#Moldova election day, July 11 - about 48.28% of the registered voters have exercised their right to elect by 21.43hrs in the Republic of Moldova and abroad. This is a considerably lower percentage than during Presidential elections:
2. The approximate distribution by gender and age of the voters in #Modova elections today (as it was recorded at 21.43hrs Moldovan time) is aprox 54% women voters and aprox. 45% men.
3. Preliminary exit poll data - based on phone interviews and w/o Transnistrian region - was presented at around 20.00hrs #Moldova time with PAS (President Sandu's) in lead. Yet, exit polls in the previous elections have been wildly inaccurate, resulting in confusion.
The link to 20.00hrs by Watchdog.MD and IPP exit poll Youtube presentation can be found here (in Romanian):
The voting aboard continues. One of the European MPs monitoring the elections @SMuresan posted this photo on his FB account at around 11.00hrs R. #Moldova time, showing the lines/queue to vote in Frankfurt, Germany:
6. Another Central electoral Commission aggregated data chart shows the following figures, percentages, age and ender distribution of voting in #Moldova elections at around 22.00hrs local time - 260258 votes. The voting in USA & Canada continues.
7. For the 1st time the vote in NY is not hosted by the Mission to UN, but by "Moldova" restaurant in Brooklyn. While small, the Mission was a standard location for years & piece of #Moldova territory in US & Brooklyn is more distant to aggregated majority of NJ, NY or CT voters!
8. Latest 2 opinion polls ahead of today's vote showed the following figures for #Moldova elections: BPC July 1st poll (including traditional ~24% undecided) indicated 35% preference for PAS (pro-West), 21% for Socialist-Communist block (pro-Russia), others less than threshold:
9. July 5th Public Opinion Barometer (BOP) showed the following preferences for today's #Moldova elections - anti-corruption PAS 33.7%, corrupt (with evidence; Russia) Socialist-Commies block 25.2% and opportunistic/corruption riddled Shor Party 6%
10. Depending on real figures there's still chance that my earlier observation on #Moldova elections (Maia Sandu's PAS to govern alone) could come true. The local @RFERL local office assumed on exit poll data an (optimistic) figure of overwhelming 64 seats for PAS out of 101:
11. Before I vote in New York in #Moldova elections, I'd ask President Sandu: 1. To make sure her decisions are well informed - she was an Education minister, but have heard concerns(!), yet co-voted her PM decision to allow the concession of MLD airport to an ex-KGB Rus officer.
12. We voted for the new #Moldova President to bring anti-corruption and, thus, a pro-Western rule of law and welfare state. This also means avoiding people with TOO good contacts to the East, even if they know how to talk softly & seemingly right, to make one feel comfortable...
13. Educating #Moldova voters in the past politicla moves and elections that aligning yourself with the a devil to take out another can backfire. The voters can become dangerously immoral, turn back to you. It will undermine democracy itself in the long run & this time for good.
14. An important takeaway regarding the fact that less people voted in extremely important July 11 #Moldova elections than in the presidential ones in 2020, could be a sign of concern to Presdient Sandu's political program (a preliminary warning w/o seeing voting results).
15. For 23.00hrs #Moldova time, preliminary results are - 69.53% polling station protocols/reports were counted
16. Already at 23.02 hrs around 72% polling station reports counted the percentages of the votes are as follows - ab. 46% pro-West anti-corrupt PAS/Sandu, 31% pro-Russian SocialistCommunist/Dodon, 7% corruption suspected PPS/Shor, thus confirming my predictions a few months ago.
P.S. For those who haven't read my previous - a most serious journalistic investigation showed ex-President Dodon of Socialist Party reporting to a Kremlin unit lead by SVR officers (SVR = ex-1st KGB Directorate, now Russian external intelligence service) dossier.center/mld/?fbclid=Iw…
18. #Moldova elections update - by 01.00hrs night (MLD time) over 95% of the polling stations protocols/reports are counted & President Sandu's PAS (anti-corruption, pro-Western) increases to 48%, Pro-Russian Socialist/Communist block goes down to 30%, corruption suspect Shor 6%
19. At 02.20hrs MLD time close to 98% of polling stations reports in #Moldova elections are counted. At this point it's the diaspora vote in #USA & #Canada that comes in last. Diaspora overwhelmingly voted for anti-coruption pro-Western PAS giving it 84% of votes, as follows:
20. While PAS victory and the right to govern alone is practically sealed, I will add mine and my family vote to #Moldova elections at the polling station in New York (Brooklyn) in a few minutes. See you there & I hope PAS won't disappoint.
21. There was no line at the NY polling station for #Moldova elections at 8pm EST USA, it was next to "Moldova" restaurant, passport online verification vs electoral register was fast, the 3 of us were processed in minutes (manually), observers were present. Voted for #Moldova
22. Final figures for #Moldova elections on July 11 - presence 1,477,574 voters = 48.41%.
Results: 1. Anti-coruption=pro-Western PAS 52.80% 2. Corruption riddled Socialist -Communist Block 27.17% 3. Corruption involved Shor's Party 5.74%
23. In terms of participation - note a good observation by a prominent #Moldova journalist working for both Moldovan and international media "if we vote for our future, why didn't that future came out to vote?" - young voters (18-25yo) participation was a mere 7.36%
23. Moldova capital city vote (Municipality, incl. the city, suburbs & villages), run by a Socialist mayor, was: 1. PAS 56.77% 2. Socialist-Communist block (of the Mayor) only 28.40% 3. Shor etc under 4%. 4. PPDA (ex-winner of unlawfully cancelled mayoral elections) 2.16%
24. Slightly over 210,000 votes of diaspora in #Moldova July 11 elections crushed the Socialist-Communist Block (came in 4th), possibly meaning even diaspora in Russia voted for PAS etc, despite Kremlin's support for Dodon. Diaspora final results: PAS=86.23%, all others under 3%
25. In comparison to #Moldova proper, diaspora younger voters of 18-25yo participation in July 11 elections was 12.04%, after the very active 26-40yo group (49.67% of voters) & relatively active group of 41-55yo (27.15%), while 56-70yo group that emigrates less was still 10.64%
26. #Moldova July 11 elections mandates distribution, in 101 seats Parliament: 1. PAS - 63 seats; 3rd time a party will govern alone in MLD & the highest percentage a party ever won, beating Communist 2001 results (50.07%) 2. Socialist-Communist Block - 32 seats 3. Shor - 6 seats
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#Moldova elections & referendum to join #EU - since I live in New York, US, makes more sense to reiterate some earlier points & add new ones - what is happening & what is REALLY at stake, aside from the obvious. At 18:05hrs (6.05PM US EST) the turnout is 48.81% (a developing 🧵)
2. For comparison, at the end of the 2020 Presidential elections the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) registered a total of 1348719 casted votes. In 2024, with the elections continuing, we already have a higher number and counting. The vote continues till 9pm local timeS!
3. Moldovans vote today to elect their President & in a referendum whether to joint the European Union or not. The CEC just declared a few minutes ago that #Moldova referendum to join the #EU has passed - no results yet ofc (video in Romanian - min 11:30)
@ForeignPolicy continues the “trend” of relying on #Russia analysts on ex-USSR, this time on #Moldova ahead of Presidential elections & referendum to join #EU … A Russian perspective is useful, but I’d love to see important alternatives/pts below (👇🧵)
2. Moldovan President, by Constitution, has to renounce its party membership and in a semi-parliamentary system is not a major decision maker - unless backed by a party in the Parliament & its Government, which is the case now via PAS party she previously led.
3. The incumbent (anti-corruption & pro-West) Moldovan President has a 36% popularity vs 10% of pro-Russian candidate. It WAS clear from the start that she will be re-elected & thus will contribute to 2025 elections for her “former” party that Governs now. (Watchdog Oct2024)
I was asked about #Ukraine peace plan last week. I wanted to point out to #Russia option in “worst case” to temporarily freeze/slow down the war, like in 2014 Ukraine or 1992 in #Moldova to then unfreeze it at more favorable times as in #Georgia or Checnya dw.com/uk/u-zelenskog…
2. Russia signals of “being ready to negotiate” should therefore be considered in the light of its previous MO of freezing conflicts to reopen them later, rather than genuine desire to solve them - that is also contradicted by prior statements and other actions.
3. 👆👇That’s 1reason why I pointed out #Ukraine will consider its own timing for negotiations & will rely on previous evidence to navigate this conflict scenario - prior conflicts #Russia initiated & adding itself as a “mediator” freezing them, Ru internal decisions, etc.
Last fall a couple from #Moldova painted the stars of David in #France, in an FSB op to destabilize the country during Israel war on Hamas. Now it’s repeated w “French solders to come back in coffins from #Ukraine ” = FSB activated its EastEuropean assets
2. #Russia with its security services more constrained in Europe now, activates its proxy assets in #Moldova the 2nd time to attempt to destabilize #France again. These FSB moves previously amplified by Ru Doppleganger network were 1st reported in 2023:
3. However, the original info by @lemondefr about 2024 paintings of coffins, which continue the 2023 trend set presumably by Russian FSB proxies from Moldova, indicates that ppl from 3 other countries were involved this time: German, Bulgarian & Ukrainian lemonde.fr/en/pixels/arti…
As ex-negotiator with #Russia in #Moldova & intl mediator in #Georgia, I see a number of problems with recent article on #Ukraine negotiations - from data interpretation & perceptions to causal effects. Reasons why Charap’s prior analysis was so criticized foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/talks-…
2. Due to lack of time, I will try to post my observations throughout the day. So, this is a developing thread. And as many of my concerns have been already covered by others, my observations may come too late. Still, kindly bear with me throughout this developing thread.
3. As a Govt negotiator on Russian troops withdrawal (and 2 Transnistrian conflict commissions) I witnessed Russians use of lies in talks about their troop numbers, even when we knew they were briefed. Therefore taking Russian statements at face value always presents a problem.
A new development with #Russia planned "coup" in #Modova is that Pres. Putin cancelled ONE of the decrees that among other recognized MLD territorial integrity. That happened after Kremlin coup in MLD failed, as #Ukraine intercepted it &Moldova stopped it newsweek.com/moldova-russia…
2. As we know #Russian attempt to destabilize #Moldova did not work. #Ukraine President Zelensky announced that its country intercepted the plans. As experts saw, the Kremlin is now trying to use its proxies, sympathizers etc to destabilize the situation
3. I was asked if #Russia really plans to invade #Moldova. I don't think so, tho Kremlin's decision making is so skewed... I do believe, however, that Kremlin expected its proxies in MLD to start a coup "Donbass" style + create instability near #Ukraine