When I wrote about subverison and the Georgia law in early April, the term hadn't really even been once over the preceding month. It was badly overshadowed by voter suppression. Now there are congressional hearings, conferences and real if early ideas for dealing with it
As the noise of new GOP voting laws has faded, it's become more obvious that subversion is the more serious risk to democracy. The persistence of the 'big lie,' Trump's grip on the GOP, the Eastman memo, and more, have helped keep the issue in the lime-light. It won't go away
Subversion is still somewhat on the sideline in Congress, where the D bill is still not really tailored to addressing the issue. And it still bares more of the hallmarks of an effort to achieve the facade of intra-party unity than a serious legislative effort
I doubt there's any real path to legislative action at this stage. But one obstacle to subversion-related legislation--an absence of serious legal/policy thinking on the issue--is fading. And for the most part, those ideas still haven't been put to the test in Washington
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I deleted a prior tweet about the Michigan congressional map, which implied the state doesn't have an explicit partisan fairness criteria for redistricting. It does, though without embracing a specific test
The map, to my mind, is almost exactly what you would expect if you ignored partisanship altogether. That's not the same as a gerrymander, of course. But it is definitely not an effort to achieve partisan fairness, even if that's very difficult to pull off in Michigan
This is a place, though, where the failure to define a serious partisan fairness test is going to get reformers into problems. It barely even matters what the test is, just that you choose it.
I think it's strange in a few ways. One is that it goes through a lot of twists and turns to achieve relatively little? Taking all of their general goals/choices for granted, IDK what they've gained over this simple one--which has the added edge of the 35% Latino VAP CD as D+20
Another strange thing is that the maps gradually became somewhat less fair and more GOP leaning, by partisan fairness metrics, and I'm not really sure why. Even the preliminary plan--which seems more reasonable to me on other respects--was met with some push back from Democrats
I'm reminded of an influential book from 1970, "The Real Majority," which was very influential in the Nixon White House, centered around the idea that the median voter was an 'unpoor, unblack and unyoung' middle-aged, middle-class, midwestern white (wife in Dayton, specifically)
This, of course, is not nearly as true as it was in 1970. To some extent, the sense that 'popularism' is revisionist--despite being the conventional wisdom--reflects an Obama-era overreaction, when many seemed to conclude that demographic changes had been greater than they were
Washington Post poll in Virginia is a bit of an odd one, and a departure from their state polling in prior cycles
Most obviously, they've gone from pure RDD in 2020 to an RDD+RBS sample, presumably to gain some of the benefits of the voter file while preserving full coverage.
Whatever the merits of that choice (most state telephone pollsters just go with RBS only), they try to blend the two samples in an odd way: they de-dupe the RDD frame, weight each to the full population, toss together (as oppose to voters with or without RBS coverage + p sltn)
A little early to tell, but if you squint at the numbers there's a case that Biden's numbers are inching back up a bit as Afghanistan fades from the news.
Here, Monmouth with Biden at 46/46 monmouth.edu/polling-instit…
Sure, there's probably some nonresponse bias. There always is!
But the amount of focus on partisan nonresponse bias has gotten way, way out of hand on this website as of late
Way back in the day, you needed a little bit of evidence to claim non-response bias was at play. Stability in the YouGov poll, or another party weighted poll, would offer some evidence--even if not conclusive evidence, given other methodological differences
With Election Day vote largely counted, "no" still has a considerable 64%, down from 67 at race call.
That may come down a bit--Biden fell about 1.5 pts between now and the outcome. OTOH, mail ballots over the last few days didn't seem as disproportionately GOP as 2020.
We'll see what it looks like in the end, of course, but at the moment I don't really see any signs that Newsom fared particularly poorly among Latino voters, as the exit poll suggested.
The results in relatively Latino counties appear about the same as 2018
And in the end, it may be that the polls underestimated 'no' by a fairly modest margin. Just typing that out, it's hard not to wonder whether acquiesce bias--the tendency for people to say 'yes' to be agreeable--might play a role. But there are many other plausible explanations