Bumping this again because it really does illustrate an important point about the nature of ideology. That is, ideology cannot be reduced to symbolic ideology - ideology as identity and the set of social & psychological motives that attract ppl to an ideological identity (1/n)
Rather, ideological labels and the motives behind them to some extent acquire different socially-constructed content on the basis of group/party conflicts, elite actions, and historical features unique to specific societies. (2/n)
In this regard, an especially interesting pattern in the above data is that right-wing identifiers in the US are different from their counterparts even in other English-speaking, Anglo-Saxon influenced nations, e.g., NZ, Australia, Canada. (3/n)
This suggests a culturally-specific role for elites linked to the right-wing party in the US and the kinds of group conflicts that have been assimilated to partisanship (and by extension ideology) in the US. (4/n)
The #twitterless Ariel Malka and I discuss this in our forthcoming chapter in the third edition of the Handbook of Political Psychology: (5/n) psyarxiv.com/xhvyj
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I RTed this thread yesterday, but this particular tweet really is an important one. I think it's relevant not only to teaching, but also to political communication. (1/n)
Those of us who are high in political engagement spend a lot of time talking to (or at) each other, and we lose all sense of what outliers were are in terms of how much more time we spend thinking about politics and how much more central politics is to our identities. (2/n)
We habitually use concepts & terminology to make sense of social and political issues that are abstract. specialized, & intellectually subcultural. We are not simply Converse's ideologues/near-ideologues, but the folks in the upper tail of the distribution in that group. (3/n)
Fascinating comparative analysis from LF Mantilla: "[C]entralized, hierarchical faith communities are more likely to resist aligning themselves with political parties than their decentralized, egalitarian counterparts." (1/n) washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/…
"Catholicism has not always avoided partisanship. The Catholic Church spent much of the late 19th and early 20th centuries fighting partisan battles against a diverse array of nationalist, liberal and socialist opponents." (2/n)
"These conflicts were often devastating for the church, leaving it marginalized or entangled with brutal dictators, as happened in Spain with Gen. Francisco Franco or in Argentina during the so-called 'Dirty War.'" (3/n)
I don't agree with all of the arguments here, but it is an interesting read that points to the complexity of public opinion and the extent to which actual behavioral trends may operate separately from political discourse. Some random thoughts: (1/n) noahpinion.substack.com/p/the-social-c…
Social conservatism as a political tendency is first and foremost a kind of identity politics -- it's about who gets recognition, who is in and who is out, and who should be dominant. (2/n)
In the US among White people, it's also bound up with a lot of identity competition that has little to do with religion or sex in philosophical terms, i.e., racial attitudes and racial backlash. (3/n)
Good thread from @robfordmancs; I concur that social media might accentuate diffs in ideological conformity b/w the more vs less politically engaged, given that elites, activists, pundits, & the engaged in general are more likely on social media. (1/n)
In this vein, we know from work by Groenendyk et al (2020) that priming ideological norms can increase expression of ideologically-constrained opinions. We might very reasonably assume that the social networks of the engaged do a lot of this. (2/n) papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf…
The "context collapse" feature of social media may worsen this, insofar as diff ideological subcultures' esoteric practices & views may become more visible to outsiders than they were in the past, amplifying perceived ideological differences. (3/n)
A related comment: there's something to the argument that conservatism is more of a temperament than an abstract ideology. But how does temperament get fleshed out in practical terms? (1/n)
The notion of conservatism as cautious, limit-seeking temperament is certainly consistent with at least one stream of research on personality and politics, e.g., (2/n) annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.114…
...a characterization that is nevertheless subject to various social and historical contingencies, as Ariel Malka and I show here, e.g., (3/n) onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.11…
It is realities of this sort that complicate any simple narrative about political messaging on inequality. I used the (not new) term 'environmental racism' here, but it might be too jargony for mass communications. But then: how do you talk about problems like this? (1/n)
In this vein, the Kalla & English (2021) study was well done and comports with prior studies. I don't dispute it & I think it is relevant for communications about *some* things. But many issues require you to confront race, and you can't message your way out of doing so. (2/n)
Indeed, this is broadly true, given just how interwined economic and racial inequality are in this country. There's certainly a conversation to be had about avoiding jargon or trendy terms when discussing racial inequality and finding the best way to talk about it. (3/n)