Obviously we'll see soon enough, but are we 100.0% convinced Manchin just killed BBB? His statement led with "cannot vote to continue," which sounds like whether to start debate on the current bill (which he was against).
Now, he used some really strong "can't get there" language--so maybe it's the whole thing, not just the House blueprint. But you can also construe his comments to still allow for, say, 1.7bn over 10 years with fully funded programs, as he's implied before. Worth clarifying
After all, he later leveled his long-standing critique of the House bill: it didn't fully fund programs, but instead partially funded a bunch of things.
Perhaps it still leaves the door open for fully funded/prioritized bill, as he's argued over and over
To this point, I think he's been fairly consistent about the basics of what he wants, and we've been going through a very slow process of progressives learning, bit by bit, they can't move him far off of it
Still not quite definitive, but the justification here seems closer to a clear no (as most of the arguments are about spending in general, not about the structure of the bill or something)
Anyway, time will tell. He's done this bit before and it ended in a spot Democrats were fine with (kill HR1, but then write a bill on his own terms), so we'll just have to wait and see. Usually he puts out the 'optimistic' signal/path forward fairly quickly
or perhaps the path forward has already been put out
From a political standpoint, it seems increasingly likely that the main consequence of omicron will be to accelerate the end of the coronavirus crisis/state of emergency
Yes, the short-term effect is a wave of cases, which may or may not increase in hospitalization/deaths (depending on how the lower severity x higher transmissibility equation sorts out).
But even assuming there is a wave of hospitalizations/death, this will be a changed pandemic.
There won't be a fantasy of crushing a highly transmissible variant with the ability to evade vaccines. And at the same time, the risks may seem more acceptable, due to diminished severity, growing immunity and improved treatment options
A really staggering share of the replies (*on twitter*, though conspicuously not on any other channel) essentially just assert that the media is singularly responsible for Biden's low approval rating
As best I can tell, this is founded on two basic arguments: 1) Many economic indicators (growth, unemployment) are good, inflation isn't especially bad, therefore perceptions of a bad economy must be driven by poor reporting and an unfair narrative
2) Biden's policies are popular, voters do/should judge policies based on policy, and therefore Biden's inability to claim credit for his popular policies reflects a media failure to give sufficient attention to the substance of his agenda
A few thoughts on the disconnect between Biden's popular policies and his personal unpopularity nytimes.com/2021/11/27/us/…
TLDR... I think it is worth fully internalizing the century-long pattern of voters a) rewarding parties for presiding over peace/prosperity; b) punishing presidents for enacting ambitious agenda.
The obvious implication: a popular, ambitious policy agenda doesn't do you much good if there isn't normalcy/peace/prosperity, especially if that agenda is not seen as attempting to respond to immediate challenges at hand
I'm late to this @jbouie piece, but I do think it's worth coming back to a week later to reiterate how odd it is that HR1/FPA, for all their gangly ambition, don't include a republican government-based attack on state legislative gerrymandering nytimes.com/2021/11/12/opi…
A guarantee-clause based attack might be very different than what you usually hear about on this website.
It would narrowly establish that republican gvt = majority rule = can't draw maps that would thwart majority rule
Only one metric would logically follow from a republican government clause attack: the mean-median gap.
A lot of the usual anti-gerrymandering would be irrelevant in this framework, like commissions, efficiency gap, compactness, communities of interest, proportionality, etc.
We did a poll of Wisconsin just after the unrest in Kenosha. Biden led by 5, 48-43
It had some pretty interesting findings on the issue was playing out in the race, with a mixed bag for both sides int.nyt.com/data/documentt…
BLM fav/unfav: 53-42
Who handles protests best? Biden+8
Who handles race relations best? Biden+19
Who handles crime best? Even
Who handles law and order best? Even
What's more important: covid or law and order? COVID +1
On defund, voters opposed it by a huge margin (19% said defund, 40% maintain, 36% increase)
And voters thought Biden supported defund, 45-38 (including 22% of Dems and 38% of nonwhite voters)
They also thought Biden hasn't done enough to condemn rioting, 31% enough 56% not enough
It will be a while until we have authoritative data on turnout in Virginia, but at the moment I think it's fair to say two things, judged against 2020:
--Black/non-white turnout was weak for Democrats
--Otherwise, Democratic turnout was probably fine
For clarity, I've assigned the turnout among early voters to each precinct using voter file data, allowing for a direct comparison to 2020 turnout using vote history data
In overwhelmingly Black precincts, turnout was just over half of 2020 levels. It was at about 75% of 2020 levels in areas with no Black voters.