Thread by @MMazarr

This may be true. But increasingly US policy toward Russia and Iran, *at least publicly* seems to be, "we refuse to take your interests seriously and claim the right to pursue our favored norms as we wish. But we demand that you play by the rules of the road we have laid down"

https://twitter.com/AmbDanFried/status/1466815853203230726

An unqualified, normative interpretation of the rules-based order worked from 1990 to maybe 2007-8. Now we need engaged, order-seeking statecraft: Not retrenchment, not abandoning the idea of a rule-based order, but being willing to qualify + condition norms on the edges

The idea that allowing any exceptions will produce a cascade of violations + collapse of the norm doesn't match historical experience. Plus, the US has claimed for itself many exceptions we seek to deny others, ranging from controlling foreign forces in Cuba to invading Iraq

Keeping our foot on the pedal of normative absolutism will create risks that do not reflect the interests of the American people. The alternative isn't retrenchment--it's simply picking our battles more selectively to preserve key norms w/o ignoring vital interests of rivals

This isn't about assigning blame. That's a distraction and residue of a theological mindset. The issue is deciding what our truly vital interests are, what a US president can ask the American people to fight for, and acting on that basis

It is strategically incomprehensible that the US might risk a perilous confrontation w/Russia over the principle that we have the right to maintain whatever military ties with Ukraine that we choose. Sustaining that principle is simply not a vital US interest

The problem now, given all the doubling-down underway, is how to pull back to a saner position w/o suffering a huge political blow. But that should now be our priority--to find a minimally acceptable off-ramp and then, in calmer moments, deliver Russia sensible assurances ...

... while taking many other steps to reaffirm US commitment to NATO, combat disinformation, build our resilience, and otherwise project strength and Western unity. The idea that the only way to do that is never to give an inch on anything = dangerous and historically invalid

And then we need to use this experience as a spur to decide what ground we really aim to defend in a (partly) rules-based order. There can be plenty of it, but it can't cover everything. Making those choices = the urgent priority for US foreign policy