Thread by @MMazarr

Whether the PRC believes time is on its side is a critical question. Moscow's faith in the long-term victory of communism helped ease urgency for aggression during the Cold War. @AndrewSErickson usefully raises that issue ... but could use more data
foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/18/chi…

Soon, he writes, PRC "leaders are likely to conclude that its deteriorating demographic profile, structural economic problems, and ... estrangement from global innovation centers are eroding its leverage to annex Taiwan and achieve other major strategic objectives"

*Are likely to*? We know this how--because our "objective" assessment shows that China confronts peak power? There's just no evidence here that Xi or others actually believe that China will begin declining soon. There's abundant evidence to the contrary, in fact ...

This study by my RAND colleagues is one of many that demonstrates how PRC officials + others see the US as declining and China as destined to surpass it. That overconfidence, rather than fear of peak China, seems the consensus view of PRC thinking
rand.org/pubs/research_…

Erickson adds: "the baseline assumption should be that Xi’s crown sits heavy and the insecurity induced is thereby intense enough to drive high-stake, high-consequence posturing and action." That's only true if Xi believes in "peak China." The essay gives no evidence for this

The essay then moves to its core recommendation: A crash program of deterrence. "U.S. planners should immediately mobilize resources and effort as well as accept greater risks to deter Chinese action over the critical next decade"

But if we are wrong about Xi's belief, that agenda is tailor-made to provoke the outcome it is meant to forestall. Example: A US statement that it is doing a crash program to win a Taiwan contingency would put Beijing in just the sort of use-of-lose scenario he fears

In other words: If "peak China" is an accurate description of PRC perceptions, undertaking a crash program would *exacerbate* it, making them believe they need to act more or less immediately. Whether deterrence works then = hugely chancy

Then, too, if the PRC *does* move in the next decade, it will strike before it hits peak military power, forfeiting the benefit of 20 more years of military spending. It'll generate intense balancing. Not sure how that solves its problems; the cost would add hugely to debt for eg

Finally: We'd see the proposed US crash program as defensive; the PRC would not. They'd likely interpret it as the dissolute, evil hegemon gearing up to smash the emerging challenger. The result would be a highly unstable balance + big risk of preemption

(One thing we *can* do that serves both goals: An urgent effort to make US military systems, C2, space etc resilient against cyber attack. That = defensive but strikes directly at key PRC operational concept and helps deny them an easy win under any scenario)

We should be calmly enhancing our capabilities and moving smartly to get strong multilateral signaling on PRC aggression (eg Japan, new EU resolution). But a better approach for the US is to *extend,* not foreshorten, China's perceived window of opportunity

We do that by signaling stability in US policy on Taiwan + opposition for any independence bid. We do it through continued economic engagement w/the PRC and general diplomacy. We do it by staying away from anything smacking of a "collapse the CCP" narrative

The lesson of Cold War is clear: Extend the competition + win with superior system. Ike considered rollback/push hard and risk war options and rightly rejected them. Before we embrace any crash programs, we need much stronger evidence they are truly necessary