Thread by @DrRadchenko

This is a rather strange article. You'd think that, at one level, Russian policy-makers should be quite pleased with it because Kupchan here endorses a strategy (that the Biden administration has in any case been following) of easing off on Russia to focus on China. But...

https://twitter.com/ForeignAffairs/status/1423072557247442944

But the evidence is unconvincing, many of the historical examples furnished get the facts wrong, and the whole premise of the article - that Washington can somehow convince Russia of what its national interests should be - infantilises Russia to a degree.

Kupchan argues that the relationship between China & Russia is asymmetrical; thus, Russia should presumably see that it is not in its interest to align with Beijing. Yet he also claims that the relationship allows Russia to push above its weight on the international stage.

Even if we accept that Russia is "insecure" (though I doubt that it's any more insecure than, say, the U.S., about its global position and power), why should we expect Moscow to go sour on a relationship that allows it to push above its weight? That would be self-defeating.

Kupchan's answer seems to be that China and Russia have a terrible history and basically don't trust each other. He goes back to the 17th century to prove it, though his focus is on the Mao years. The analysis is not the best you've read on Sino-Soviet relations.

For example, we have this here. Seems (from elsewhere in the text) that Kupchan is talking about 1950-59, which of course overlapped with the Korean War, Khrushchev's nuclear threats in the Middle East, the Berlin crisis etc - one hell of a way to "seek stability."

Or this here. First of all, the Soviets withdrew all experts, not just military experts but I am a little bit skeptical about the claim that they broke off strategic cooperation.

In fact, Moscow continued to reach out to China with various proposals for strategic cooperation (e.g. in Vietnam) until at least 1965, and if anyone broke off strategic cooperation, it was obviously China, not the Soviet Union. But this is just me being the annoying historian.

This here is a more serious mistake. It's well known that Moscow's relations with Beijing "recovered" by 1989, when Gorbachev and Deng pledged to "close the past and open the future." I'd argue things were on a dramatic upwards trajectory already from 1987 onward.

That's important, not least because it shows that even as Gorbachev reached out to the West, he also recognised the importance of improving relations with China (Sino-Soviet rapprochement became one of his lasting legacies).

This is because Gorbachev realised something that Kupchan does not - that is, that the difficult history of Sino-Russian and Sino-Soviet relations give both sides every reason to seek closer, more stable partnership that would not allow third parties to play them off one another.

The Chinese also learned something from the experience of dealing with Moscow: that if you try to browbeat your partner into following your political preferences, you'll like just cause resentment and backlash. The Chinese have not so far translated their power into leverage.

That's why I am a little bit skeptical about the rest of the article, where Kupchan raises the well-known straw-men, including the prospect of China squeezing Russia out of Central Asia and, omg, taking over Siberia or something.

If he spent more time in Central Asia, he would have discovered that the local actors are far from being turned into willing auxiliaries to China's empire, and if he spent more time in Siberia, he would've concluded that the problem there is that China is not interested enough.

To conclude, I find the whole premise of "splitting" China and Russia wrong. It strikes me as naive. It reminds me of that time in the early 1970s, when Mao was trying undermine detente and Ostpolitik, as if the US and Germany did not understand their own national interests.

Sure, it is certainly in Moscow's interest that folks in DC believe that it can be lured away from Beijing (gives the Russians way more leverage).

But even if the Russians had a fantastic relationship with the West, it would be stupid and irresponsible for them to allow themselves to be "played" against China.

What the US policy makers should really do imho is to re-visit Nixon's reasons for engaging with Beijing back in the day. Yes, there was an element of card-playing there but the key was not this. The key was that the US could ill afford to ignore China.

And so it is with Russia. Whatever relationship with Russia is pursued (whether it is engagement or containment or a combination of both), it should be pursued for its own sake, not for any instrumental reasons that have to do with China.

'Splitting China and Russia' seems to me like a wrong take on the problem. I don't know why it has become so popular in Washington. Could it be from people not reading enough history and not being able to put themselves in their opponent's shoes?