Thread by @jgotkowska

1) 🧵 Discussions on ‘European defence’ have intensified in the recent weeks with the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the AUKUS deal.

As I have recently written an article on European security and defence policy, here’s a thread on where we are:
osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/…

2) A few more issues have an impact:
👉the work on the Strategic Compass, the EU’s security and defence strategy
👉the French presidential election in April 2022 & France's presidency in the EU in the 1st half of 2022
👉the outcome of German elections?

3) France has ever wanted an ambitious EU’s security&defence policy – in terms of arms industry support, EU operations in southern neighbourhood, capability development in the EU.
+ It is Macron's topic, and the French defeat due to AUKUS is looming large before the election in F

4)Germany is more willing to develop EU’s security&defence policy, but this might go different ways. CDU is in favour of more military engagement & internal coalitions of the willing; SPD/Greens wish for more EU in security,but not necessarily with strictly military means

5) But what is the EU really doing in its security and defence policy beyond toxic slogans like ‘European defence’, ‘European strategic autonomy’ or ‘European army’?

6) SHORT REVIEW of 2016 security & defence initiatives:
👉military-technical cooperation – PESCO
👉support for cooperation of arms industries in Europe – PADR, EDIDP, EDF
👉more funding for crisis management and crisis prevention – EPF

7) Let’s talk about PESCO…
👉46 military-technical cooperation projects (1 already closed)
👉26 of them will deliver results or reach full operational capability before the end of 2025
👉progress is insufficient
👉PESCO cooperation is marginal for most of the member states

8) Industrial cooperation:
👉two programs were closed - PADR (€90mln) and EDIDP (€500mln)
👉European Defence Fund was launched (€8bln for 7 years)
👉it’s difficult to estimate overall results of PADR &EDIDP
👉but entities form France, Italy and Spain gained most of the grants

9) Crisis management/crisis prevention
👉European Peace Facility was launched (€5bln for 7 years)
👉EPF will take over co-financing of peace support operations of EU partner countries/organisations
👉EPF will finance deliveries of arms&military equipment to EU partner countries

10) What will come NEXT in the EU's security and defence policy?
👉the EU is developing its strategy in security&defence,i.e. the Strategic Compass.
👉the Compass will list EU's priorities in 4 areas:
1⃣ crisis management
2⃣ capability development
3⃣ partnerships
4⃣ resilience

11) 1⃣ Crisis management:
👉Question is where&how the EU should conduct crisis management operations?
👉Do we need a new initial entry force (5000 soldiers) instead of the never used EUBGs?
👉Do we want to build coalitions of the willing within the EU according to art. 44?

12) 2⃣ Capability development:
👉The development of what military capabilities should the EU support - for crisis management or collective defence?
👉Should the EU’s capability planning process have precedence over NDPP in NATO or the other way round?

13) 3⃣ Partnerships:
👉What should be the division of labour between the EU and NATO/UN?
👉Which partners in which regions should the EU cooperate with in security & defence?
👉How to shape such a cooperation?

14) 4⃣ Resilience:
👉What priorities in resilience should the EU set for itself? – in cyber, critical infrastructure, information, supplies, external borders,fighting terrorism..?
👉How to define the mutual defence clause/art.42.7 if NATO is responsible for collective defence?

15) All these questions will be soon negotiated between the member states in the EU upon the EEAS draft as a basis for discussion.

3⃣6⃣0⃣ degree approach is the answer from the CEE perspective.

16) In crisis management
the EU’s strength is a comprehensive civil-military approach with better coordination of own activities (humanitarian aid, development and economic cooperation, diplomacy, crisis prevention) & division of labour with NATO and the US.

17) Crisis management and partnerships in security&defence should cover also Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership countries.

Lithuania with support of other eastern flank countries has recently proposed an 👉EUTM training mission for Ukraine.

18) Capability development in the EU cannot be used for crisis management operations only, but for collective defence in NATO. Key is the closest possible coordination of EU’s instruments with NATO processes.

19) In resilience – the EU can to a larger extent support member states and NATO in non-military responses to military and hybrid aggressive actions from outside of the EU and to political & economic pressure from Russia or China.

20) In March 2022 the EU should agree over the Strategic Compass. Its implementation will depend on the member states’ ownership of the strategy. If it favours French priorities only, divisions will grow and it will be difficult to implement the concept.

21) More on this topic in the @OSW_eng commentary. END
osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/…