Thread by @scharap

Wanted to add a thread to the ongoing discussion in part sparked by this piece in today’s @POLITICOMag

https://twitter.com/politicomag/status/1461755604264001539

I hope I’m wrong, but more and more signs including this @julianbarnes @nytimes story nytimes.com/2021/11/19/us/… suggest that #Russia is preparing for a major offensive

If that’s true, choices become very stark very quickly. Threatening consequences is important, but I haven’t seen anyone make a convincing case that the West is prepared to do what it takes to force #Russia to back down. So coercion alone is not going to be enough.

So, to put it bluntly, we seem to have a choice between attempts at coercion that fail to stop a devastating war (our current path) and unsavory compromises that offer at least a chance at preventing the war.

Moscow appears to be on the verge on foreclosing other options.

And while Minsk II is not advantageous for #Ukraine, I am positive that the Minsk III that would emerge after the war would be far worse.

One more point, since people apparently have trouble understanding nuanced arguments.

Note the words “insufficient” and “also”. This is not an either/or proposal. An effective policy has to mix coercion and compromise if coercion itself is not going to work.

Try reading Schelling first before you engage.