Discussions over the weekend around oft overlooked fact that M1 remains one of few Western tanks to use hydraulic turret drive, where essentially all peer AFV designs have migrated to all-electric
A short thread on the actual dangers of hydraulic drive, and a trope along the way
Tank turrets are really heavy – 26 tonnes for an M1 Abrams – and need to move fast to traverse weapons and respond to fine control commands for stabilisation. As a result hydraulic systems were for a long time the norm for control
For today what you need to know is oil is at high pressure (1,00 psi or more) and forced through pipes or hoses to actuate physical movement of big heavy components. It also gets quite hot when working. Those two characteristics become relevant imminently.
The critical risk with hydraulic drives is their potential behaviour when damaged or otherwise failing. With the systems running at high pressure, any leak in the system will elicit a high velocity spray of fluid.
This has a number of significant risks. In respect of the vehicle, you will suffer degradation and then total failure of your hydraulic system. For AFV that typically means no more turret movement or stabilisation without manual cog spinning by the gunner.
You're essentially removed from the fight in any meaningful capacity, and likely to be easily outmanoeuvred and killed if you don’t withdraw. Traversing by hand is at least a possibility though.
More immediately however, you have high pressure and temperature hydraulic fluid spraying from the breach in the line. Regardless of the fluid composition, which comes next, this is hugely dangerous.
It can scald crewmembers, fry your electrics, and generally make continued operation of the vehicle highly unlikely, as everything is getting covered in hot oil at a relentless pace and volume.
The pervading fear and the key driver of the move to electric drive is fire. In the past hydraulic fluid was highly flammable, with a flash point c.150-300C and autoignition from 300C upwards (sometimes a little lower c.260C).
That’s well within the realm of the environment during a vehicle penetration or other vehicle fire. Even something simple like a line break near the engine or exhaust components could readily ignite it.
Thereafter your vehicle is on a downward spiral to being a burn out hulk, even with a fire suppression system you have a continuously venting high pressure flame thrower inside your vehicle, and the fire can propagate back into the hydraulic line and through the whole vehicle
The pressure of the system is a significant risk as even a tiny leak can spray a finely atomised mist of oil and air a considerable distance, subsequently igniting as a rather effective fuel air explosive somewhat ceaselessly as the system continues to vent under pressure.
However *TROPE ALERT* hydraulic turret drive does not mean an assured fire laden death trap in modern AFV, because chemical engineering has come to the rescue, or at least mitigation for those stubborn enough to stay with hydraulics...
Because from ~1950 industry, which uses hydraulics on far larger scale in arguably more dangerous environments than even the military (foundries/mines/steel mills are basically permanently on fire & filled with hydraulic machinery in poor state of repair) moved to mitigate risk
They came up with the concept of fire-resistant hydraulic fluids (FRHFs), which seek to reduce (but never eliminate) the risk of hydraulic fluid catching alight under high pressure leaks and breaches.
There are two broad approaches; (1) introduction of water into the fluid, and (2) use of synthetic non-aqueous products instead of oil.
(1) Sees a water glycol or invert imulsion (both c.40% water) as hydraulic fluid along with additives to increase viscosity and anti-wear properties. Result is fluid with high water content that when atomised in a leak water will try to ‘snuff’ the fire as it attempts to ignite.
(2) Uses synthetic fluids that are inherently fire resistant (but fireproof) such as phosphate esters. They have been widely used in industry and military applications, but are rather grim from environmental and cost angles, so are losing popularity.
A new synthetic approach uses polyol esters derived from reactions between animal/vegetable fats and synthesized organic alcohols, and are much cheaper and environmentally friendly, so have been picking up use for quite a while now as the preferred option in civil domains
What does any of that mean? Regardless of choice, modern FRHF hydraulics are not especially flammable, but to be clear, are not fireproof. To be certified in the US, they go through a few tests that mean the risk of uncontrolled fire is quite low.
Tests include spraying warmed oil at 1,000 psi through a nozzle that simulates a high pressure leak onto a flame. This will burn, its still atomised oil, but fire must self-extinguish when the flame is removed and must not propagate to the nozzle. No burn may last longer than 5s
Another test has a continuous spray of 60 seconds onto a metal channel heated to >700C. It may not ignite, or if it does only on the channel and any fluid rolling off the channel may not burn, nor may redirected spray burn.
Other organisation such as the Mine Safety & Health Administration (MSHA) do similar tests with additional ignition sources – open flames, welding arcs, burning rags, hot manifolds, molten metal etc. Again success is usually limited burns of <5 seconds and no propagation of fire.
Back to tanks! Having seen real world results of AFV hydraulics in the wars of the 1970s, the US led a charge to find something not hideously flammable for their AFVs, seeking a straight swap fluid rather than novel techs like electric drive that everyone else was looking at.
The existing standard US hydraulic fluid was MIL-H-6083 hydraulic fluid, also known as OHT, and it burned REALLY well (flashpoint was only 80C). After some experimentation with loads of options, they went with an interim solution, a fluid called MIL-H-46170, or FRH.
FRH was adopted on M1 in 1980 and raised flash point to c.200C which was better, but still not great when you consider the ignition threats that can occur in a combat vehicle. Also, many US AFV didn’t make the swap from OHT to FRH and used OHT for decades to follow.
Latest standards for FRH claim self-extinguishing after initial ignition (so drips and spray wont continue to burn like MSHA standards), flame propagation of no more than 0.3cm/s, a flash point of 246C and autoignition of 343C
One reason for that is that FRH struggles at low temperature, becoming so viscous as to prevent function in very cold climates and requiring pre-warming systems and other mitigating procedures.
In the 90s US came up with MIL-H-53119, or CTFE. Its quite expensive but non-flammable. Expense was acceptable as its a critical survivability issue and they worked out in training over prior 10 yrs theyd already had more than $20m damage to AFV from hydraulic leak induced fires
However, CTFE was an all-new fluid, not petroleum based, and required system modifications (it corrodes some components), so it was shelved on cost of conversion grounds to instead be used for hypothetical new design vehicles in the future.
They looked at adding small (c.3%) halon based compounds into FRH, just skimming under the boundaries of the Montreal Protocol Treaty banning them, and this looked like it made the fluid near impossible to ignite. Im not clear if that ever progressed, if anyone knows do comment.
Meanwhile M1 continues to use FRH, low risk but by no means no risk. Since the banning of Halon-1301, modern fire suppressant isn’t brilliant against atomised hydraulic fuel air fire, and if the system fails to operate or doesnt extinguish you have an uncontrolled fuel source
So modern hydraulics aren’t assured death traps like hydraulics of old. But they’re also far from safe versus minimal risk electric drive systems. Electric is also massively lower maintenance, more reliable and has finer control, but that’s a different discussion
Disclaimer: I’m no chemist, am open to correction, but this the product of reading a half dozen papers on hydraulic fires and some TRADOC-type studies on US hydraulic fluid development, and at least offers a bit of science to the knowledgebase. /end #tanktwitter#miltwitter
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Someone (i want to say @AndreiBtvt?) recently posted a pic of the High Mobility and Agility (HIMAG), which is an interesting oddity of history.
A thread of a few facts and pics of this sort of tank for today's #tanktuesday
As the name suggests, it was a testbed for mobility and to experiment with lighter and more agile vehicles rather than increasingly heavy MBT, born out of the US Army's Armored Combat Vehicle Technology (ACVT) programme.
Headline features included hydropneumatic suspension, move from heavy conventional turrets of the day (3-man with 105 mm gun) to a lightweight turret mounting an autoloaded ARES XM274 75 mm gun firing cased telscoped ammunition
Cummins awarded an $87m contract to finalise the Advanced Combat Engine (ACE), a modular and scalable opposed piston 2-stroke diesel engine solution, capable of hybridization. Doesn't sound immediately exciting, but ACE is actually pretty cool - read on to see why!
Sitting within the Advanced Powertrain Demonstrator effort, headlines are that Cummins claims it provides a 50% increase in power density, (same power in smaller form) a 20% reduction in heat rejection, and 13% improved fuel efficiency. Add in 10x more electrical power generation
OP engines are so attractive the US Army said "The Army studied engine architectures for over 20 years and based on thousands of hours of testing independently concluded that the [OP] architecture is the superior platform on which to base the future of combat vehicle propulsion."
Given the popularity of the topic around the AJAX problems, a brief summary of whole-body vibration (WBV) and why it's a problem. In short and to the surprise of no one, shaking a human rapidly and for a long time is bad, but can also be really bad.
Perhaps moreso than usual a disclaimer - this is Twitter, I dont have much space and some things are simplified or omitted for simplicity. I'm not a Dr or human factors specialist and this is a hugely complex science, I’m just giving a flavour of the topic. That out of the way...
So, what is WBV? UK Health & Safety Executive are rather interested in it, and define as shown. In essence, something vibrating your whole body, obviously.
As an occupant of any vehicle you are subject to WBV, the frequency and severity of vibrations are v important
I have a tendency to write unsolicited threads on AFV tech that interests me or comes up in Twitter interactions.
Here is a long overdue index thread of threads for anyone stumbling across my profile and loyal followers alike!
A primer on the critical dimensions of AFV design, the overall dimensions that constrain most other dimensional/volumetric elements of an AFV, and a lot of the inherent capabilities too.
The start of an open-ended (9 parts at the time of writing) series on tracked AFV running gear and mobility. Some interesting nuances that people don't always realise:
1/ Some data from the US CBO on their AFV programmes, showing the average age of a US Army M1 tank was at time of data collection 8.3 years.
Why is that an interesting fact? A slightly rambling thread:
2/ There was exciteable discussion a few weeks back around age of AFV designs which was largely reductive and a bit misguided by the original author but prompted interesting discussion.
Ultimately a modern tank is just a metal box to be iteratively retrofitted with newer bits.
3/ Thats a slightly reductive statemeent too admittedly, but step changes no longer require complete fresh slate designs as they used to. The modern tank is at the size and weight limits, so its now a case of more efficient packaging inside that space.
Only a day on from IR release to the first big land news – reports via @FTusa284 yesterday that Rheinmetall confirmed Challenger 2 LEP awarded, official details TBC but 148 tanks looks good
A thread on whaqt LEP is, largely taken from my feature on it last month for @JanesINTEL
A Pocket History: LEP, like all UK programmes, has a lengthy backstory but in the contemporary space emerged in 2013 as a pure obsolescence management project, replacing equipment that was no longer manufactured or supported and extending functional life without capability lift
With this modest scope, the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) issued two GBP23 million (USD31.23 million) assessment phase contracts in December 2016 to BAE Systems and Rheinmetall Landsysteme for the development of digital prototypes.