Study of Microsoft employees shows how remote work puts productivity and innovation at risk geekwire.com/2021/study-mic… via @GeekWire // This is a paper out from a large group of researchers at Microsoft (and others). I have many thoughts on this. 1/
2/ My intention is not to comment on research per se but on how it might be misapplied. Studies of electronic communication in orgs--have been put forth ever since MSFT introduced email. At best this is telemetry and at worst it can be used to imply causality.
3/ I have no doubt that this research accurately captures the flow of information using digital tools around the company for over 60K people. That's a huge amount of work and analysis. Kudos. The challenge from the outset is that it conflates that flow with "collaboration".
4/ All of these measures are activities…not progress or innovation. Just as BillG famously debated/fought IBM over a notion of counting lines of code, the number of emails, IMs, or meetings can potentially be the wrong thing to measure. Of course during a pandemic these change.
5/ IMO as a manager, there are two mistakes one could make. One is to measure digital communication and associate it with execution, productivity, or even progress. Second, is to associate any of these measures with collaboration.
6/ This second point is a bigger challenge. "Collaboration" is never negative. And no one wants less communication. But before the pandemic no one ever said every meeting was effective collaboration or even communication. That's why these digital artifacts are vanity metrics.
7/ All that aside (and I really don't want to debate the 10 authors), the real issue is as described previously, the pandemic is not about "work from home" or "remote". The real question that is now raised is "why did we work the way we did?" Old thread:
8/ I mention this b/c it should not be a surprise that the big companies were most anxious to "get back to normal"--everything about today's large companies by and large is modeled after post-war, centralized, hierarchical efforts. No reason at all that is the only way to scale.
9/ In "Creating the Future of Work" I try to outline a bold future to reinvent how we work instigated by the pandemic. Key is the "post-War" mindset is no longer valid. Given the success we have seen, why not rethink and consider why what worked did work. medium.learningbyshipping.com/creating-the-f…
10/ This paper does a great job on the analysis if one presumes that three key variables are *fixed*. The problem is the pandemic has shown that fixing those is the wrong thing to do in the face of WFH. These three variables:
• Strategy
• Org structure/shape
• rewards/growth
11/ Strategy. A strategy that presumes a huge amount of cross-company, cross-team, cross-function comm/collab (whatever) is one not suited to remote work. If you pick this strategy then of course you need to be in meetings all the time and you need people to be connecting dots.
12/ Historically MSFT was heavily tilted this way (Apple is extremely tilted--it is the key reason the products are what they are, IMO). In hardcoresoftware.substack.com I talked about how we used to joke about making a table like this below and filling in the squares.
13/ If you build tightly coupled products as a strategy then you need all those disparate team "talking". The question is how much do customers really value that *today*? The big successes during pandemic work were people simply doing what seems to work/right. Why stop now?
14/ Org structure today is optimized around communication going up/down/across mgmt chains. Everything from mgmt hierarchy to titles is conflated with a centralized strategy. It is all designed around how manufacturing companies scaled after the war, based on how the war was won!
15/ It goes without saying that all the layers of management in BigCo have been ridiculed for decades. I have written tons on the value of ineffective middle management suck-ups even. BUT, these roles only make sense when executing a highly coordinated-central strategy.
16/ It is literally the case that if you require a given part of one product to be co-designed or deeply connected to "n" other products, then at some point you are going to have any number of coordinating roles. Each one of those creates meetings, comms, or "collaboration".
17/ This leads to an org shape that is optimized around a presumption that everything needs to have "collaboration" overhead built in. Pretty soon there are 10 levels of hierarchy and that itself creates more "collaboration"
18/ My view is a loosely coupled strategy is executed by a loosely coupled organization. And a loosely coupled-org strategy means that there are fewer layers. Fewer layers by definition will mean fewer meetings, fewer people to talk to, less "cross-collaboration" in a good way.
19/ Finally, rewards/growth need to be looked at differently. In the old model everyone aspired to be "promoted" so they could go to the next level of meeting--leads meeting, group meeting, GM meeting, exec staff and so on. But what if those meetings/layers do not exist?
20/ Today everything about growth after say 5yrs is focused on "management" on becoming a manager. In a well-run bigco that is 20% of the employees but in many orgs it can easily be 35% (when I managed Office it was that number, then Windows was >30% until we made changes).
21/ While many bigco say that oppty are the same for IC v. manager, that simply isn't statistically true. But that is based essentially on the post-war (military) model. There's no reason at all to be that way now. Companies need code more than ever. Promote, grow, pay for code.
22/ 20th century bigco came to define a career path where success was how quickly you stop doing the work you were hired to do. At my 5 year college reunion, I was the only CS major still writing code. Everyone else was promoted to management. CRAZY!
23/ Finally, the paper made this crazy point. (yes that's judgemental and again not picking a fight). But in no model of innovation does the number of meetings or emails correlate with or is a causal factor of innovation. Really. I mean it.
24/ The pandemic has been a trauma for everyone in planet earth. Those entering the workforce now, the future CEOs, executives, and founders will necessarily have entirely different views on how to work because they are "native" remote/WFH. LISTEN TO THEM NOW. THEY KNOW.
25/ Everyone wants to get back to normal. The thing is this is normal now and forever. It will take years, but the people who have only known remote/WFH are in fact the leaders of tomorrow. They don't know the old ways. Why teach them bad habits? // END
PS/ Meant to include this excerpt.
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With early success in a product there's often a strong desire (or rush) to "make it a platform". Having an app is great and making it a platform is better.
How Microsoft and Apple worked *together* to create Macintosh is a huge lesson on building a platform. 1/
2/ Apple saw the value of having VisiCalc on Apple ][ and IBM saw that for PCs with 1-2-3.
The common thread is that platforms benefitted from a third party betting their future business on the platform. It was existential for the platform to have companies doing that.
3/ Conversely, third parties came to realize that betting their business on a platform can create a stronger relationship--an influencer relationship--with the platform. Bill Gates saw that potential with Macintosh.
I know it is difficult to believe, but there was a time when key tech leaders and influencers of the world were dead set against the graphical interface.
In 1985, less than a year after Macintosh was unveiled the naysayers were out in full force... 1/
2/ About 2M Apple ][ had been sold in total. About 3.5M IBM PCs (8086). About 8M Atari, TRS-80, C64 all combined. This was early. ~20M computers sold, worldwide, total.
Dr Dobbs, InfoWorld, Byte magazines were supreme. We're in "Halt and Catch Fire" S1. Joe MacMillan reads IW.
3/ If a hobbyist magazine printed a story you didn't like you probably just ranted at your user group meeting thursday night.
If it really bugged you, then you'd write a letter to the editor. Maybe they would print it a few weeks later. Then a few thousand people would see it.
Incompatible Files, Slipping, Office 97 RTM— new post in “Hardcore Software” …rdcoresoftware.learningbyshipping.com/p/045-incompat… // “Reviews” were a key part of the early days of the PC era. In the context of shipping Office 97, this post looks at how reviews were changing as the industry matured. 1/11
2/ From the earliest days through Windows 95, personal computer reviews were primarily done by “tech enthusiasts” and aimed at same. Basically hobbyists reviewed products for hobbyists. That was the industry. Here’s BYTE giving Office 97 ⭐️ ⭐️ ⭐️ ⭐️ ⭐️ across the board.
3/ Such enthusiast outlets were our key constituency as most all sales were driven through retail channel and most retail customers were buying magazines like these by the pound (at the peak, an issue of BYTE or PCMag was hundreds of pages, mostly ads). So victory.
"Making the Laptop Commonplace" - NY Times 1985. A great example of challenges in forecasting progress in technologies when improvements are happing at exponential rates. Article asks what happened to all those predictions from last year (!) that laptops would be a big deal? 1/
2/ "People don't want to lug a computer with them to the beach or on a train to while away hours they would rather spend reading the sports or business section of the newspaper."
What if the laptop were the place to read those!
3/ "Right now laptops cost considerably more than the equivalent desktop computer."
What if the need to innovate in laptops not only made components smaller, but cheaper, and at the same time consume less energy? Then who wouldn't want a laptop *instead* of a desktop?
The “gyrations” through Apple’s beta cycle since WWDC when it comes to Safari UX are fascinating—some might even say not very “Apple-like”. Changing is fine. But where the design seems to be ending up is suboptimal for a platform, IMO. Here’s why, but not why one might think /1
2/ Moving address bar up/down and/or having a separate address bar are rational design choices that people will (vigorously) debate. I have an opinion too.
What one has come to expect from Apple is a “point of view” in product design expressed through “the way it should work.”
3/ There was a lot of feedback about the early design and implementation. It was rough. That started the feedback loop from developers (those are who use the beta) that it was never going to be right. Developers of all people should know it could change. But momentum gained…
2/ If you would have told me in 1997 that I would still be talking about the paperclip in 2021, I would have LOLed and OMGed. I definitely want to go through reasoning and choices of the feature because it is super interesting. But the real story is not as much why, but how?
3/ In 1995, Office was half of Microsoft's profits. Through the release of Office 95 there were over 12 million licenses sold (about 100M Windows capable PCs had been sold since 1990). Still, there was competition from two billion-dollar companies, leaders in the DOS era.