The Commission pursued a voting rights strategy that maximizes districts with Black population around 40%. Compared to the computer-generated random maps, this looks quite different. Here are draft maps for state House with the highest Black populations:
On partisan fairness, the maps are between perfect symmetry & what would be expected from randomly-drawn maps (which would favor Reps). For example, here is seat share for 38 member senate based on the 2018 Senate results compared to computer & public maps ippsr.msu.edu/sites/default/…
I’ll speak more about our report on the draft maps & the Michigan redistricting tonight at 7pm at @LWVLansing lwvlansing.org
We also have new public opinion data on Michigan's redistricting commission. Most Michiganders are not very familiar with the Commission, but most expect the process to result in fairer maps. In a separate survey, policy insiders are more familiar but still positive overall.
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Across Western democracies, the education divide slowly reversed from higher education voters favoring parties on the ideological right in the 1960s to favoring parties on the ideological left by 2020, easing but not reversing the income divide academic.oup.com/qje/advance-ar…
In multi-party systems, the education divide coincided with the rise of Green parties on high-education left & anti-immigration parties on low-education right. In the US, factions arose within the major parties, making the 2-party education divide stronger & income divide weaker
Globally, party vote share among the highest educated has become more correlated with party platform positions on sociocultural issues. Party vote share among the highest income voters remains correlated with its party platform positions on economic issues watermark.silverchair.com/qjab036.pdf?to…
The average swing against the president's party in the midterm election is -3.8% in share of the national House popular vote & -6.2% in House seat share. If that happened from 2020 to 2022, Dems would end up with only 47.7% of the 2-party popular vote & a 45 seat deficit
So far, Biden’s underwater approval has not translated into any sign of an anti-Democratic wave on the generic ballot. But research finds ballot numbers follow prez approval & a thermostatic ideological reaction against direction of policy. An R wave would be historically normal
We’re having a 2024-appropriate election discussion when the electoral task at hand for Democrats is avoiding a massive wave against them in 2022. 1994 & 2010 were huge & impactful National & state-level waves. They were products of large public thermostatic swings, not messaging
There are real trends in the rise & fall of disciplines, but they are slow. Trends in research university tenure-track faculty do not necessarily match trends in the much larger higher education teaching market researchcghe.org/perch/resource…
A big source of inertia is that most research university departments are aging, with assistant professors making up a small share of tenure-track faculty (the social sciences are on the young side) researchcghe.org/perch/resource…
Clinton & Obama comparisons are more for 2024 than now. Both suffered massive losses in 1st midterms, linked to congressional agendas. By re-elections, they had both generic incumbency & a radicalized Republican foil (including on economics) to enable visible triangulation
Low-education voters were traditionally inattentive, meaning both lower turnout & more nature-of-the-times voting. We haven’t yet run a low turnout election or a democratic incumbent under education polarization. But basic midterm backlash dynamics may overwhelm other factors
We don’t know yet how Republicans will look in 2024 (including on economics). 1995-6 & 2011-12 Rep internal fighting (including primaries) & public image had a lot to do with Dem successes in 96 & 12. Left/center conflict could matter less or allow triangulation with Rep foil
Nice @davidshor overview/debate & 2022/24 election simulation: nytimes.com/2021/10/08/opi…
In my view, Shor's meta point that decision-making by high-education liberal operatives hurts Democrats is more widely important than just recommending popular issue positioning
But nationalization, coalition group emphasis, context effects, ideological sorting, & polarization are all very important trends that are likely to be affected by many party decisions over time
Policy agenda effects are real, though under media control. Policy position effects seem limited & specific to issues where the parties once had muddled positions. But the long-built liberal & nationalized image of the Democratic Party is very important & Dems used to resist it
Media coverage of Congress is overwhelmingly focused on heated conflict. Coverage of social problems can be more substantive, but the focus moves to political conflict once policies are being debated
Process conflict media coverage of Congress tends to reduce bill support & highlight extremism. The dynamic is made worse by the incentives of backbenchers to generate attention on their efforts, which tends to make it harder for leaders to corral votes niskanencenter.org/how-media-cove…
Contentious media coverage can reduce support for bills, but does not always do so. Media coverage of legislative debate never seems to increase support for bills. Coverage of heated conflict is more likely to reduce support