In discussions of future COVID dynamics and potential for ‘herd immunity’, need to remember there are four main routes to immunity that can reduce Delta transmission - even though coverage often focuses on just one or two of them. A quick thread... 1/
Because Delta transmissibility is so high, and current vaccine less effective in reducing Delta transmission, vaccination alone unlikely to get R below 1. But that doesn’t mean immunity can’t drive R below 1 in future... 2/
There are four main routes to immunity to Delta:
A. Cross-protective immunity from vaccine designed against earlier variant
B. Cross-protective immunity from infection with earlier variant
C. Immunity from infection with Delta
D. Immunity from Delta-specific vaccine
3/
Much coverage of immunity against Delta focuses on route A. But what about the other 3 routes? Many countries already have substantial immunity from pre-Delta exposure (B) and are currently building immunity from Delta infections (C). 4/
Unfortunately Delta-specific vaccine (D) not yet available, but other 3 in combination will likely be enough to get R<1 eventually - we know from earlier variants that post-infection immunity against the infecting variant is generally robust (e.g. thelancet.com/journals/lance…). 5/
Over-time, responses may wane or further variants may emerge, resulting in R increasing above 1 and outbreaks occuring again (but with far lower severe disease):
This could produce similar dynamic to seasonal coronaviruses & influenza, where immunity builds and R declines against circulating variants, followed by seasonal outbreaks as viruses evolve & initial responses wane (e.g. journals.plos.org/plospathogens/… & journals.plos.org/plosbiology/ar…) 7/7
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
The terms ‘safe’ or 'unsafe' appear often in discussions of COVID threat, but they're vague, subjective words. What level of risk vs disruption is acceptable in long run (whether COVID or another disease)? 1/
As an example, I spent a chunk of my childhood paralysed and unable to walk thanks to a post-infection condition (GBS). Lingering effects for years. Not nice at all. But what should we as a society sacrifice to prevent a given level of risk? 2/
Vaccination is massively reducing COVID risk (at least in the countries that bought up most of the doses). So at what point are specific disruptive measures (whether at local or cross-border scale) no longer justified? 3/
If - and it’s still a big if - exposure notifications from the NHS covid app/T&T were a major factor in driving the recent UK case decline, it’s worth considering what might happen next... 1/
It’s plausible that a rapidly growing epidemic + rapid testing availability + exposure notifications (both formal via T&T/app and informal among friends) has led to large numbers of people who would have been involved in transmission instead quarantining. 2/
If exposure risk is concentrated in time (e.g. because of Euro matches), quarantine timing would also have been concentrated in the period immediately after. Which means we can make a testable hypothesis about what might happen next… 3/
Still see 70% quoted as level of vaccination required for 'herd immunity'. Important to note it's now likely to be much higher. The standard (albeit rough) calculation for herd immunity threshold is (1/E) x (1-1/R) where E is vaccine effectiveness in reducing transmission... 1/
In scenario where R is 6 (plausible for Delta in susceptible populations without any restrictions), and vaccination reduces infection/infectiousness such that onwards transmission reduced by 85%, above calc suggests would need to vaccinate (1-1/6)/0.85 = 98% of population. 2/
If transmission reduction is less than this (which is likely the case for some vaccines against Delta), or R higher, then herd immunity wouldn't be achievable through current vaccines alone. This leads to three possibilities... 3/
One argument put forward for July 19th UK reopening is to bring infections forward to reduce winter wave. To be honest, I’ve always found idea that we could tailor a pandemic to get 'better' sized future waves a bit absurd - whether in spring 2020 or now. A few thoughts... 1/
For me, main issue now is medium term disruption vs medium term epidemic size. Many people now seem OK with R>1 in countries with relatively high vaccination % (at least implicitly, given they aren’t advocating for the strong measures required to guarantee R<1). 2/
Given R>1, much of Europe faces large epidemics likely to end with accumulation of immunity in next few months - much of it from infections. Reopening would accelerate this, but won't be difference between epidemic & no epidemic (unlike, say, reintroducing measures to get R<1) 3/
In discussions of Delta in UK & much of Europe, it's worth remembering that to avoid a large number of future COVID-19 cases at this point, countries would need to dramatically curtail social mixing - otherwise they've still got a rising epidemic, just with a flatter peak. 1/
Big difference with UK, of course, is case numbers. Given current case level in UK, if test & trace was suddenly omniscient with full adherence, millions of people would now be in quarantine. In terms of disruptions, it would be somewhat equivalent to a snap ban on gatherings. 3/
I've always found it very unhelpful that 'self-isolation' is used to refer to both isolation and quarantine, but the distinction is now becoming increasingly important... 1/
To recap, isolation is for people who are confirmed to be infected; quarantine is for people who currently seem healthy but may be infected. A stay-at-home order is basically a large, untargeted quarantine (some countries even call it 'community quarantine'). 2/
As vaccines reduce infections/transmission, countries are re-evaluating approaches to disruptive quarantine, whether for travellers or contacts of cases (e.g. in US: cdc.gov/coronavirus/20…). However, we need to be careful about jumbling isolation and quarantine together... 3/