@ChoucairWalid provides a very realistic reading of Bassil's reasons for blocking a government he doesn't control. What is unknown, however is whether Hezbollah will go along with this: beirutobserver.com/2021/09/252422…
There are several unanswered questions in his analysis. First, is Hezbollah willing to face the generalized economic and social breakdown that will follow if no government is formed, just for Bassil's sake? The repercussions in the Shia community are already significant.
Second, Is Hezbollah willing to give Bassil space to provoke a vacuum at all levels in the state, and therefore risk entering into a standoff with Syria over the election of the next president, as clearly Damascus will favor Suleiman Franjieh, not Bassil?
Third, if Bassil seeks a vacuum in parliament by not having elections next spring, as his leverage to create a vacuum in the presidency, is Hezbollah willing to undermine an institution that it dominates with its allies, headed by Nabih Berri, a major ally?
And fourth, as Lebanon fragments even more, Hezbollah will have to accept greater de facto internationalization of the crisis in the country, which will loosen its hegemony even more. Is it willing to reach that stage simply to avoid clashing with Bassil?
All these questions may explain why Mikati is holding on, as he realizes he's in a power struggle that he has to win. Whichever way one looks at it, Bassil is crossing a lot of red lines—even Hezbollah red lines—so we have to wonder where his plan is really going.

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More from @BeirutCalling

27 Aug
There is a growing view in Lebanon that the cabinet formation process is really a sideshow for something much more sinister, namely an effort to accelerate the collapse of the second Lebanese Republic and replace it with a new system.
In this context, Hezbollah and Aoun share a desire to get rid of the post-Taif system and replace it with one more to their liking—in Hezbollah's case a system that gives the Shia community, and by extension Iran, a much larger say in the destiny of the country.
While I see many obstacles to such a plan, it doesn't mean Aoun and Hezbollah are not trying it. For Aoun, the idea is to go back to 1988, as some perceptive analysts are arguing, and rebuild a new constitutional order.
Read 6 tweets
27 Aug
Lee seeks to delegitimize the Palestinians' claim to their land by writing they are "an ad hoc collection of Arabic-speaking people who came from all corners of the Levant, mostly from Greater Syria but some perhaps from as far away as the Gulf." bit.ly/38jbJ6w
But in the very next sentence, he has no trouble legitimizing the arrival of Jewish immigrants from Poland, Russia, and Yemen "because they thought of themselves as members of a pre-existing nation returning to their homeland."
Migration is a phenomenon that has shaped all Levantine countries, and is hardly tied to issues of legitimacy. Nor does the "Palestinians are Arabs" line do more than echo a long-standing argument by the Zionist movement to justify the Palestinian "transfer" to other Arab states.
Read 5 tweets
25 Aug
There are interesting possibilities for Syria if there is competition between Iran and Arab states over supplying Lebanon with energy. The Iranian fuel vessel headed for Lebanon may unload in Syria, from where the fuel will be transported across the border.
Similarly, Egyptian gas and Jordanian surplus power may come to Lebanon through Syrian territory. That makes Damascus happy for 2 reasons: It can benefit from the gas and electricity, and politically it signals an Arab effort to reintegrate Syria into the Arab fold.
You can be sure Syria will take a cut of the Iranian fuel transported through its territory. But Syria is also keen to see the Arab project succeed. That means that if Hezbollah views competition over energy as a game Iran must win, then Syria is playing both sides.
Read 7 tweets
23 Aug
It’s apparent that Aoun’s decision to play hardball on a new cabinet is having damaging consequences for him and Bassil. Without a government, all the blame for the catastrophic situation today is being directed against him, impacting his legacy and Bassil’s future.
Aoun thought he could play the populist card by refusing to lift subsidies. But all he did was fall into the trap of the major fuel importers and their political sponsors who kept their products off the market, raising public resentment against Aoun.
By pretending to be alone against the gangsters in the country, Aoun is completely isolated, though more reliant than ever on Hezbollah. But that game comes with few gains and much heartbreak. Aoun is slowly backtracking on subsidies but has, otherwise, only extended the problem.
Read 7 tweets
2 Aug
Yesterday I posted a thread arguing that unless a government is formed that can improve Lebanon’s situation, Gebran Bassil would be unable to prepare for his presidency. No Mikati, no Bassil, I argued. Here is a more pessimistic scenario to consider.
Bassil feels that unless he can impose his conditions on Mikati, it is preferable to force him out and support a nonentity like Faisal Karami. Assuming Karami will accept Bassil’s and Aoun’s conditions—no certainty—what will happen?
Very likely Karami will be a subpar version of Hassan Diab, who is already a subpar version of anything that moves. Karami will be undermined by the political class just as Diab was, on the assumption that his failure will lead to Aoun’s and Bassil’s failure.
Read 8 tweets
1 Aug
While the “atmosphere is positive” in the cabinet-formation process, the reality is that the obstacles remain the same in negotiations today. That said, one important factor will weigh heavily on Aoun’s attitude and possible flexibility.
Aoun’s and Bassil’s strategy in the past year, which is aimed at securing Bassil’s presidency, is built on three pillars: First, affirming in the minds of people that the Aounists are outside the pre-2005 political class, and even pose a threat to it.
Second, that Aoun and Bassil seek to fight the corruption of the political class, but have been blocked (hence the demand for the justice ministry). Third, that Aoun and Bassil remain popular among Christians, which elections will show (hence the interior ministry demand).
Read 6 tweets

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