Worth remembering that a near-term emissions peak, by 2025 or so, is very much in line with China's own internal plans around its power and heavy-emitting industries.
The fact that we have seen no advance of the pre-Paris Agreement target of 2030 is incredibly telling.
Really worth remembering that "2030 peak" wasn't a new thing from Xi's 2020 UNGA speech, it dates all the way back to 2015: reuters.com/article/us-fra…
China is nearly a third of annual global emissions, more than the U.S., EU, Japan, and South Korea put together, so whatever it does or doesn't do has an outsized influence.
"Too time-consuming". God help us.
For all that we rightly criticize the sort of thin-but-glossy PDF decarbonization policies that the likes of Australia have presented industry.gov.au/sites/default/… China hasn't done even that.
We're left with these unofficial third-party projections from academics instead, plus whatever can be cobbled together from emerging elements of the current five-year plan: carbonbrief.org/influential-ac…
If anyone thinks they can see more concrete details in the 1+N plans released last month then I'd be happy to accept that. But I find I really have to squint to see anything firm:
We think of the founder of GE as the great inventor Thomas Edison, but its true founder was just as much (if not more so) another crucial figure of America's Gilded Age, John Pierpont Morgan, the founder of JPMorgan.
Edison attracted Morgan's interest when he installed electricity in the financier's 5th Avenue house. J.P. Morgan was an archetypal early adopter of this brand-new technology, and quickly glimpsed its potential.
"The AEC still believes that it would be relatively easy physically to open up gas resources at the rate of one trillion cubic feet per year with the explosion of one hundred nuclear devices a year."
We know how much carbon there is in fossil fuels and how much CO2 they produce when burned. These are global commodities whose production volumes are well-known.
Multiply the two and you have a good-enough number for FF emissions. The best analysis merely refines this sum.
Whereas calculating land-use emissions involve multiple calculations about the carbon cycles of different ecosystems, and how those ecosystems link up, and are being changed by climate change itself, etc. etc. There's an awful lot that we don't know in all of this!
Now we have 190 countries turning 2019's contentious argument into 2021's reality, committing to end investment in new coal power and phase it out in major economies during the 2030s:
Something to think about as India starts to reduce its dependence on coal.
The first map is districts affected by the 54-year-old Naxalite insurgency.
The second map shows India's coalfields.
The Godavari valley in the east of the country is central to both the insurgency and the coal industry.
We don't know that much about the Naxalites' funding model, but extortion of wealthy local businesses such as mining and coal processing and transport seems to be important.
The insurgency has declined dramatically in recent years but it seems to be in the coal belt that it's hanging on longest.
If the coal industry declines, does that weaken the insurgency (less money, less land expropriation) or strengthen it (fewer jobs, more discontent)?