Thread by @MMazarr

One argument of critics is that, as Bret Stephens claims, the US had a cozy minimal presence which "Any American president could have maintained ... almost indefinitely — with no prospect of defeating the Taliban but none of being routed by them, either"
nytimes.com/2021/08/15/opi…

"In other words," Stephens adds, "we had achieved a good-enough solution for a nation we could afford to neither save nor lose. We squandered it anyway." This is far too simplistic, a dangerous and misleading straw man. Many problems with this vision of a Permanent Minimal War:

1. There is no end to the effort in this scheme. None. If we agree that governance + other key indicators were stuck or in reverse, this clever stratagem ties the US to a truly forever war. What major democracy has ever maintained such a role (in *active* combat) for 3+ decades?

2. Even w/small force levels there are economic costs. Proposed 2021 spending was $14B assuming big drawdown; if violence fluctuated, we could easily have seen spikes. So, with potent domestic needs, we spend $20B+ a year on an endless war?
militarytimes.com/flashpoints/20…

3. The "stay forever" plan assumes the Taliban would have tolerated such a stalemate forever. They would not. The last few days suggest they had major untapped political + military power. If they sensed the US was digging in to stay, they would escalate, not abandon their cause

4. Indeed, the best guess is probably that there was never a stalemate to preserve. Mapping Taliban control is tough, but lots of indicators showed gradual rise in power. Last days indicate that they were accumulating more influence than we thought
lawfareblog.com/challenges-map…

And so, the US would not have had a calm perpetual position but rather more likely confront a series of "2009 moments": Trends look bad, we can surge or watch it fall apart. That's not a sustainable long-term strategic position to be in. Biden did future presidents a huge favor

5. Staying forever makes the US complicit in maintaining a permanent state of war in another nation. However bad Taliban rule may be, the costs of war must weigh as well: 240K deaths since 2001 including 70K civilians. Thousands still dying in 2020-2021
bbc.com/news/world-asi…

6. Finally, other risks in withdrawal--to the US homeland, to Pakistan, to US reputation, of refugee flows--exist at least to the same degree in an ongoing war. Spikes in violence, spreading fighting + eventual Taliban desperation could have produced all manner of perils

Stephens says we've stayed in Korea for 71 years, so why not Afghanistan? Well, how about this: *Because there is not an active conflict underway in Korea,* and we are not targeted by an insurgency.

He admits that "the Afghan gov't [is] corrupt and inept" but at least it isn't "massacring its own citizens or raising the banner of jihad." That isn't the point. If your partner can't govern effectively, you can't simply dig in: Eventually, your position will become untenable

He says departing a war without victory amounts to "squandering the sacrifice of so many Americans who fought the Taliban bravely and nobly." As opposed to staying in a war you know you cannot win, and demanding that till more sacrifice for a callous strategic gambit?

Finally, the moralistic crescendo: "Our inability to help everyone, everywhere doesn’t relieve us of the obligation to help someone, somewhere," and "America’s power and reputation" rely on "being a beacon of confidence and hope." Good argument for foreign aid, not for making war

Bottom line: There simply is no magical, "leave the minimum force to tamp down the Taliban and look the other way" option for Afghanistan. It doesn't exist. You can't halfway fight a war--not in general, and surely not for a whole generation

It's ironic that this idea is appearing alongside moralistic repudiations of the administration. The Permanent Minimal War option is nothing more than institutionalized avoidance of responsibility, a callous dance around the real decision, dressed up to look like clever strategy