This tweet by a finance economist on climate policy & transport fuel price increases has been getting a lot of attention on German Twitter.
I am doing a THREAD about it because it's got some truth in it, but it's also misleading in several respects
First of all, how do people respond to fuel price increases? Do they keep driving just as before, and cut expenses elsewhere?
Energy & transport economists have concept for it: the price elasticity of fuel demand.
It ranges from 0 (no fuel demand reduction) to (-)1
Höfgen's tweet implies that the price elasticity of fuel demand is 0. Empirical research, however, comes to different conclusions. This study for Germany estimates it at 0.45 iaee.org/en/publication…
If elasticity is higher than 0 that means that a CO2 price will reduce transport emissions to some extent.
And indeed studies on the impact of a CO2 fuel tax in Germany estimate a reduction in transport emissions between 7 and 16 MtCO2 (see report ariadneprojekt.de/media/2021/10/…)
So the statement that fuel price increases "help the climate exactly ZERO" is seriously misleading. It seems to be based on an assumption of price elasticity = 0 that is at odds with empirical evidence.
Now to the kernel of truth: the price elasticity of fuel demand varies depending on a lot of factors.
In this paper we reviewed the literature on it & suggested that it ranges from 0.1 in the most car-dependent rural areas to 0.5 in European cities doi.org/10.1038/s41558…
So Höfgen's scenario of fuel price increases resulting in no reduction of car use applies perhaps to the most car-dependent rural areas. But not to many other areas where people live. In the latter, people will reduce car driving to some extent.
The problematic assumption seems to be - in plain language - that all travel by car is *necessary* and has *no alternatives*. In practice, that is not the case: a lot of car use has alternatives, or is "luxury" (will not be undertaken at whatever cost).
The kernel of truth is that there are *some* population groups for which things look as Höfgen's describes them: low-income, high & expenses on fuel, little ability to cut them, will end up cutting expenses in other areas.
We estimated price elasticity for four different groups in the UK and find that it's pretty low (though still 0.33) among households with low income and high fuel costs, accounting for ca. 9% of the population. Elasticity is higher for the other groups though.
So how many people would belong to this 'poor & inelastic' group in Germany?
We made another study trying to identify 'forced car owners'. We find they're 7% in UK and 5% in Germany. So slightly fewer in Germany.
So my guesstimate would be that the scenario described by the tweet would apply to something between 5-9% of the population in Germany. It wouldn't be accurate for the remaining 91-95%. (END)
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...and this regardless of whether the current situation is socially 'fair' (it's not ⬇️) or whether it even makes sense from an economics perspective (economists are divided but many think it doesn't). Those arguments won't cut much ice I'm afraid.
It talks about how Europe is actually pretty car dependent, how that explains a lot of inequalities in transport, and how some use those as excuses to preserve the (car-dependent) status quo
THREAD
There's a lot of American (or Australian) literature presenting Europe as a car-free paradise, but that's just because they're *so* car dependent, and Europe less than them.
But actually in most of Europe, it's not that easy to get by without a car.
The evidence shows that:
▶️ most travel in Europe is by car
▶️ large accessibility advantage from having a car in most places
▶️ most people in most countries see cars as a "necessity no one should do without"
At the same time, quite a lot of Europeans don't have one
You could take *any* of the sectors in this chart, and argue that climate mitigation there is an irrelevant distraction, because the large majority of emissions come from elsewhere.
We call this rhetorical strategy "whataboutism", and it's often applied to countries, when people say "we're just 1% of emissions!" and "what about China!?"
But it's just as often applied to *sectors* and specific measures.
If you know Germany you know that it's pretty common, almost 'common sense', to claim that Germany is doing better than other countries re: climate & environment.
Journalist here calls it an "undisputed climate leader"
Specifically, the discourses here are no. 5 "All talk, little action" (AKA targetism), drawing attention (often presumed) achievements relative to other countries (rather than relative to the goal) and to future targets (rather than concrete achievements)
...and no. 3 "the free rider excuse", hinting that other countries are not willing to do their bit (so why should we try *even harder*)?
- or the day when German journalists will stop saying "we're *undisputed* climate *leaders*, but what can we do, we can't do everything *alone*!" (like here ⬇️)
"We've committed to stop bragging about our presumed superiority on environmental matters by 2050"
Anyway I'm sure that day will become before the phaseout of combustion engine vehicle sales because... the German government is adamantly refusing to set a date for that