Blockchain miners unilaterally order transactions into blocks
They are partially centralized with each miner of a block
They are partially centralized with each miner of a block
As example of what can go wrong
Someone creating a token trade on a decentralized exchange can get sandwich attacked and lose funds through slippage
Miners uses their advanced knowledge to attack user transactions by manipulating ordering
Poor user experience today
Someone creating a token trade on a decentralized exchange can get sandwich attacked and lose funds through slippage
Miners uses their advanced knowledge to attack user transactions by manipulating ordering
Poor user experience today
This is known as Miner Extractable Value (MEV)
There are many forms of MEV
Arbitrage is useful
Frontrunning, sandwich attacks are bad clearly
There are many forms of MEV
Arbitrage is useful
Frontrunning, sandwich attacks are bad clearly
In the Flash Bots 2.0 paper, cases are shown of people losing funds
Rajesh got all the rupees in his village and lost it all by being frontrun
Rajesh got all the rupees in his village and lost it all by being frontrun
Chainlink Fair Sequencing Services aims to provide more fair ordering for transactions
Decentralized ordering of transaction ordering helps fix this
DONs are a great ready made committee
Oracles reporting tx ordering is a natural oracle functionality
DONs are a great ready made committee
Oracles reporting tx ordering is a natural oracle functionality
In phase one
FSS will have Secure Causal Ordering (encryption of transactions)
You can't frontrun what you can't see!
Encrypt -> order -> decrypt
Some limitations, but this can be fixed through combining another method
FSS will have Secure Causal Ordering (encryption of transactions)
You can't frontrun what you can't see!
Encrypt -> order -> decrypt
Some limitations, but this can be fixed through combining another method
Phase two
Add Aequitas set of consensus protocols
Transactions ordered by super-majority receive time
Secure casual ordering + Aequitas = complementary approach
Add Aequitas set of consensus protocols
Transactions ordered by super-majority receive time
Secure casual ordering + Aequitas = complementary approach
This a belt and suspenders approach
Best case = Aequitas fair ordering works
Worst case = TXs are still private before ordering
Best case = Aequitas fair ordering works
Worst case = TXs are still private before ordering
FSS can order transactions for layer 1 contracts on the application level
FSS can order all transactions for layer 2 networks
FSS can order all transactions for layer 2 networks
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