Feel its important to dispel a few myths about the military aspects of the situation. First, that a real military buildup would have the element of surprise and this is so visible that it can't possibly reflect worst intentions. That's just not correct. 1/
Russia can deploy a large force, with prepositioned equipment, for months. Then add logistics and conduct an operation on short notice. The posture retains the element of surprise. Ukraine cannot know the timing of the operation and can't afford to mobilize too early either. 2/
Current unit positions do not necessarily reflect final unit positions. They are being moved about. Russia can move these units back and forth for months. And yes this does appear to be a much more covert deployment, contrary to what some political analysts think. 3/
The notion that if Russia wanted to concentrate forces for an attack we wouldn't know about it is inane. There's no magical way to gather 50+ BTGs without it being highly visible in 2021. That doesn't mean you cannot retain key elements of surprise and mask intentions. 4/
As several news stories have revealed, disposition and relative size of the force may be known, but key indications and warnings may not be observed. These could reveal the timing and potential scope of operations, but they would arrive on short notice. 5/
Coercive diplomacy is analytically the 'safer bet.' But folks should be careful in interpreting that based on notions about current military activity. On the contrary, if you wanted to deploy a large force, retain the element of surprise, and make intent difficult to discern...
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Brief thoughts on Russian military activity and deployments. The deployment does constitute a buildup, and not just north, or east of Ukraine. Elements of 41st CAA, 1st GTA, & 58th CAA reinforcing permanently based units of the 20th and 8th CAA & 22nd Army Corps in Crimea. 1/
The military activity is out of cycle. These are not routine drills, certification checks, and one would struggle to come up with innocuous explanations for what is being observed. It is not just about 41st CAA units moving up to Yelnya, or 1st GTA movements. 2/
This activity is not particularly public, or paired with coercive statements, compared to what took place in February-April earlier this year. It does appear that the Russian military has been ordered to position itself for a possible operation in the coming months. 3/
Commercial sat imagery suggests that units parked at Pogonovo began leaving over a week ago. A new concentration has appeared near Yelnya in recent days. The 144th is an unfilled, understrength division. It appears that elements of the 41st have shifted position to Yelnya. 1/
Elements of the 41st CAA were parked in Pogonovo after March-April, supposedly to participate in Zapad-2021 exercises. They never left after the exercise which concluded mid-September. Then began loading and moving out over the past week. janes.com/defence-news/n…
Here The Lookout's post is quite helpful, discussing the appearance of a new concentration of forces in Yelnya that emerged in recent days, and unlikely to belong to the 144th MRD.
Fascinating podcast on tripwire forces & deterrence, but in listening to this, and reading the article I have questions. If just having sufficient forces to blunt was a solution, then we wouldn’t have weaker states attacking stronger ones. How much does the mil balance matter? 1/
The authors seem to stray a bit into the best deterrence is defense. That’s not true, defense is not deterrence. However, the belief that having deployed forces to blunt an attack & thereby achieve deterrence by denial is the prevailing conventional wisdom in DC. 2/
The problem is that military establishments come to different impressions of the military balance, expectations for how a war might go, and political leaders are not impressed by capability/operational concepts anyway. Having more stuff is only part of the equation. 3/
Some thoughts on Shoigu's recent announcement declaring an end to this buildup of Russian forces near Ukraine's borders. Well, most of them. The statement is a positive evolution of this situation, but I would not count the matter resolved. Thread 1/ tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/1…
Shoigu suggested that the deployed elements of 41st army are actually staying in Pogonovo outside Voronezh until Zapad-2021. This means through September. 56th VDV BDE is not on his list, so we can assume they will stay in Crimea and convert into a regiment there as planned 2/
We still have to see this withdrawal happen over the coming weeks, even as there are indicators that some units are on the move from Eastern Military District in Russia to this region, i.e. the final force posture that they intend to maintain after April is unclear. 3/
Updated thoughts on the situation around Ukraine. Russian troop deployments continue. The situation looks set to endure through April into May. Russian rationales (plural) offered remain unconvincing. I would look closely at mil posture and statements over next two weeks. 1/
Russian forces are deploying in staging areas, not moving to forward assembly points, or dispersing. This may change. The distance between Voronezh and Ukraine for example offers some time for indications and warnings, and modest opportunity to detect change in posture. 2/
There are indeed field hospitals, signals units, electronic warfare, air defense, MTO combat service support units involved. Mostly seeing elements of 4 armies, 3-4 VDV units, and supporting assets that belong to higher echelon commands in MDs. 3/
Updated thoughts on the situation around Ukraine. I was mostly inclined towards Russia making a demonstrative show of force to intimidate. This week the ongoing buildup in progress & certain aspects lead me to worry more about ultimate intent. Brief thread 1/
Russian forces continue to gather in Crimea and elsewhere near Ukraine’s borders, but fairly slowly. My sense looking at this situation is that nothing is necessarily going to happen right now, but if they have offensive operations in mind, they are more likely mid-late April. 2/
This buildup looks quite different from 2014, but that’s irrelevant. The Russian military is in a different place in terms of capability, force posture, readiness, etc. The political context is different as well. So, we should not fight the last war in analysis. 3/