Evergrande panic? I can almost hear you asking for it...here is your Chinese thread!
From a panoramic macro perspective, chances that a widespread financial market panic unfolds are relatively low - it will mostly depend on the Chinese authorities reaction.
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The chart below shows the % of Chinese households wealth in real estate - 74%, quite high.
For comparison, US households own <30% of their wealth in real estate.
This tells us:
- The Chinese economy is not very financialized
- Real estate matters for the CH household
How much?
74% of wealth concentrated in real estate is quite a lot, yes.
But 74% of what?
The chart below shows Chinese HH net assets (value of assets - liabilities).
In 2019, Chinese household net assets were RMB 500 trn = approx. 70k USD net wealth per each Chinese adult.
Pretty solid
So, how did China achieve this 15.5% CAGR in households net worth?
If you follow me, you probably know the answer already: credit creation.
China alone created more credit than ROW together over the last 20 years.
Credit creation = increase of private sector wealth.
Now, back to Evergrande.
If credit creation increases the net wealth of the private sector, credit destruction does the exact opposite - it drains resources and net wealth from the private sector.
The Chinese private sector war-chest is solid, but deleveraging is tough business
Chinese authorities hold the keys here: what will be their response?
So far, they have come up with reverse repo liquidity injections. The PBOC lends cash (well, bank reserves) to banks at a fixed rate and for a fixed period in exchange for securities.
Cool, but does nothing.
Banks don't lend reserves (yes, it works the same way in China too)
They expand credit when there is a decent risk/return in doing that, and now there is not.
The credit impulse in China is unlikely to head north unless Chinese authorities intervene differently.
Basically, the CCP needs to ''encourage'' state-owned enterprises to borrow and banks to lend a bit more forcefully - they have done it big times in the past, it wouldn't be news.
That would spur credit creation and push up economic activity and asset prices.
For context, that's how the Chinese credit impulse was looking like before entering the Evergrande saga.
Sizeable action is needed.
What about worldwide contagion?
The Chinese economy has still high entry barriers for foreign investors.
For instance, foreign investors % allocation to Chinese stocks is in the low single digits despite China accounting for a large share of global earnings and growth.
As the domestic economy is not highly financialized and foreign investors are still underinvested, the chances for global widespread contagion are not incredibly high.
Amundi and UBS are amongst the biggest European owners of Evergrande (and Chinese) bonds...
...and today they are down, but only slightly more than what their usual beta to the Eurostoxx 600 would suggest.
Amundi is down 4% (beta 1.05) while the Eurostoxx 600 is down almost 3%.
Chinese CDS is on the rise, high-beta risk assets are suffering, DXY is heading north.
All classic signs of a moderate risk-off.
Watch the CCP reaction to closely understand how deep the sell-off and damage to the Chinese consumer demand can be.
The end.
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People obsess about outright yield levels, but curve shapes are at least equally important.
The US yield curve has been flattening relentlessly since May this year - chart below shows the yield differential between 5y and 30y US bonds.
This is paramount important.
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Yield differentials between short and long-end of the curve inform you about investors’ expectations on interest rates years down the line.
A steep yield curve means investors demand compensation (term premium) to own long bonds vs rolling ownership of short bonds each time
Premium for what risk?
It can be inflation, (real) duration or credit risk.
In this case, the curve has become flatter so investors demand less premium to own long end bonds - the distribution of probabilities of future interest rates has become easier to predict.
Very unpopular take, but backed by facts.
And I care much more about facts than opinions.
House prices are NOT expensive, when measured as one should reasonably do: in real terms, assuming a 10% down-payment and the remaining 90% financed with a fixed-rate mortgage.
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The median US house price has gone up 2.4x times since 1990.
In real terms, we are looking at a whopping 70% price increase over the last 10 years.
But houses are not paid for 100% in cash.
The median home buyer finances 88% of the house price with a fixed-rate mortgage.
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What's really relevant is how much these mortgage installments weigh on your net monthly income.
The red line in the chart measures just that, with the index = 100 in 1990 for comparison.
So how can (mortgage payments / real wages) be pretty low if house prices are high?
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The gold standard (black box) prevented govt to inject large qty of resources in the private sector (big deficits w/o plans to tax back) and banks to create tons of money (strong lending)
Constraining credit creation conflicts with the very human nature - ''I want all, and now''
After '71 (orange box), credit expansion is a completely elastic process - we can freely expand/contract the amount of money in the system.
Obviously, we choose to expand credit very often.
But sometimes deficit hawks prevail and we ''put deficits under control'' (black arrows)
Keep in mind the pace of change matters - decelerating credit creation is enough to slow down YoY GDP and earnings growth.
When you go into net surplus, you are actively draining resources from the private sector.
When the Fed buys bonds, the asset side of banks balance sheet is changed from
x bonds to
x reserves
Both are assets & have good regulatory/liquidity treatment
But bonds earn you coupons and expose you to market risks and volatility
Reserves don't
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If the Fed buys bonds from non-bank financial institutions (e.g. asset managers), their asset side will be changed from x bonds to x bank deposits
Similar story: bonds earn you carry and expose you to interest rate/convexity/credit spreads risks and vol
Bank deposits don't
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Fin.Inst. need to earn coupons to survive
They also have to be exposed to market risks on the asset side to match/hedge the risks on the liabilities' side of their balance sheet
A pension fund holds long duration liabilities and needs long duration assets to hedge risks
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