The EU's proposals for addressing the problems in NI are substantive & far reaching. They will effectively do away with all paperwork for goods destined for NI - instead of a border in Irish Sea, think of a “green” (NI-bound) & “red” (Single Market) lane 1/
It has taken a lot of time & leadership from @MarosSefcovic & @vonderleyen to get Commission services & member states into line. Although EU capitals haven't seen the final package & all the details, they've been socialised with what's coming 2/
The Commission's ambition has been driven by 1) a desire to institute practical fixes to improve experience of citizens & businesses in NI, but also, importantly, 2) tactics 3/
If HMG now says “no/not enough”, it will be easier to rally member states behind a tough response, as @EU_Commission will be able to credibly claim it went “as far as it could”. EU unity will be key weapon in any ensuing standoff; these proposals make it more likely it'll hold 4/
Unsurprisingly, EU will offer no concessions on ECJ. For this reason alone, senior EU officials are resigned to fairly hostile response from @DavidGHFrost. This may come via A16 notification or “legal limbo” with ongoing negotiations & grace periods, where Protocol isn't applied
But EU officials are clear sighted about where both could lead: de facto, Ireland's place in Single Market being called into question. Put differently: they clearly see @BorisJohnson cynical calculation, that absent E-W checks, Bxl won't force Dublin to swallow a N-S border 6/
That calculation is, of course, correct. But I fear HMG is massively underestimating the likely EU response in these circumstances - circumstances where there would be growing pressure to institute checks & controls between Ireland & France & Ireland & other EU member states 7/
No German Chancellor or French President would side with HMG putting a member state in such an untenable situation. The v purpose of Single Market is to eliminate barriers between members. If UK's actions call that into question, the EU's response could be much more forceful 8/
Not a silly micro line-by-line tariff retaliation, but the *suspension of the entire zero tariff/zero quota deal*. There's a termination clause in TCA that can be triggered unilaterally: many in Bxl think a big simple move like this would be needed for UK to finally understand 9/
That this is existential. Recall “sequencing” in Brexit negotiations - WA/Irish border 1st, trade talks 2nd - existed precisely because EU wanted to ensure it locked down a solution to Irish border. If that's now being called into question by HMG, many think the TCA should be too
No WA, no TCA. Hard Brexit/WTO tariffs. The politics won't be easy. But many in Bxl rightly fear that once A16 is triggered, no British PM, let alone @BorisJohnson will be able to stand Protocol back up. With it will disappear the poss of a negotiated solution to Irish border 11/
Senior EU officials are VERY tired. They think HMG simply wants to “fight every day”. Still, EU will assume more risk & further bend Single Market for UK next week. HMG may not bite. But they should do so with an appreciation of the full consequences that then might follow ENDS
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What to make of the blizzard of French presidential polls in recent days? The racist far-right pundit Eric Zemmour (no apologies for the word racist) is at 15% in first round in one poll, just behind Marine Le Pen but miles behind President Macron 1/
In another poll, @EmmanuelMacron is seen soundly defeating all challengers in the two candidate second round on 24 April. He beats Zemmour 65-35, Le Pen 60-40 and the leading (for now) centre-right contender, Xavier Bertrand, 55-45 3/
Almost unnoticed, phaps bc it’s done with an English rather than a Hungarian accent, our populist, nationalist PM is setting out to weaken institutions that define a liberal democracy: he’s moving, Orbán style, to make it harder for his Govt to lose power theguardian.com/commentisfree/…
There is a pattern here, if we’re only willing to see it. A populist government hobbling those bodies that exist to keep it in check, trampling on democratic conventions and long-held rights, all to tighten its own grip on power.
We need to recognise it, even when it wears a smile and tousled hair, and speaks in the soothing cadences of Eton College
Germany now faces weeks - if not months - of political uncertainty which creates all sorts of policy risk for Europe. A real danger in the months ahead is a lengthy period without a new voice of any kind in Berlin, just as France plunges into an uncertain election of its own 1/
Because EU faces three extremely big, complex policy questions in the third & fourth quarter this year - over Rule of Law issues with Pol & Hungary; the EU's fiscal orientation in 2023 & how to manage UK escalation over NI Protocol - which are crying out for a political steer 2/
But with a lame-duck Govt now in Berlin, soon to be followed by same in Paris, no major EU policy decisions are likely under either. This risk is the problems fester, escalate & subsequently become harder to resolve 3/
Covid has been good for the EU.
It is now both more cohesive and resilient as a result of the pandemic, compared to before it. But are EU policymakers on the verge of committing another historic fiscal mistake? Thread 1/
Two reasons explain EU’s greater resilience post-Covid
1) The creation of Recovery Fund (RF), which has enabled significant EU-wide borrowing, subsequently transferred to member states as grants. This is facilitating their economic recovery, without increasing their debts 2/
2) Populism has had a bad crisis. This is partly because of RF. Take Italy's case: It's hard to argue against €180bn (10.5% of GDP). Hence the nationalist far-right League led by @matteosalvinimi has largely shut up & entered into reform-oriented coalition led by Mario Draghi 3/
The review to reform EU fiscal rules begins soon. 3 key points: 1/ Process brings risks; 2/ There's an emerging consensus on debt, not investments; 3/ COM is toying with completely overhauling governance - empowering members states to determine their own fiscal trajectories 1/
Process is key - & brings risks. Member states must submit Stability & Convergence Programs to Bxl by mid-Apr. For this they'll need an idea of what fiscal rules in 2023 will be. But we'll only have a new Govt in Berlin in.. Dec? Maybe Jan? That leaves Q1 next yr to do a deal 2/
Absent consensus, COM may be forced to issue a Communique - instead of concrete legislative proposals - pointing to what new rules will likely be. It's here when fiscal hawks (@VDombrovskis is key) will likely urge old rules & EDPs to apply - despite tightening they imply 3/