I am running a live election-night model for the governor’s race (similar to the NYT “needle”) and will be posting updates in this thread as results pour in. The model turns on once ~20 precincts report e-day votes & ~5 counties report absentees.
The state elections website (which is publishing statewide returns publicly) is really taking its sweet time. Lagging the networks by quite an amount. But with 3 absentee dumps and results from 107 precincts, reporting jurisdictions show a small shift toward Dems v 2020.
I imagine the model will switch itself on any moment now and then I can send you a screenshot
"any moment now"
The hangup is that we don't have full absentee votes anywhere yet. The model needs or else we're projecting a strong pro-McAuliffe swing in election-day votes to absentees which isn't correct. Need to observe the polarization in both types.
Ok, we're running now! The model isn't going to get information from late mail votes tonight, so it won't be able to call a close race if those are a big chunk, but I'm going to try ignoring them for now and assuming swings in partisan splits are roughly equal statewide
The lay of the land right now is that McAuliffe is underperforming in absentee votes, both in terms of vote share and turnout, and it's enough to cancel out (by a large margin) any increase in Dem election-day vote versus 2020. The promise dashboard chart is coming momentarily
Here's the full model projection now. It thinks Youngkin is on track to win by 2-3 points **though there is large margin of error.** Things typically pan out as expected, but we need to see more election-day precincts from the cities and suburbs (esp in and around Fairfax
The model is stabilizing around Youngkin +3 with 32% of the vote in. Things are close enough and there are enough votes left in Fairfax where McAuliffe could win, but the model sees a pretty likely (70%) R win in Virginia tonight. And a swing to Rs of at least 10 pts either way.
Just to give you an idea of where I'm at qualitatively, I am currently writing our post-VA piece as if Youngkin has won
The only reason my model is not at 100% Youngkin probability now is because there is lot of uncertainty in the absentee ballot predictions as most have not reported yet, especially in the big cities. But the writing is on the wall here. It looks like Rs will go 2-3/3 in VA.
I don't have time to clean up these plots right now, but the story in Virginia is a clear drop-off in turnout in the strongest Democratic areas (esp in absentee voting) and a stronger-than-average swing against them in the exurban places where they have lost ground since ~2012
One thing making precinct-level analysis in VA reallllyyy hard right now is the splitting up of votes at the absentee and election-day level. Makes e-night prediction easy, but muddies up comparisons across years when partisan composition of vote method changes.
The model is still at Youngkin +2.
Confidence intervals narrowing quite quickly now.
A better model would have treated the absentee ballots a little better. I could also have imposed a Bayesian prior on vote shares; obviously, Dems aren't losing the absentee votes in big counties by 50 points.
This could end up closer to Youngkin +4 or +5 at the race absentee votes in Democratic strongholds are falling off. Just clear complacency among Dems for McAuliffe. But also real evidence of sub/exurban vote-swticthing. See scatters here (at the county level).
The model is now telling me to call the contest for Youngkin — which, uh, yeah, is pretty obvious and was from the start. Look how flat those lines are over election night, esp after we started getting returns from Fairfax.
You love to see a working model...
Someone DM'd me for a model update, so here you go. Also attaching a chart comparing McAuliffe's projected margin in the remaining absentee buckets as compared to Biden 2020.
OK, here is my final chart for the night.
Comparing 2021 and 2020 in Virginia, we see disproportionate Democratic drop-off in big cities and evidence of substantial vote-switching among swing voters (or at least among voters in swing counties). Article coming soon.
That chart uses the final predictions from the live-model, made when 98% of the estimated vote was reporting (just a few absentee buckets were outstanding). Point being the comparisons are using complete observations and are as close to final as we’ll get until tomorrow AM.
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Our polling model for VA-Gov is up. It controls for house effects and (attempts to) adjust for partisan nonresponse ("attempts to" bc we detect only modest patterns in the VA polling right now).
One big thing: Polls show ~7% of voters are undecided right now. That really explodes the CI. Luckily, there has been very little correlation so far between the number of undecideds & the gap between McAuliffe and Youngkin. (Versus in CA when we saw undecideds breaking 4 Newsom.)
One thing to keep your eye on, in terms of trying to spot potential polling error, is that multiple polls have come in with Youngkin's vote % with voters of color wayyy higher than Trump's, including among Black respondents. Like ~10pts. Nonresponse or real? We'll know Tuesday...
My piece on the state of the Democrats: Their problems stem from long-term increases in ideological sorting, factionalized identities, nationalization, & educational polarization—each of which contribute to their problems in the Senate + Electoral College. economist.com/united-states/…
The piece doesn’t get into institutional reforms that might help them, in part because none are likely to pass and in part bc that’s not the point of the article. For the record, though, they should pursue everything that might make our federal institutions more proportional.
In the end, I think these structural patterns and long-term trends in the electorate, especially an increase in our collective “social distance” (identity-based polarization) & ideological sorting, are likely to overwhelm the impacts of message-based strategies, eg “popularism.”
I… don’t know. This objection rings hollow to me. In part because educational polarization is a long term trend (we have 70 years of it at this point) with stable growth — but really because our conversations on this are usually conditioned on patterns staying roughly the same.
You can make the argument that, well, correlates of voting will change over the next decade, so the rural white non-college bias of the Senate will get “solved” somehow — but it’s still a huge problem today, and it should be the mean expectation for the future too.
So yeah. I don’t think predictions for 5-10 years from now have too high uncertainty to not be useful. But smart people are conditioning on these things in convos, & I think they’re right. After all I think it’s *un*reasonable to think edu polarization will substantially reverse!
This Pew poll seems to indicate support for Trump among Republicans is a lot lower than either the 2024 trial-heat polling or my general read of the media conventional wisdom suggests. Only 44% say he should run for president again. pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021…
Not really sure how to reconcile this all, to be honest. My hard prior is that, if the GOP had a primary today, Trump would win a resounding victory. But maybe that prior is wrong. When we find conflicting evidence the answer is usually somewhere in between!
Let’s do an exercise:
Poll 1: If the 2024 GOP primary was held today, with all the rules from 2016, and it was Trump v all the top GOP leaders who _might_ end up running, would he win?