There’s been a lot of discussion lately about the level of #Taliban control in #Afghanistan, so this is a brief THREAD on that topic. 1/n
The debates about district control go back a long time. I was first involved in these during my time @CENTCOM circa 2009. At that time, ISAF was producing district control maps, as was CENTCOM & @DefenseIntel (among others). None of them agreed on methods or results. 2/n
@CENTCOM@DefenseIntel Later, while with ISAF & at the command’s request, I wrote an internal memo laying out the challenges with the various methodologies involved with assessing "control" at the district level in #Afghanistan. 3/n
@CENTCOM@DefenseIntel Some of the more significant issues w/it entail: What does “control” really mean & how should it be characterized? What are the appropriate indicators & data sources for assessing it? Are districts the best (or even a meaningful) unit of measure for it? 4/n
@CENTCOM@DefenseIntel These Qs have never been fully resolved & so the discussion continues today. IMO, “control” is a fraught concept for a bunch of reasons. But its conceptual simplicity to lay audiences makes it nonetheless appealing & so it persists in popular forums. 5/n
@CENTCOM@DefenseIntel@billroggio@WarOnTheRocks It’s a credit to @billroggio that he stuck w/it while others packed it in. While his maps suffer from the imperfections of the “control” concept as described above & limits of his sources/methods, the consistency of his work over time nonetheless provides something useful. 7/n
@CENTCOM@DefenseIntel@billroggio@WarOnTheRocks It's interesting now, however, to see a bunch of different control maps emerging again. Not surprising w/the #Taliban offensive + US withdrawal in the news, but interesting nonetheless. Here is one published by the BBC recently. It differs markedly from @billroggio's map. 8/n
@CENTCOM@DefenseIntel@billroggio@WarOnTheRocks@mansfieldintinc@BBC@AANafgh The point of all this is: 1) “Control” is not a well-defined or consensus concept—different analysts/sources differ on what it means; 2) None of these maps should be viewed as precise—I would put a ROM estimate of +/- 10-15% error bars on control %s derived from any of them. 11/n
Today, @USGAO released a report that describes the efforts of @StateDept, @DHSgov & @DeptofDefense to counter foreign disinformation. 1/n
@USGAO @StateDept @DHSgov @DeptofDefense GAO cited the following as examples:
- @StateDept's Global Engagement Center helps federal agencies, embassies & int'l partners develop analytic skills, policy responses & technical capacity to counter foreign disinformation overseas. 2/n
@USGAO @StateDept @DHSgov @DeptofDefense - @DHSgov's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency educates the public on the risks of disinformation and partners with state and local election officials to disseminate educational materials to help them identify disinformation. 3/n
Fascinating account here of how #alQaeda's Ayman al-Zawahiri reportedly ended up in a Siraj Haqqani safehouse in downtown Kabul (& the #Taliban's request for AQ to not acknowledge the event). Will put some key points in this thread. 1/n
According to the article, a young #Taliban intel (GDI) officer brought Zawahiri to Kabul in 2022 b/c the latter was suffering from "heart, kidney and skin problems" & needed treatment in the capital. They traveled over the course of 3 weeks from Helmand province. 2/n
Al-Zawahiri was initially posted in a #Taliban intel (GDI) safehouse, but after a drone was sighted flying overhead, he was moved to a second safehouse (near the Sai Rahi Aludin roundabout) in the capital. 3/n
As with its last report, this latest report on the #Taliban’s relationship with #alQaeda in #Afghanistan is 180 degrees out from the current US assessment. 1/n cbsnews.com/news/afghanist…
“According to the report presented to the UNSC [#alQaeda] has established ‘up to 8 new training camps in #Afghanistan, including four in Ghazni, Laghman, Parwan & Uruzgan Provinces, w\a new base to stockpile weaponry in the Panjshir Valley….’ 2/n
“…The terrorist organization also operates 5 madrasas - religious schools where it trains and indoctrinates children to become fighters - in the east & northeast of #Afghanistan, the reports said…” 3/n
I was recently passed a pre-publication copy of Feridun Sinirlioğlu's independent assessment of the situation in #Afghanistan, conducted for the @UN
I'll put some thoughts about it in this THREAD. 1/n
@UN (Since the report isn't out yet, I can't link to it, but you can find various news articles about it via Google, such as this one by @VOANews: ) 2/nvoanews.com/a/un-mandated-…
@UN @VOANews Overall, the assessment is clearly written & admirably forthright, especially given that its audiences are wide-ranging, from the #Taliban to those who hate the Taliban.
Its primary conclusion: "the status quo of int'l engagement is not working." 3/n
Today, the #Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs published an evaluation report of its contribution to the Resolute Support mission in #Afghanistan that *pulls no punches.*
I'll string together its primary findings in this THREAD. 1/n
Before the findings, a quick comment: the Dutch MFA produced this report b/c "Dutch contributions to missions under Article 100 of the Dutch Constitution are subject to an obligation to evaluate the deployment after it's been completed"
Today, the @JoeBiden admin released its National Security Strategy. I’ll summarize its major points & put some thoughts on #terrorism & #Afghanistan specifically in this THREAD. 1/n
@JoeBiden The strategy exists in 5 parts: (1) overview of the problem; (2) sources of US strength (solutions); (3) global priorities; (4) strategy by region; (5) conclusion.
Oddly, part 1 starts on page 6. Nitpicky, I know, but still weird--who counts the cover as page 1? 3/n