The “gyrations” through Apple’s beta cycle since WWDC when it comes to Safari UX are fascinating—some might even say not very “Apple-like”. Changing is fine. But where the design seems to be ending up is suboptimal for a platform, IMO. Here’s why, but not why one might think /1
2/ Moving address bar up/down and/or having a separate address bar are rational design choices that people will (vigorously) debate. I have an opinion too.
What one has come to expect from Apple is a “point of view” in product design expressed through “the way it should work.”
3/ There was a lot of feedback about the early design and implementation. It was rough. That started the feedback loop from developers (those are who use the beta) that it was never going to be right. Developers of all people should know it could change. But momentum gained…
4/ Then Apple added the options to have the tab bar top or bottom and/or compact/separate and so on. This is what I wanted to comment on. Many people rejoice at having the choice. “Give me options” is the rallying cry of developers/techies everywhere.
5/ At the same time “everyone knows” that vast majority of people never change the default. A design choice like this either works or doesn’t. Most people would have had a “moved my cheese” moment/minutes and then resumed routine usage.
6/ So the argument goes that for power users options are great. They can find them and tweak them. Then they are back to being fully productive and most people don’t notice.
But this creates a “fork” in the evolution of the product. That is bad for everyone.
7/ When Office 97 introduced the scroll wheel on mice (invented by an Excel PM) the original idea was to zoom w/ the wheel. But Word and browsing thought scrolling was best. Testing. Debates. More tests. Scrolling was right. Still we shipped an option. No one used it.
8/ Here’s the 2 problems that arise. First, from an engineering perspective the code has these two states. Everything needs to be tested against these two states. Easy to see a bunch of ways that this impacts web site design too because now sites have different available pixels.
9/ This is not just a pain or an easy to absorb cost, but this compounds exponentially. Every new feature now has to consider this modality. Pretty soon combinatorics of options like this across a platform add up.
And remember, this was kind of an objection handler for techies.
10/ Second, product now has a constraint for all future design changes. Down the road every new feature has to be designed considering how the design works in each of these states.
What can happen is that a new feature conflicts with one state or simply doesn’t work with it.
11/ In the scroll wheel, what happened was that it meant now across Office the wheel was inconsistent because not every app really made sense with zoom. How often do you need zoom in Outlook? Sure just doing the “right thing” could mostly work, but it is also confusing.
12/ So there are real costs. Ultimately, product design is about expressing a point of view. It isn’t always right. It can be super wrong (some people probably didn’t get to tweet 12 and already made snarked about Windows 8).
But a point of view is what a product is.
13/ Of course some preferences or options are a good thing. But the time to add those is not when introducing a new feature you’re not sure of. That’s the worst time.
All that does is say that if the vocal group on pre-release products complains, then add an option. Ugh.
14/ If feedback is so overwhelming and you believe your point of view won’t be “appreciated” by a larger more diverse set of customers, then revisit the choice entirely.
Or stick to your POV. Maybe it’s right. Or wrong. Adjust down the road. It’s how new things can happen.
15/ Making choices about changing UX people are used to is fundamentally what product design is about. Only you know where you want to take a product in years beyond a release. Sometimes you make changes along the way that take time to “appreciate”. Or you make mistakes. // END
PS/ I know this is controversial on twitter esp b/c here are the tiny %age of people who use options. But please at least consider the real engineering challenges that happen by introducing modalities—or just blast me for hating choice.
I get the visceral reaction. Honest. 🙏//
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Study of Microsoft employees shows how remote work puts productivity and innovation at risk geekwire.com/2021/study-mic… via @GeekWire // This is a paper out from a large group of researchers at Microsoft (and others). I have many thoughts on this. 1/
2/ My intention is not to comment on research per se but on how it might be misapplied. Studies of electronic communication in orgs--have been put forth ever since MSFT introduced email. At best this is telemetry and at worst it can be used to imply causality.
3/ I have no doubt that this research accurately captures the flow of information using digital tools around the company for over 60K people. That's a huge amount of work and analysis. Kudos. The challenge from the outset is that it conflates that flow with "collaboration".
With early success in a product there's often a strong desire (or rush) to "make it a platform". Having an app is great and making it a platform is better.
How Microsoft and Apple worked *together* to create Macintosh is a huge lesson on building a platform. 1/
2/ Apple saw the value of having VisiCalc on Apple ][ and IBM saw that for PCs with 1-2-3.
The common thread is that platforms benefitted from a third party betting their future business on the platform. It was existential for the platform to have companies doing that.
3/ Conversely, third parties came to realize that betting their business on a platform can create a stronger relationship--an influencer relationship--with the platform. Bill Gates saw that potential with Macintosh.
I know it is difficult to believe, but there was a time when key tech leaders and influencers of the world were dead set against the graphical interface.
In 1985, less than a year after Macintosh was unveiled the naysayers were out in full force... 1/
2/ About 2M Apple ][ had been sold in total. About 3.5M IBM PCs (8086). About 8M Atari, TRS-80, C64 all combined. This was early. ~20M computers sold, worldwide, total.
Dr Dobbs, InfoWorld, Byte magazines were supreme. We're in "Halt and Catch Fire" S1. Joe MacMillan reads IW.
3/ If a hobbyist magazine printed a story you didn't like you probably just ranted at your user group meeting thursday night.
If it really bugged you, then you'd write a letter to the editor. Maybe they would print it a few weeks later. Then a few thousand people would see it.
Incompatible Files, Slipping, Office 97 RTM— new post in “Hardcore Software” …rdcoresoftware.learningbyshipping.com/p/045-incompat… // “Reviews” were a key part of the early days of the PC era. In the context of shipping Office 97, this post looks at how reviews were changing as the industry matured. 1/11
2/ From the earliest days through Windows 95, personal computer reviews were primarily done by “tech enthusiasts” and aimed at same. Basically hobbyists reviewed products for hobbyists. That was the industry. Here’s BYTE giving Office 97 ⭐️ ⭐️ ⭐️ ⭐️ ⭐️ across the board.
3/ Such enthusiast outlets were our key constituency as most all sales were driven through retail channel and most retail customers were buying magazines like these by the pound (at the peak, an issue of BYTE or PCMag was hundreds of pages, mostly ads). So victory.
"Making the Laptop Commonplace" - NY Times 1985. A great example of challenges in forecasting progress in technologies when improvements are happing at exponential rates. Article asks what happened to all those predictions from last year (!) that laptops would be a big deal? 1/
2/ "People don't want to lug a computer with them to the beach or on a train to while away hours they would rather spend reading the sports or business section of the newspaper."
What if the laptop were the place to read those!
3/ "Right now laptops cost considerably more than the equivalent desktop computer."
What if the need to innovate in laptops not only made components smaller, but cheaper, and at the same time consume less energy? Then who wouldn't want a laptop *instead* of a desktop?
2/ If you would have told me in 1997 that I would still be talking about the paperclip in 2021, I would have LOLed and OMGed. I definitely want to go through reasoning and choices of the feature because it is super interesting. But the real story is not as much why, but how?
3/ In 1995, Office was half of Microsoft's profits. Through the release of Office 95 there were over 12 million licenses sold (about 100M Windows capable PCs had been sold since 1990). Still, there was competition from two billion-dollar companies, leaders in the DOS era.