens' type outcome where we don't lose a lot, and don't make a lot.
There has been a lot of talk about copper lately (esp w Chile and Peru likely incr in taxes). I am hardly an authority but here is how I think about it.
TL;DR the setup for copper prices is about as attractive r/r youโll see in commods in the mid-term imo.
Letโs start w the basics. Copper is almost in structural deficit today (and will certainly be in a cpl yrs). Basically every major mining house CEO is saying this. GS is saying this, etc.
Miners have been high-grading for years; not making large scale new discoveries...
The problem in commods markets is when an ancillary use case for a commod develops much faster than mine supply can be brought online. In this case that use case is EVs.
Update on $CAMB.LN. Co is on the tape w/ another extension (1mo) for CEO to formalize bid at 80p...this marks the second extension. CFO etc are dropping out of bid for 'technical considerations'. Some quick thoughts...
1) chance of real, and higher, bid should be higher. Stock has traded north of 80p for a while and results were ๐ฅsince bid first mooted. CEO must know 80p isn't get it done but is still asking for extension (again)...i think chance bid is made now is prob 70% (vs 50/50 prior)
2) Timing. Every extension plays in favor of minorities given reopening/progression of business. CEO must know this ofc so this affects likely bid px. Ie there's no point coming w/ 80p in a mo that is automatically rejected. I think 100+ is somewhat likely now (for first bid)...