So since I've garnered a number of new followers this weekend, I thought I'd follow up on the substance of the discussion around my @POLITICOMag article. A thread. politico.com/news/magazine/…
Folks (particularly those hyperventilating) should recognize that this is a question about means, not ends. Everyone wants to avoid a major war in Europe, right?
If so, the question is how. Some believe that if we only whack the Russians upside the head (or threaten to do so) either via sanctions, military assistance to UA, etc., enough, then they'll reverse course, send everyone home and apologize for the trouble.
Others (@DrRadchenko) think this is all a bluff. Russian forces will probably go home even without the whacking in that case.
Others think that the wheels are already in motion and war is inevitable.
My view is that the threat of an attack is real, and that there's no plausible amount of whacking (or threatened whacking) that would fundamentally alter Russia's calculus unless...
there's a negotiation in which they get some of what they want. Pursuing a negotiation doesn't mean abandoning coercive tools; it means using them as leverage, but also being prepared to give-and-take.
The terms of the arrangement (Kyiv taking visible steps on Minsk II) I proposed in the piece have the advantage of being a) reversible if Russia doesn't reciprocate and b) things Ukraine has already signed up to do!
This is *not* my idea of a good outcome. But, if my analysis of current Russian policy is right (and it seems like the USG is trying to convince allies of the same), the alternative (war) is far worse. END
OK, can't help myself: two more points. First, analogies to Munich are intellectually lazy, ahistorical, and intended to shut down discussion. You don't have to like Putin's #Russia to recognize it's not Nazi Germany
We can have a debate about the extent of #Putin's ambitions, and whether tactical concessions will somehow make them grow, but give Munich a rest.
Second, an argument that is worth considering: @ChristopherJM and others make the case that Ukraine's domestic politics make any forward movement on Minsk impossible.
It's an interesting question, but in my view not so clear-cut as @ChristopherJM claims. Let's recall that Zelensky was elected in a landslide on a platform of ending the war. He crushed an incumbent president whose campaign slogan was "Army, language, faith".
Poroshenko's own political strategist said he lost because of the over-emphasis on nationalist themes. strana.news/articles/inter…
Polling also shows similar widespread support for peace.
Yes, it's clear the political discussion in Kyiv doesn't comport with these broader public moods. And it's also clear that Zelensky has squandered his political capital by this point.
But here's the point: a bloodbath on the battlefield is likely to cause far more internal unrest than, say, passing a conditional amnesty.
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If that’s true, choices become very stark very quickly. Threatening consequences is important, but I haven’t seen anyone make a convincing case that the West is prepared to do what it takes to force #Russia to back down. So coercion alone is not going to be enough.
And a bunch of other folks not on twitter including two from Ukraine, two from Moldova, etc. This was a unique endeavor where we set out to find common ground among representatives of countries that do not get along well, to put it mildly. 2/
We agreed on a proposal that everyone could live with —even if no one was completely satisfied. The idea was to revise the regional order particularly as it concerns the "in-between states" so as to boost security, facilitate prosperity, and better deal w/conflicts 3/