Incompatible Files, Slipping, Office 97 RTM— new post in “Hardcore Software” …rdcoresoftware.learningbyshipping.com/p/045-incompat… // “Reviews” were a key part of the early days of the PC era. In the context of shipping Office 97, this post looks at how reviews were changing as the industry matured. 1/11
2/ From the earliest days through Windows 95, personal computer reviews were primarily done by “tech enthusiasts” and aimed at same. Basically hobbyists reviewed products for hobbyists. That was the industry. Here’s BYTE giving Office 97 ⭐️ ⭐️ ⭐️ ⭐️ ⭐️ across the board.
3/ Such enthusiast outlets were our key constituency as most all sales were driven through retail channel and most retail customers were buying magazines like these by the pound (at the peak, an issue of BYTE or PCMag was hundreds of pages, mostly ads). So victory.
4/ BUT as PC became standard in biz and also a families, techie reviews got squeezed from both ends (less techie & more “enterprise”). @waltmossberg started his WSJ column in late 1991. He was decidedly for “regular” users. “PCs are just too hard to use, and it isn’t your fault”.
5/ Such reviews put a whole new lens on Office. We prided ourselves on designing for such regular people, but quickly found that a first principles look at our products would yield decidedly different reviews. We weren’t surprised as much as bummed. Walt’s Outlook 97 review:
6/ I mean “the email module is the worst” is pretty problematic for Outlook, an email program.
I clipped it and carried it around for literally the rest of my career. It was also when I/we changed how we thought about reviews with a big de-emphasis of “techie” outlets.
7/ Yet at the same time a whole other point of view entered as a “gatekeeper”—industry analysts such as Gartner (and Forrester, Giga, Meta, …). These reviews didn’t speak for regular people but “regular IT people”. This was much more difficult a challenge…
8/ IT was basically under siege with PCs popping up everywhere and also breaking everywhere they were responsible for fixing everything but had not control. Where Walt might have wanted ease of use improvements, Gartner wanted big “strategy” and also no real changes in product.
9/ Today it is difficult for many to internalize the importance of reviews. In fact in today’s lingo these reviews were gatekeepers—we needed them in order to reach customers. Every newspaper, magazine, dedicated pubs, TV, etc featured tech. We had to meet 100s of outlets.
10/ The biggest challenge in engaging reviewers was a lack of “data”. Reviewers had their opinion and represented their readers. We had our view of product and industry. A battle of anecdotes was tricky.
Meanwhile PC sales were exploding. That was the real story. What a curve!
11/ Lots more about this lesson and a the changing PC environment in hardcoresoftware.substack.com. Please consider subscribing.
This is the last post of the PC era “beginning”. Now moving to the new millennium and the rise of biz computing. A huge set of challenges to come. //END
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Study of Microsoft employees shows how remote work puts productivity and innovation at risk geekwire.com/2021/study-mic… via @GeekWire // This is a paper out from a large group of researchers at Microsoft (and others). I have many thoughts on this. 1/
2/ My intention is not to comment on research per se but on how it might be misapplied. Studies of electronic communication in orgs--have been put forth ever since MSFT introduced email. At best this is telemetry and at worst it can be used to imply causality.
3/ I have no doubt that this research accurately captures the flow of information using digital tools around the company for over 60K people. That's a huge amount of work and analysis. Kudos. The challenge from the outset is that it conflates that flow with "collaboration".
With early success in a product there's often a strong desire (or rush) to "make it a platform". Having an app is great and making it a platform is better.
How Microsoft and Apple worked *together* to create Macintosh is a huge lesson on building a platform. 1/
2/ Apple saw the value of having VisiCalc on Apple ][ and IBM saw that for PCs with 1-2-3.
The common thread is that platforms benefitted from a third party betting their future business on the platform. It was existential for the platform to have companies doing that.
3/ Conversely, third parties came to realize that betting their business on a platform can create a stronger relationship--an influencer relationship--with the platform. Bill Gates saw that potential with Macintosh.
I know it is difficult to believe, but there was a time when key tech leaders and influencers of the world were dead set against the graphical interface.
In 1985, less than a year after Macintosh was unveiled the naysayers were out in full force... 1/
2/ About 2M Apple ][ had been sold in total. About 3.5M IBM PCs (8086). About 8M Atari, TRS-80, C64 all combined. This was early. ~20M computers sold, worldwide, total.
Dr Dobbs, InfoWorld, Byte magazines were supreme. We're in "Halt and Catch Fire" S1. Joe MacMillan reads IW.
3/ If a hobbyist magazine printed a story you didn't like you probably just ranted at your user group meeting thursday night.
If it really bugged you, then you'd write a letter to the editor. Maybe they would print it a few weeks later. Then a few thousand people would see it.
"Making the Laptop Commonplace" - NY Times 1985. A great example of challenges in forecasting progress in technologies when improvements are happing at exponential rates. Article asks what happened to all those predictions from last year (!) that laptops would be a big deal? 1/
2/ "People don't want to lug a computer with them to the beach or on a train to while away hours they would rather spend reading the sports or business section of the newspaper."
What if the laptop were the place to read those!
3/ "Right now laptops cost considerably more than the equivalent desktop computer."
What if the need to innovate in laptops not only made components smaller, but cheaper, and at the same time consume less energy? Then who wouldn't want a laptop *instead* of a desktop?
The “gyrations” through Apple’s beta cycle since WWDC when it comes to Safari UX are fascinating—some might even say not very “Apple-like”. Changing is fine. But where the design seems to be ending up is suboptimal for a platform, IMO. Here’s why, but not why one might think /1
2/ Moving address bar up/down and/or having a separate address bar are rational design choices that people will (vigorously) debate. I have an opinion too.
What one has come to expect from Apple is a “point of view” in product design expressed through “the way it should work.”
3/ There was a lot of feedback about the early design and implementation. It was rough. That started the feedback loop from developers (those are who use the beta) that it was never going to be right. Developers of all people should know it could change. But momentum gained…
2/ If you would have told me in 1997 that I would still be talking about the paperclip in 2021, I would have LOLed and OMGed. I definitely want to go through reasoning and choices of the feature because it is super interesting. But the real story is not as much why, but how?
3/ In 1995, Office was half of Microsoft's profits. Through the release of Office 95 there were over 12 million licenses sold (about 100M Windows capable PCs had been sold since 1990). Still, there was competition from two billion-dollar companies, leaders in the DOS era.