A powerful story in @nybooks about the human effects of waging war. It is surely true that Taliban takeover threatens many bad outcomes. It is *also* true that persistent war imposed tremendous suffering in ways not often captured by the US media ... nybooks.com/daily/2021/10/…
2/ How easy it was for us to fall into thinking of an ongoing stalemate as "stability." Preserving that stalemate required airstrikes, raids, empowering local despots. It killed and maimed innocents, destroyed families and villages, drove many into the arms of the Taliban
3/ "The US will be remembered for enabling ... progress in women’s rights, an independent media and other freedoms." But in rural areas, "the main battlegrounds of America’s longest war, many Afghans view the US primarily through the prism of conflict, brutality and death"
4/ It will be a crime, and an invitation to future tragedy, if the primary lessons we digest from this war are about technocratic aspects of COIN doctrine + geopolitical credibility. The more important lessons have to do w/the moral and human cost of war we wage ...
5/ ... and the great danger, once committed, of falling into an endless justification for continued war which views human beings as mere instrumental tools of your strategic goals, and ignores the categories of suffering inconvenient to the narrative you wish to tell
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Whether the PRC believes time is on its side is a critical question. Moscow's faith in the long-term victory of communism helped ease urgency for aggression during the Cold War. @AndrewSErickson usefully raises that issue ... but could use more data foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/18/chi…
Soon, he writes, PRC "leaders are likely to conclude that its deteriorating demographic profile, structural economic problems, and ... estrangement from global innovation centers are eroding its leverage to annex Taiwan and achieve other major strategic objectives"
*Are likely to*? We know this how--because our "objective" assessment shows that China confronts peak power? There's just no evidence here that Xi or others actually believe that China will begin declining soon. There's abundant evidence to the contrary, in fact ...
Much more to find out about AUKUS and the process by which it came about. But the more detail + official reactions emerge, the more one wonders: Did we have to alienate *the* major European advocate for a stronger EU role in Asia in order to get this trilateral connection?
Australia's frustration with the French deal had been brewing. It may have been headed for an exit anyway. But to engineer that outcome in a way that infuriates the French, *on top* of other US-EU economic + geopolitical disputes, seems gratuitous ... politico.eu/article/why-au…
... and *on the very day* that the EU announced its new Indo-Pacific strategy. That strong statement should have been an unqualified win for the US. Instead it lands w/a thud + an echo of resentment. The timing seems almost calculated to embarrass the EU reuters.com/world/europe/a…
A couple of profound lessons the United States should learn from the Afghanistan experience--one that go well beyond CT and COIN and corruption and nation building, to the broader principles of a post-primacy foreign policy acutely aware of America's shifting global position
1. Stop being infuriated with others for having different interests + perspectives on issues and refusing to accede to US demands. Often we "blame" others for behavior that we could easily have anticipated (and often did). That's on us, not them thediplomat.com/2021/09/the-us…
Whether it's Pakistan's view of Afghanistan, or China's interests in DPRK, or India's view of Russia, or EU's of Iran: We need to work around others' divergent perspectives rather than trying to bully them into our lane. One lesson: Stop w/the sanctions, especially secondary
Many complex aspects here. But it's interesting that we just spent months berating senior officials for sitting by + doing nothing amid the self-deceptions of the Afghan war. And now some are berating a senior officer for *not* standing by + doing nothing when risk of war loomed
If we want a system able to correct itself in real time, we must accept the risk--and it is a risk--of officials sometimes stepping outside their lane. The alternative to conformism isn't always tidy procedure. It can require bureaucratic rebellion that breaks rules
To those who say, "Follow the rules + work w/in the system," I'd reply: That's what George Ball did in 1965. It's what Powell did in 2002. It's what people using "official dissent channels" do. Mostly, *it doesn't work*: The system grinds on; path dependence + conformism win out
Important essay in FA which hints at a very plausible route to a collapse of US policy toward Iran. First: more evidence that the bullying approach just doesn't work. US "maximum pressure" didn't cause back-down + deepened IRGC economic role in Iran foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/…
Then, on future: Space for grand bargain is gone. Tehran doesn't see value of abandoning JCPOA but feels no urgency to fully revive it. Potential = public Iranian claims of willingness to renew while demanding US concessions (sanctions) + slow-motion expansion of nuke capability
This NYT story has been rightly criticized as alarmist + too simple, but it does highlight a seemingly clear underlying trend. An actual time frame of 6 months vs 1 won't reassure the US, Israel or others nytimes.com/2021/09/13/us/…
For those hardy few interested in professional military education: Another misleading take on the role of war colleges in producing national tragedies. I get the idea and agree w/their ire at jargon + abstract guidance. But many problems w/this thesis city-journal.org/putting-the-wa…
1: Generals don't set national strategy. Blaming the "graduates of this [PME] system" for Iraq and Afgh. presumes that bad military strategy was the source of failure. Instead it was the choice to go to war combined w/fact that the conflicts weren't resolvable by military means
No magic PME curriculum will generate strategists able to overcome the problems the US faced in Afghanistan. We do need military leaders more willing to state openly that a given mission isn't feasible--but that's an issue of service culture + civil-mil relations, not PME