For a long time, I thought the value proposition of a newsletter is great. Only recently I have understood my framework for assigning value to a newsletter was perhaps flawed.
2/ My initial framework was based on my own opportunity cost. I thought since the opportunity cost is $200-300k but I am willing to sell my intellectual capital for $100/year, that must be a great deal for subscribers.
3/ That thesis isn’t entirely wrong at first glance since I did end up getting 1k subscribers in less than a year. But this thesis is very much “author-centric” view.
A more “subscriber-centric” view is likely to reveal the value proposition (or lack thereof) better.
4/ So, what is the value of reading any newsletter?
Quite frankly, it is a mystery. This mystery is nothing unique to newsletter industry and equally applies to a huge section of the knowledge industry.
5/ When you call a plumber to fix something in your home, you get immediate and obvious value from the plumber’s service.
But value in knowledge economy is abstract, vague, and difficult to ascertain.
The total cost of a newsletter consists of implicit and explicit costs.
6/ Explicit costs show up on your credit card bills (or don’t if newsletter is free).
The implicit cost is what makes things difficult. A big part of implicit costs is time. We all have million things to read, and we are all behind on our readings.
7/ So when you give time to a newsletter and it doesn’t meet your standard, it has cost.
The other cost is perhaps the most pernicious.
8/ A writer can and does influence readers. If you allow garbage content to influence your worldview and your opinion on a stock, you will directly or indirectly lose money.
9/ I hardly doubt that I myself will publish a lot of deep dives that will have lot of bad opinions despite my best efforts to avoid it.
The bad news for readers is that they still have the ultimate burden to rummage through the content to derive value from it.
10/ Lazy readers looking for buy/sell decisions may end up paying a lot of money without realizing it.
The good news? Explicit costs are lot less for newsletters. The total cost, however, remains mystery and can only be known in hindsight.
11/ As already indicated, this is nothing unique to newsletters and parallels exist in many other industries all around us.
What is the value of investing with a particular hedge fund? Of course, that’s a mystery too despite the historical under/outperformance.
End/ Because of this inherent mystery, a lot of knowledge economy has a tendency to just become a marketing contest.
The burden to figure out the gold from the garbage may always be on customers/subscribers.
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I was recently speaking with someone and we both somewhat lamented how Buffett did not bet big on Google.
Google IPOed in 2004; it may not be clear then that they would win search. But surely by 2014, Buffett should have known it, right?
2/9 Following our conversation, we both explored a bit whether it really was that obvious that Google was an easy buy in 2014 when it was trading at ~$500.
Let me share two quotes.
3/9 "The growth rate in Internet penetration is set to peak in 2016. Were Google’s revenue and profit continues to track Internet penetration, then those metrics would peak as well"
3/5 IRS later did a similar study from 1996 to 2005, and found people who started in the bottom 20% in 1996 saw their income increase by 91% over the decade and people who started at the top 1% actually saw their income fall by 26%.
Etsy just announced to acquire Depop, a gen Z focused online apparel resale marketplace for $1.625 Bn (all cash). Optically expensive i.e. ~2.5x GMS or ~23x revenue based on 2020 numbers.
Here are my thoughts.
2/ Etsy coined an interesting term today “house of brands”.
After Reverb acquisition in '19 and now Depop, the strategy seems clear: keep penetrating vintage, handmade core marketplace AND acquire other niche marketplaces that you will have hard time building a connection with.
3/ Why is this important?
E-commerce is primarily behavioral in nature. Once you buy something from a marketplace, they have enough of your data to encourage you to buy again.
Once a marketplace grabs critical attention in a niche, it can be difficult to unseat the incumbent
ADSK had a pretty decent 1Q, comfortably beating high end of the revenue guidance. 98% of revenue are now recurring, and net revenue retention was in the range of 100-110%.
Topline guidance was raised by ~$40 mn. Here are my notes from the call
2/ Q1 is expected to be trough from growth standpoint and the rest of the year is likely to have some acceleration post-pandemic. ~75% of FCF of this year will be generated in the 2H.
3/ Billings from converting noncompliant users doubled YoY in Q1. In fact, a noncompliant customer converted into one of the largest premium customers.
But don’t expect hockey stick growth from conversion of noncompliant users. ADSK wants to gradually and naturally convert.