Very happy to (finally) highlight the release of this study. The idea, given intensifying US-RU/US-CH rivalry, was to ask what factors tend to stabilize such competitions and keep them from running out of control. A few major findings [THREAD]:
rand.org/pubs/research_…
2/ We reviewed literature on stability, escalation, and rivalry, and developed principles of stability in great power rivalries. We tested these in a number of historical cases + applied the resulting framework to current US-China and US-Russia contests
3/ Those current-day applications are a little dated--it took a while to get this report out. But we believe the basic conclusions remain valid, and that the trajectory we laid out has roughly continued (though has been mitigated in some cases, eg US Russia diplomacy)
4/ The study lists variables we found to be associated w/stability (personal relations, commo channels, managing allies + proxies etc) and two defining elements of stable rivalry: Acceptance of a shared status quo + tendency of relations to return to an equilibrium after shocks
5/ Even as of 2019-2020, we found that based on the vast majority of these variables, (no surprise) both US-Russia and US-China rivalries were headed toward unstable, volatile degrees of intensity. Both were kept from even worst instability by a handful of stabilizing variables
6/ One chief lesson was that "The US should take care to limit the signals that it aims to threaten the existential security of rivals. All the case studies agree that a perception of mutual existential threat objectives is the most destabilizing single factor in a rivalry"
7/ Another lesson: "Our historical case studies ... provided numerous examples of military capabilities deployed for deterrent purposes or to achieve military advantage that had significant unintended escalatory consequences"
8/ Leading recommendations included the well-worn but crucial requirements to develop stabilizing rules of the road, enhance transparency, strengthen communication channels, take care in deploying the most provocative systems, and build personal relations among senior officials
9/ We also suggest that the US "Look for ways to grant rivals increased status in exchange for creating a trade space for arrangements that would serve U.S. interests and enhance stability." Operationalizing that idea can be tricky but reassurance is a key component of statecraft
10/ In sum: The study emphasizes the simple but critical idea that, alongside actions to set red lines, stand up for US interests, and augment deterrence, attending to the requirements of stability in these contests will be an equally important priority in managing them

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Mike Mazarr

Mike Mazarr Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @MMazarr

30 Nov
Just another reminder that this is basically the same strategic norm the US claimed re: Cuba and enforced in the missile crisis + later. SecState Vance in 1979 about just the infamous Soviet brigade in Cuba: "the presence of this unit runs counter to long‐held American policies"
Remember, too, that in the resolution of the crisis, in agreeing to (private) assurances to w/draw missiles from Turkey, the US explicitly affirmed the validity of this notion of equivalence: It is destabilizing for a great power to deploy certain weapons too close to its rival
I know that the debate over what Russia was + was not promised re: NATO enlargement still rages. Persuasive arguments on both sides, tho my best reading of the evidence = that Russia has a decent case to feel at least slightly misled. But ...
rferl.org/a/nato-expansi…
Read 6 tweets
30 Nov
A fascinating and visually stimulating summary of several Taiwan scenarios. But it reinforces a lesson of every unclas/strategic-level game or TTX I have ever participated in: I don't see how the PRC makes unqualified aggression work
reuters.com/investigates/s… via @specialreports
Every time I've seen this played out (politically + strategically, not tactically), there comes a point where those who'd prefer to hedge (Japan, EU, etc) become enraged by Beijing's aggression and decide they have no choice but to respond more decisively--whatever that means
They do that in large measure not because of any generic commitment to norms or alliances (though those are real considerations). They do it because *their* interests become directly threatened, and their red lines get crossed
Read 9 tweets
28 Nov
This is *exactly* the problem with an excessively normative conception of foreign policy. When "wrongdoers" don't accept our generous offers, there's no middle ground of statecraft. We refuse to deal w/them as legitimate states and default to implied regime change strategies ...
... which stretch on for decades as we watch the targets of our ire do all manner of nasty things (eg get 60+ nukes, as w/DPRK). These regimes will eventually change. But in the meantime we had better be willing to undertake diplomacy + accept sometimes rotten bargains
It is entirely possibly to marry a Kennan-esque long-term expectation of systemic victory with a powerful interim willingness to engage w/autocratic troublemakers. We keep seeing diplomatic compromise as a moral failure when in fact it is the essential support-system ...
Read 4 tweets
23 Oct
A powerful story in @nybooks about the human effects of waging war. It is surely true that Taliban takeover threatens many bad outcomes. It is *also* true that persistent war imposed tremendous suffering in ways not often captured by the US media ...
nybooks.com/daily/2021/10/…
2/ How easy it was for us to fall into thinking of an ongoing stalemate as "stability." Preserving that stalemate required airstrikes, raids, empowering local despots. It killed and maimed innocents, destroyed families and villages, drove many into the arms of the Taliban
3/ "The US will be remembered for enabling ... progress in women’s rights, an independent media and other freedoms." But in rural areas, "the main battlegrounds of America’s longest war, many Afghans view the US primarily through the prism of conflict, brutality and death"
Read 5 tweets
19 Oct
Whether the PRC believes time is on its side is a critical question. Moscow's faith in the long-term victory of communism helped ease urgency for aggression during the Cold War. @AndrewSErickson usefully raises that issue ... but could use more data
foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/18/chi…
Soon, he writes, PRC "leaders are likely to conclude that its deteriorating demographic profile, structural economic problems, and ... estrangement from global innovation centers are eroding its leverage to annex Taiwan and achieve other major strategic objectives"
*Are likely to*? We know this how--because our "objective" assessment shows that China confronts peak power? There's just no evidence here that Xi or others actually believe that China will begin declining soon. There's abundant evidence to the contrary, in fact ...
Read 14 tweets
16 Sep
Much more to find out about AUKUS and the process by which it came about. But the more detail + official reactions emerge, the more one wonders: Did we have to alienate *the* major European advocate for a stronger EU role in Asia in order to get this trilateral connection?
Australia's frustration with the French deal had been brewing. It may have been headed for an exit anyway. But to engineer that outcome in a way that infuriates the French, *on top* of other US-EU economic + geopolitical disputes, seems gratuitous ...
politico.eu/article/why-au…
... and *on the very day* that the EU announced its new Indo-Pacific strategy. That strong statement should have been an unqualified win for the US. Instead it lands w/a thud + an echo of resentment. The timing seems almost calculated to embarrass the EU
reuters.com/world/europe/a…
Read 9 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Too expensive? Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us on Twitter!

:(