Leto is a mediocre, basically good person struggling & failing w/ forces beyond him. He wants to rule consensually, feels a sense of duty to his liege, loves his family, & dies for these values. This makes him relatable and sympathetic.
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Paul starts as a brat (like Luke) and just gets worse. He is surrounded by religious fanatics and becomes one himself in fairly short order. He drinks the kool-aid that he is some kind of messianic semi-divine being, a mash-up of Jesus and Plato's philosopher-king, and then
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gets carried along to lead an interplanetary religious holocaust killing tens of billions
I've never understood how Paul & Fremen are supposed to be sympathetic. The ancien regime may have been corrupt & decrepit, but Harkonnens & Emperor weren't murdering ppl in the billions
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Also, Leto is normal. He basically just wants to put his feet up and spend some quality time with the fam.
Meanwhile, everyone around him is a weirdo: witches, superhumans, religious zealots, plotting royals, a Star Wars cantina full of assorted other sociopaths.
This is the
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I’ve never liked the Dune series much. It’s an awful world, worse than our own, and Herbert seems to revel in making worse and worse with each book. Like Game of Thrones, there’s a gleeful brutality masquerading as realism or human nature. No thanks
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Worth remembering just what a boondoggle give-away to North Korea the Kaesong Industrial Zone was. 'Detente' it was not:
"Throughout its life cycle until its closure in 2016, the Kaesong complex faced nagging questions - not only about slave labor & unsafe working conditions,
but also about the use of its proceeds to fund Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program...Kaesong provided Pyongyang nearly $100 million a year in hard currency. No one but Kim Jong-un really knew where the money went. The N Korean workers at Kaesong were selected by the regime, had
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no rights to strike or bargain for better working conditions, were not permitted to speak to their S Korean managers, and received as little as $2 a month out of $130 a month in “wages” paid to the N Korean government by the S Korean manufacturers who invested there. None of
They won't seriously risk their rule or material perks for a psychological (nationalist) pay-off. In fact, IMO, both Koreas are de facto status quo states, despite de jure revisionism:
1. Talk is Cheap
So sure, both Koreas talk tough and maintain formal commitments to
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unification, but talk is cheap obviously and leaders lie a lot. Unification might be formally retained as an end-goal, but only as a far-off, de rigeur ideal recited ceremonially, rather than actually seriously planned for or built into NK strategy. I could be convinced of the
quagmire with no obvious endpoint. That is not K at all. The war has been over since mid-1953, and it is NK, not the allies, who provokes. The lack of paperwork - a formal peace treaty - has no bearing on the empirical situation on the ground which is far from open conflict.
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B. A 'War-Ending Declaration' (종전선언) is a legally bizarre neologism which no one really understands
The only reason this strange language is used is bc the Moon government's first effort to get a 'peace treaty' failed, as did its second, vaguer 'peace regime' effort. So
THREAD: Strategically, 9/11 was a one-off sucker-punch. That’s it.
1. 9/11 did not ‘change everything.’ In fact, it changed surprisingly little
This language was deployed to create political space for a vast expansion of US coercion, especially in the Middle East. If all the
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rules have suddenly changed, then all sorts of behavior are suddenly permissible – like domestic spying, torture, and Iraq. But strategically, 9/11 did not change that much: US GDP continued to expand; US military power was scarcely affected; US alliances did not fracture; the
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stock market re-opened after a few days and did not crash; gas prices did not spike; the global Islamic revolution Osama Bin Laden hoped this would ignite did not materialize:
If the Afghan withdrawal & 20th anniversary of 9/11 can wind-down our big foot-print 'war on terror' (for a more measured counter-terrorism), here is a quick case for greater restraint:
of empires/hegemonies is too many commitments and too few resources. We should, obviously, avoid such overstretch, & given rising China, US commitments in the Middle East particularly (Afghanistan, e.g.) should be re-considered
2. Domestic/Democratic: Blowback Militarization
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The post-9/11 militarization of US foreign policy has come home: in the torture debate (yes, we actually 'debated' torture), domestic surveillance, endemic governmental secrecy, near reverence on military and police issues (just watch Fox for 5 minutes),and the militarization/