In 2010, "Russia" attended the NATO summit in Lisbon and called the friendly meeting "historic in terms of its spirit and atmosphere.." 1/ THREAD
At the NATO summit in 2010, "Russia" presented a grand proposal for missile defense cooperation, not exactly something you normally do with enemies. 2/
In 2011, "Russia" abstained on UN Security Resolutions 1970 & 1973, authorizing the use of force against Libya by NATO countries. Russia could have vetoed these resolutions and stopped NATO countries, but did not. It was a major cooperative moment between Russia-US-NATO. 3/
These "cases" of intense cooperation between Russia-US-NATO occurred after NATO expansion. (You cant explain cases of cooperation and confrontation cited the same independent variable) 4/
In 2014, Russia reverted back to talking about NATO expansion as a threat. For 5 years, 2009-2014, NATO expansion was almost never discussed between US and Russian leaders. (NB, I worked for Obama between 2009-2014 & attended almost all of these mtgs) 5/
So what changed between 2010 and 2014? Did NATO become stronger? No. Did NATO try to bring Ukraine in? No. Was the US more threatening to Russia? No. Rather, things changed inside Russia and Ukraine. In other words, you have to bring domestic politics into the story. 6/
In 2011, Putin announced he was seeking a 3rd term. In 2011, massive demonstrations erupted inside Russia (and Arab world). In 2013, new massive demonstrations erupted in Ukraine. In 2014, Yanukovich fled Ukraine. In 2014, Putin annexed Crimea & supported separatists. 7/
These domestic-level variables inside Russia & Ukraine -- not changes in BOP, not NATO policy, not US policy (Obama was president the whole time) drove changes in Russia's threat perception about NATO constructed by Putin. Power matters in IR. Domestic politics matter too. 8/ END
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"Biden should state publicly his desire to reinvigorate diplomacy to end the war in eastern Ukraine..." 1 THREAD
, including naming a senior envoy to represent the United States in these negotiations and insisting that the United States formally join Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France to reinvigorate the now moribund Normandy talks tasked with ending the war in eastern Ukraine. 2/
Such an announcement would dispel the absurd Russian claim that Washington and Kyiv are scheming to restore Ukrainian sovereignty over Donbas by military force ... 3/
"Biden should state publicly his desire to reinvigorate diplomacy to end the war in eastern Ukraine... 1/ THREAD.
"including naming a senior envoy to represent the United States in these negotiations and insisting that the United States formally join Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France to reinvigorate the now moribund Normandy talks tasked with ending the war in eastern Ukraine." 2/
"Such an announcement would dispel the absurd Russian claim that Washington and Kyiv are scheming to restore Ukrainian sovereignty over Donbas by military force..." 3/
In my 5 years in the US government (2009-2014), NATO expansion to Ukraine was a non-issue in U.S.-Russia relations & U.S.-Ukraine relations. 1/ THREAD
In 2010, Medvedev even attended the NATO summit in Lisbon. He said, "The meeting… was historic in terms of its spirit and atmosphere." (I was there; he was thrilled to be at the meeting.) 2/
While attending Obama, Biden, Clinton, Lavrov, Donilon, etc. meetings with Putin/Medvedev/Lavrov, and listening in on nearly every phone call between Obama and Russians for 5 years, I cannot recall a serious contentious exchange about NATO expansion. 3/
The job of an intelligence officer is to make probabilistic assessments about the intentions of foreign actors. The job of a US foreign policymaker or diplomat is to try to shape those intentions in ways that serve US interests. 1/THREAD.
If the IC assesses that the probability of Putin invading Ukraine is 10%, then the job of Biden, Blinken, Sullivan et al is to reduce that percentage to 5% or 1%. 2/
Those spending so much time arguing about probabilities should spend more time discussing creative ways to influence these probabilities, no matter if you think it's 70% or 10% probability of invasion. 3/
After 30 years of either liberal internationalism or all-out war, American strategists have forgotten the tools of "coercive diplomacy" for dealing with great power adversaries. Everyone should go back and read Alex George. Some recommendations: 1/ THREAD.
The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam (with David K. Hall & William Simmons). Boston: Little Brown, 1971. (Expanded Second Edition, 1994, with William E. Simmon.) 2/
Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (with Richard Smoke). New York: Columbia University Press, 1974. 3/
Even at the peak of Reagan's constructive engagement with apartheid South Africa, U.S. officials criticized the regime. (though not nearly enough as I wanted at that time!) THREAD 1/
Reagan's Asst Secy for Africa Chester Crocker said that the US wanted to see "the emergence in South Africa of a society with which the United States can pursue its varied interests in a full and friendly relationship, without constraint, embarrassment or political damage." 2/
"The nature of the South African political system prevents us from having such a relationship now. That goal will remain elusive in the absence of purposeful, evolutionary change toward a nonracial system." 3/