Thread by @hxhassan

One major flaw in jihadism/counterterrorism analysis is to compensate for knowledge of the human terrain by relying on (flawed) stats/numbers or statements on social media. We’ve seen that in Iraq and Syria, and we’re seeing it now in Afghanistan.

To give a quick example:

Not a single Afghan talks about an expanding Islamic State there, for example. This is almost exclusively coming from non-Afghan observers, old or new. But let’s entertain this claim, which really relies on not reporting or in-field woek but on “stats”. Still, let’s see the stats

Two points:

1. ISIS is claiming attacks, and those go into analysts’ databases. A trendline is established. A dude somewhere walking by another dude & shooting toward him, only injuring him, that is counted as an ISIS “operation”.

A more vital point >>>

2. The definition of “the Taliban” or “Taliban militia” has broadened significantly in the past 1-2 months. Before it was Taliban members & fighters, today anybody working in government services anywhere (some could be a former Taliban enemy working with the previous government)

When more people are counted as Taliban, including in remote villages and without being properly part of a militia, then it becomes “easier” to spike the numbers. The expanded targeting pool doesn’t necessarily indicated expanded strength or capabilities. Basic, yet overlooked.

https://twitter.com/hxhassan/status/1446152762790719497

One more thing, last year when COVID19 kicked in, we saw a “resurgence” of ISIS in both Iraq & Syria. How long did that last? These “spikes”, if they don’t last, need to be explored more closely and put in context. Often they’re greatly exaggerated and lead to false conclusions.

And of course there is the genuine question about who’s behind certain attacks. But that’s always an issue everywhere, so let’s assume all claims are true

https://twitter.com/EdH_B/status/1446154940993449984