Here’s my understanding of what happened on the sub deal. There were problems between Australia and France on their 2016 deal. It was over budget and late. Part of this is in the nature of such projects. France thought it was mainly haggling over cost but for Australia it was…
…more existential. They worried they would end up paying more for a submarine that would appear late and be less capable and more expensive than an SSN. Such a submarine might have no survivability in the 2030 and 2040s in their view.
Earlier this year, Australia approached the UK about switching to a nuclear powered subs. The UK then approached the United States. The Biden administration asked the Australians to cancel the deal with France and then negotiate with them but the Australians…
….did not want to go that route for reasons I can only guess at. Canberra believed France had gotten the message and wouldn’t be surprised. For this reason, the US underestimated the degree of French anger & assessed that it was not shared by the rest of the EU (still unclear).
Their view is that this was an Australian decision based on their changing strategic circumstances and a deteriorating environment. They are still very committed to working with the EU and France in particular on China/ Asia but it is not clear that that will cut it.
I will add to this thread as I learn more.
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One of the most imp emerging debates in US foreign policy at the moment is whether the US is in a competition of government systems w/ China, (or as Jake Sullivan put it on Monday, "a competition of models w/ autocracies"). I wrote about this on Wednesday. theatlantic.com/international/…
I recommend you read the whole piece but to me the key line is "a world safe for autocracy does not preclude a world safe for democracy." Jessica & Tom argue that China does not proactively seek to advance its governance model & is pragmatic in how it deals with other countries.
A lot of the same commentators who said nothing when President Trump directly and repeatedly criticized or undermined the UK government in office now seem horrified that President Biden reiterates long standing US policy about Northern Ireland and the Good Friday Agreement. 1/6
Biden is not intervening on behalf of the EU. He is simply making the point that the US supports the various agreements reached pertaining to NI, including the GFA and the protocol. 2/6
Worth noting that the Trump admin said something similar. The point is none of this is new and it is bipartisan. The Johnson government has also understood this for some time. independent.co.uk/news/uk/politi… 3/6
I have a new piece for @TheAtlantic on how Joe Biden has a personal foreign policy doctrine a mere few months into his presidency: the United States is in a competition of government systems with China that it is at risk of losing. 1/6 theatlantic.com/international/…
Biden speaks about this all the time, in formal remarks and off the cuff. It is a marked departure from his statement in the campaign that China is not competition for us. 2/6
Some in his administration / party disagree and hope his views are not settled while others just don't grasp what he's saying. The result is that the administration as a whole is not yet converting his doctrine into a strategy but that may come in time. 3/6
I might have missed it but it seems at @MunSecConf Biden did not address Macron’s top priority of strategic autonomy and Macron did not address Biden’s priority of competition with China.
Some other reactions. All the speeches were solid but unsurprising. All missed an opportunity too. Biden elaborating on what being back means but tbh that's a surprise to no one (support NATO, etc). He was strong on democracy and China.
He could have said something about strategic autonomy redefining the 2% concept, democratic backsliding, or the need for the EU & UK to work closely together but chose not to. Merkel offered a list of all the things Germany is doing or will do including on staying in Afghanistan
I think it was very smart of Biden to call Boris Johnson so early today. Anxieties in Brexit circles about Biden have been unreasonably high. This is an easy way of signalling a commitment to work together, will be valued by No 10, & deprives Farage et al of a talking point.
As No 10 knows, it in no way signals a softening of Biden's position on the Good Friday Agreement. But that won't be an issue if the UK reaches a deal w/ the EU, which I expect it will. With that out of the way, there's lots of opportunity for cooperation on COP26, covid, G7 etc
The other point that has been lost is that US-UK relations have been pretty awful for the past 4 years. Trump rhetorically supported Brexit but he interfered in ongoing terrorist investigations, leveled wild accusations against UK intelligence, humiliated the UK ambassador...
In talking with European officials over the past week, I have not found them to be particularly impressed with China's role. Of course they will issue thanks for shipments of aid but they know the CCP is at least partly responsible for letting this get out of control...1/4
...and they know that its refusal to be transparent will prohibit deep cooperation in the future. I have not found anyone in the EU or NATO who has said China is supplanting the US. Perhaps public opinion will weigh in behind China but there is no data on that yet. 2/4
Europeans aren't thinking about the US much. They didn't really care about the travel ban b/c no one was traveling. They resent Trump's criticism but expect it. Their takeaway is that the US, along with Brazil, is an example of the failure of populism to deal w/ this crisis 3/4