Yesterday I posted a thread arguing that unless a government is formed that can improve Lebanon’s situation, Gebran Bassil would be unable to prepare for his presidency. No Mikati, no Bassil, I argued. Here is a more pessimistic scenario to consider.
Bassil feels that unless he can impose his conditions on Mikati, it is preferable to force him out and support a nonentity like Faisal Karami. Assuming Karami will accept Bassil’s and Aoun’s conditions—no certainty—what will happen?
Very likely Karami will be a subpar version of Hassan Diab, who is already a subpar version of anything that moves. Karami will be undermined by the political class just as Diab was, on the assumption that his failure will lead to Aoun’s and Bassil’s failure.
That means that Bassil won’t really get anything done, but he can blame it all on the corrupt political class that opposes him. Meanwhile, he would control a government that holds parliamentary elections, cheat in favor of the FPM, and allow Bassil to say he’s the strongest Xian.
That government would be a caretaker government if no cabinet is formed after the elections—Bassil’s aim. The caretaker government would also hold power once Aoun steps down in 2022. That means Bassil, by blocking all cabinets, can blackmail the political class into electing him.
Is this a realistic scenario? Yes, but it assumes that Karami will be Bassil’s willing tool, which is not guaranteed. It assumes Hezbollah will go along with it, even if it means alienating Berri and the Sunnis, which it may do—or not do if the situation deteriorates, as it will.
It also assumes that electoral cheating can secure a victory for the FPM, when that’s not invariably true if the margins are too large. Bassil’s and Aoun’s electoral popularity is not ensured if the president is seen as the perpetuator of the people’s misery, as will happen.
We’ll see what option Aoun chooses, given that he’s apparently become his son in law’s ventriloquist dummy. But this scenario is the most destructive one, but Hezbollah may go along with it if it means a pro-Iran president is secured over a pro-Syrian one. Thoughts?

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More from @BeirutCalling

1 Aug
While the “atmosphere is positive” in the cabinet-formation process, the reality is that the obstacles remain the same in negotiations today. That said, one important factor will weigh heavily on Aoun’s attitude and possible flexibility.
Aoun’s and Bassil’s strategy in the past year, which is aimed at securing Bassil’s presidency, is built on three pillars: First, affirming in the minds of people that the Aounists are outside the pre-2005 political class, and even pose a threat to it.
Second, that Aoun and Bassil seek to fight the corruption of the political class, but have been blocked (hence the demand for the justice ministry). Third, that Aoun and Bassil remain popular among Christians, which elections will show (hence the interior ministry demand).
Read 6 tweets
10 Jul
Reading the apocalyptic headlines in Lebanese newspapers today, one can reach certain clear conclusions. First, that the political class, starting with Hezbollah, has no clue about how to resolve Lebanon's escalating economic and financial problems.
The mode of operation in the past 31 years has been to resolve all problems by dividing the spoils among the political-financial-sectarian cartel and otherwise leaving all problems as they were, bringing in governments to keep this unsustainable system alive.
Now it has all gone tits up—a perfect storm of misery is hitting the country and nothing can contain it. The only ones trying are Western and Gulf countries and international financial institutions, but the idiots here are still paralyzed, fighting over control of a corpse.
Read 18 tweets
26 Jun
Reports are that Hariri will return tomorrow to Beirut. Given all the false starts, one hesitates to predict a cabinet soon, but Nasrallah’s speech yesterday and the fact that Bassil’s efforts to undermine the Berri initiative have floundered suggest this may be different.
Indeed, Bassil’s theatrics last Sunday were most likely designed to torpedo Berri’s efforts, precisely because they were nearing a positive conclusion and Bassil saw he could not get a blocking third. Hezbollah didn’t fall for it and in recent days shot down his protests.
They reportedly backed Hariri in his right to name a Christian; they did not accept Bassil’s effort to name the two remaining Christian ministers, saying this was tantamount to a blocking third; and they reaffirmed support for Berri’s plan.
Read 5 tweets
2 Mar
I'm wondering if the protests today across Lebanon are not only a natural reaction of people in distress, but also a concerted effort by the political leadership opposed to Aoun and Bassil to raise the pressure on them both to greenlight a new government: bit.ly/3dWfaEa
The sudden proliferation of protests across different geographical and sectarian areas makes me think that there is a political dimension as well here: Is this a new May 7, which brought down Rashid al-Solh's government in 1992? But this time directed against Aoun and Bassil?
Both Aoun and Bassil seem to believe, perhaps rightly, that if there is a Hariri-led government in which they don't have a blocking third, they will be marginalized by the other forces in it, particularly if Hariri prioritizes a partnership with the Shia parties.
Read 8 tweets
26 Feb
Saad Hariri, in his interview with Marcel Ghanem last October, signaled a radical change in his political approach, composed of two parts: First, a decision to base his domestic political strategy on a partnership with the main Shia parties, Hezbollah and Amal.
This he showed by denouncing his erstwhile allies Samir Geagea and Walid Joumblatt, who had spent months criticizing Hariri. He effectively told them that if he and the Shia parties agreed, Geagea and Joumblatt could follow if they wanted, but if they did not, tough luck.
Two days later Joumblatt shifted his position, realizing that he risked being isolated. Geagea didn't, but is today marginalized domestically, as if confirming that those who are aligned with Saudi Arabia in Lebanon are destined to write themselves out of the story politically.
Read 12 tweets
10 Feb
The deadlock in the Lebanese government-formation process may not be as permanent as it seems. The dilemma of Gebran Bassil shows why. Aoun's refusal to sign off on Hariri's cabinet is based on one aim and one desire:
The aim is for Aoun and Bassil not to be weakened in any new government; and this is tied to their desire for Bassil to succeed Aoun as president. The two feel the first can only come by having a blocking third. The second is more problematical.
The reason is that for Bassil to become president, he needs two things: Hezbollah's support, so the party can do for him what it did for Aoun in 2015-2016 and blackmail the political class into voting for him. And he needs to have resolved his problems with the U.S.
Read 6 tweets

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