Thread by @MMazarr

A fascinating and visually stimulating summary of several Taiwan scenarios. But it reinforces a lesson of every unclas/strategic-level game or TTX I have ever participated in: I don't see how the PRC makes unqualified aggression work
reuters.com/investigates/s… via @SpecialReports

Every time I've seen this played out (politically + strategically, not tactically), there comes a point where those who'd prefer to hedge (Japan, EU, etc) become enraged by Beijing's aggression and decide they have no choice but to respond more decisively--whatever that means

They do that in large measure not because of any generic commitment to norms or alliances (though those are real considerations). They do it because *their* interests become directly threatened, and their red lines get crossed

The case for a looming strategic tipping point ("China grabs an island in the strait, the US doesn't go to war, and the world turns on its axis toward Beijing!") seems to assume appeasement or bandwagoning vs balancing responses. It assumes nobody else has red lines

Example: China barges into the SCS w/a fleet, declares it will enforce the ADIZ, sinks a few Philippine vessels. Do we imagine the political response in Manila--under direct attack, w/100s dead, facing the prospect of permanent vassal state status--would be to fly a white flag?

I'd say China is now right up against these red lines. From this Reuters feature, for eg, if it grabs one or more small islands in the strait, the US + others are *very* likely to rush massive arms to Taiwan proper, + maybe forces. The next belligerent steps = big balancing

The economic, political and diplomatic forms of balancing are not insignificant. A China which has got back some islands (or even Taiwan) but forced others to isolate it economically, politically, culturally, and technologically = far *weaker* in 10-20 years, not stronger

The upshot: It's the PRC which faces the worst strategic dilemma in the region. What it wants (coercive control, territorial claims) threatens the autonomy + interests of others. The only way it can get these things is via coercion. Which prompts balancing and stronger responses

This suggests to me that as long as the US remains engaged, the risk of rising Chinese aggressiveness is *to some degree* self-correcting. Managing that process to our advantage = a useful way to think about our basic strategic challenge